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ABSTRACT

This thesis will determine the influence of Turkey’s domestic resources on
Turkey’s foreign relations with the five Turkic states in the Caspian Sea Region. The
spheres analyzed in this study are the common ties, which are history, culture, religion
and language, with the regional countries, pan-Turkism, Turkey’s initial interactions as
well as ongoing constructive policies in the region. Findings showed that both Turkey
and the five Turkic republics were enthusiastic to carry their relations in every field to
future cooperation following the break up of the Soviet Union. However the Turkic
Republics’ interest in Turkish development model gradually declined starting from the
1994s.The hypothesis that socio-cultural ties will ease establishing close foreign relations
is applicable to all five republics. The Turkic states welcomed Turkey’s educational and
cultural policies with great willingness. In the field of business we find that Turkish
economy follows a similar pattern in its relations with the Azerbaijani and Central Asian
markets. Accordant policy goals of Turkey and the five republics led Turkey to establish
close foreign relations with the regional countries. Turkey tried to give military aid to the
Turkic republics of Central Asia in their struggle against terrorist groups which have the
capacity to destabilize governments and to threaten international security. The hypothesis
that the more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea Region the more Turkey
will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries is mostly apparent in the case of
Azerbaijan. In the area of energy politics Turkey has its strongest link with Azerbaijan.
Besides being strong economic partners Turkey is Azerbaijan’s biggest supporter in the
region against Armenia.
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Defining Concepts and Theory

I built my theory around the idea that Turkey’s domestic sources of foreign policy
affect Turkey’s foreign relations with the Turkic countries in the Caspian Sea Region. My
independent variable is domestic sources of Turkey’s foreign relations with the Turkic
countries, which are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from Central
Asia and Azerbaijan from the Caucasus and my dependent variable is Turkey’s foreign
relations with these countries. Domestic sources are divided into three categories, which
are Turkey’s historical, cultural and political relations with the Turkic states and Turkey’s
economic interests in the region. My question for this thesis paper is to see how Turkey’s
domestic sources of foreign relations affect Turkey’s foreign relations with the regional
countries.

Apparently the traditional separation of domestic politics and foreign politics may
have sensible advantages but today, especially with increasing global communication and
transportation networks, the study of political science does not isolate domestic politics
from foreign politics. In other words, it is hard to draw a strict line between domestic and
foreign politics in current international system which offers intense interactions between
states. London (1956) gives a great example to explain this relation. He argues that
“foreign and domestic politics resemble the positive and negative components of electric
current; eliminate one and the other will not function, they produce power only when

combined.”1 In accordance with the theory of this thesis paper London argues that “in
any political system domestic issues have an important bearing on the management and
substance of foreign policy.”2 This study is directly based on London’s approach and
seeks to find the influence of domestic sources of Turkish policy on Turkey’s foreign
relations with the regional countries and the strength of this influence.

The theoretical framework of this study is strengthened by Rosenau’s linkage
politics. Currently political life has changed with almost the virtual interaction of national
and international politics. According to Rosenau’s linkage politics, “recurrent sequences
of behavior that originate in one system are reacted to in another.”3 Although Rosenau
“acknowledges the importance of policy boundaries” he adds to it that “both national and
international boundaries are becoming central to daily lives.”4 The initial stage of a
linkage is called input and the latter stage is called output. In this thesis paper, the inputs
are Turkey’s historical and cultural ties and political relations with Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Turkey’s business interests in
the Caspian Sea Region and the output is the interaction between Turkey and these states.
We may call this output as foreign relations as well. In view of Rosenau’s linkage
politics, I suggest that patterns of Turkish character within the region will stir up
boundary crossing responses and eventually will turn out to be Turkey’s constructive
foreign policy in the region.

Linkages are commonly used concepts. One set of linkage that will be applied in
this thesis paper is ideology. This linkage offers that “policy formation-implementation is
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ideological”.5 In this thesis paper the ideology, which was supposed to hold the Turkic
states together, is pan-Turkism and the general boundary of this ideology is mainly
Turkey and also the Central Asian countries. Turkey’s further sets of functionaries which
influence the domestic policies of the regional countries and which are utilized in this
study are Turkey’s diplomatic services, secular and political doctrines, exchange of goods
and students.

Today’s international system as Rosenau argues “is linking polities ever more
firmly”6 than before. For example; different countries from the far East to the far West
are involved in the post-Soviet region with their policies. Furthermore, these policies in
pursuit of different goals, somehow, are interlinked. As this study is going to show the
post-Soviet international system brings different policy options towards the Caspian
region for different countries.

For Turkey, the break up of the Soviet Union means exercising political influence
by offering Turkish political and economic system as a development model. For the
Western countries, particularly the US, being a major actor in this newly emerging region
is crucial to prevent the spread of Iranian fundamentalism. Turkey, in this context, as an
ally of the US, could avoid the US’s such concerns by acting as a stabilizing factor in the
region. From a Russian perspective, it is important for Russia not to lose Russian
dominance in its “backyard” and to have control over the pipeline routes. China, on the
other hand, wishes to realize its economic calculations on the pipeline routes to transport
oil and gas to the country.

3

Source: Energy Information Administration

Figure 1:Caspian Sea Region

Hypothesis: Given the enthusiasm and mutual expectations of Turkey and the
Turkic countries in terms of establishing close and cooperative political and economical
relations with the break up of the Soviet Union I hypothesize that;
_ The stronger the socio-cultural ties are between Turkey and the Turkic states the
closer the foreign relations between Turkey and the Turkic countries are.
_The more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea Region the more
Turkey will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries.
_The more Turkey has common policy goals with the Turkic states the more
4

Turkey has closer foreign relations with Turkic countries.

Methodology: This is a qualitative study and the spheres analyzed in this study
are the common ties, which are history, culture, religion and language, pan-Turkism,
which is the ideology of the union of all the Turks, Kemalist ideology, Turkey’s energy
politics and trade relations with the region, Turkey’s initial interactions with the region
and Turkey’s ongoing constructive policies in the region. In addition to explaining the
areas that are mentioned above I will talk about the contextual factors influencing these
areas. I will try to analyze domestic contexts of the countries, particularly Turkey’s
domestic context in terms of social relations, political stance and economic needs.

Data collection: I will refer to news reports and Turkish economic institutions’
annual reports. I will try to access information from the documents of the websites of the
Turkish international organizations such as Turkish International Cooperation and
Development Agency (TICA) and I will make interviews with the officials from these
organizations. I will also use journal articles and the existing literature on the history and
culture of the Turks and the Newly Independent States (NIS) of Central Asia and the
Caucasus as secondary sources.

Limitations: The amount of knowledge on the Turkic countries is limited.
Especially there is lack of information on Turkey’s bilateral political relations after 1994.
Also the documentation and research of Turkey’s involvement in the region in terms of
Turkey’s cultural and educational contributions to the Turkic states is scarce.
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1.2 Literature Review

Historically the amount of studies on Central Asia, which is a peripheral region,
has been relatively little when compared to studies on Europe or the US. Despite this fact
there is still substantial literature on the geopolitical issues of the Muslim states of the
former Soviet Union and Turkey’s interactions with these states in terms of economic,
political and cultural relations in the post-Soviet international order. These works focus
on the official and work visits of Turkish businessmen and politicians immediately
following the independence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, Turkey’s contributions to the region in educational, cultural and economical
fields and Turkey’s involvement in the energy game. However the literature lacks
significant resources on Turkey’s bilateral relations with these countries. This thesis
paper is going to fill this gap by analyzing Turkey’s relations with the Turkic countries
on a bilateral basis.

With the break up of the Soviet Union Turkey’s presence was felt heavily in the
region. Turkey took its place in the “New Great Game”7 with its constructive policies
such as Turkish entrepreneurs’ attempts to establish schools, business and cultural
centers, to give scholarships to students, to supply educational materials or to appoint
teachers and imams, who lead prayers in mosques, to the places in need. Unfortunately
these contributions of Turkey have not been recorded in an organized and chronological
fashion. One of the few sources giving extensive information on Turkey’s contributions
in the region is TICA. Another limitation of doing research on the Caspian Sea Region is
that the information on the current relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics is
6

scarce. The literature mostly talks about Turkey’s interactions with the five Turkic states
at the initial stages of their independence. At this stage we can find numerous works
explaining Turkey’s and the newly independent countries’ enthusiasm to establish close
relations and cooperation. However it seems like this enthusiasm has declined starting
from the mid-1990s.

History and Culture: Findley’s book, The Turks in World History, traces Turkic
peoples’ history starting from early period’s steppes to today’s nation states. It makes a
great contribution to this thesis paper by projecting the cultural, economic, social and
political history of modern Turkish Republic and the five post-Soviet republics. This
work sheds light on the history of Turks for non-specialists considering it as a part of the
history of humanity. The author answers the question of “what the most distinctive largescale patternings in politics, culture, society or economy and how things differ for Turkic
peoples who somehow avoid incorporation into these patterns.”8

Hostler’s book, Turkism and the Soviets, gives us extensive knowledge on the
origins and characteristics of the Turkic peoples of the world. It is a strong source to learn
about the ethnic, cultural and religious ties between the Turks living in Turkey and the
Turks living in the former Soviet Union. It is a sufficient source to learn about a
significant manifestation of the Turkish issue, pan-Turkism, which concerns Anatolia and
the Turkic speaking areas of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic as well as
other Asiatic territories. The author discusses the emergence and development of panTurkism in the post-Soviet region.
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Politics: The two strong sources on Turkey’s relations with the Turkic Republics
are Turkey’s relations with the west and the Turkic Republics, and Turkey in Post-Soviet
Central Asia. Bal’s main concern is to argue whether Turkish development model, which
offers a secular, democratic and multi-party political system, and a liberal economy
integrated with global economy, is an appropriate model for these republics. He presents
how enthusiastic the Turkic leaders were to support this model in 1991 and how this
support began to decline by the end of 1992. This is the first study which gives detailed
information on the initial interactions between Turkey and the Turkic Republics.
Winrow’s Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia is a short study on the same topic. Winrow
informs us about Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic republics from the demise of
the Soviet Union until 1995.Winrow gives place to the First and Second Turkic Summits
and the results of these summits. Winrow, like Bal, contributes to the literature by
examining the achievements and shortcomings of Turkish policy towards Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan from the enthusiasm and optimism of 199192 to the realism of the mid-1990s.9

Menashri’s Central Asia Meets the Middle East examines the impact of the
emergence of the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union in Central
Asia and its influences for the Middle East. Robins goes through Turkey’s efforts to
introduce democratic politics and an open market economy to the newly independent
states. Hale in Turkey and Transcaucasia studies Turkey’s policy interests and
determinants in the region. Both of these works refer to pan-Turkism, which is the
ideology to unify all Turks, while discussing Turkey’s policies in the region.
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Jung and Piccoli study Turkish politics with a pan-idealistic approach as well. In
their book, Turkey at the Crossroads, they analyze Turkish politics in view of the
Ottoman-Turkish submerged legacy. They link the current political problems of Turkey
to this legacy. Moving from this perspective the authors see Turkish policies in Central
Asia and the Transcaucasus as the revival of pan-Turkism. In addition, there is a study on
Islamic modernism, pan-Turkism, Turkish nationalism and economic and cultural ties
between the Turkish Republic and the Turkic states.

In the last days of the Ottoman Empire Young Turks, who initiated the reform
movement of the Ottoman administration in the first quarter of the 20th century, and the
two principal exponents of pan-Turkism, Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Akcura, pursued purely
pan-Turkic oriented policies. Also, during the Second World War, pan-Turkist groups in
Turkey supported the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union with the hope to
defeat Soviet troops and free Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Caucasus from the
Soviet command. These were two different time periods when pan-Turkism was popular
in the Ottoman Empire however it may be not be accurate to justify Turkey’s policies in
the Caspian Sea Region by referring to pan-Turkism.

In my view, naming Turkey’s involvement in the region through its development
organizations, and Turkey’s efforts to get closer to the Turkic people as signs of panTurkism is misleading. Although there have been some marginal groups who advocate
that the ideology through which Turkey pursues its policies in the region should be panTurkism, dominant Turkish centrist leaders of the Turkish political life do not support
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such pan ideals. Centrist politicians are aware of the negative implications of such
policies. It is the apparent prediction of Turkish leadership that such “pan-Turkic oriented
foreign policy creates virtual state of war in Central Asia considering many ethnic Turks
living on the territory of Iran, China and Russia.”10 Moreover Turkic people, who have
lived under the Soviet command up to 1990s, do not want to see another “big brother”.

Aras’s The New Geopolitics of Eurasia, and Turkey’s Position, is an effort to
create a guideline for Turkish foreign policy in Eurasia. In his book, Aras analyzes the
new geopolitics of Eurasia focusing on the roles of the newly involved actors in this area
following the break up of the Soviet Union. The author discusses Turkey’s position in
this region to provide insights for the future of Turkish foreign policy towards the region.
The author claims that “for the first time in its republican history, Turkey seeks to
develop a sphere of influence with its pro-Western and secular orientation in the
region.”11Aras also studies Turkey’s energy politics, pipeline route selection in particular,
in the region. However the author’s argument that all parties involved in the energy game
can benefit through cooperation needs to be supported by tangible evidence.

Similarly Chufrin’s The Security of the Caspian Region, is a study focusing on the
geopolitical aspect of the region. This book takes an innovative approach to analyze
regional issues with a concentration on the geopolitical environment. It addresses specific
issues such as the national, political and security interests in the region during the postSoviet period. Authors from twelve different countries including Turkey and the Caspian
Sea Basin countries have contributed to this book. They introduce data on a wide range of

10

topics from the true energy resources of the Caspian Sea Region to military spending by
regional governments.

Karaosmanoglu’s contribution to this edited volume is about Turkey’s objectives
in the Caspian Sea region. This chapter tells about the geopolitics of pipelines, Turkey’s
cooperation with Russia and Turkey’s internal and external constraints. Like Aras,
Karaosmanoglu describes Turkey’s economic considerations in the area of oil and gas
reserves.

Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states cannot be understood excluding Russia.
In this respect this thesis utilizes some works on Russian involvement in the region with a
particular focus on Russian-Turkish relations. One of these works is D. B. Sezer’s article,
Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with
Economic Partnership which explores the Turkish Russian relations mostly in terms of
economics starting from the 1980s. These two countries have traditionally belonged to
two different continental systems however their relations have been shaped by a
combination of cooperation and competition over the past decade. Akturk’s article,
Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–2002) examines this cooperation
between Turkey and Russia in the post-Cold War restructuring. The author proceeds by
giving references to international relations theories. The author’s argument is that the
retreat of Russian threat allowed for the possibility of Turkish-Russian cooperation.12

Lastly Aydin’s Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus, is

11

a great source discussing Turkey’s position in the Caspian Sea basin. It introduces
Turkey’s challenges and opportunities which were born after the emergence of eight
independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus in a clear way. The author’s
prediction is that “although economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely
to stabilize for some years, it is without doubt that Turkish policymakers will continue
with their efforts to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the
regional capitals”.13

Educational Policies: Demir, Balci and Akkok make a great contribution to the
literature with their article, The role of Turkish schools in the educational system and
social transformation of Central Asian countries: the case of Turkmenistan and
Kyrgyzstan considering the scarcity of documentation on Turkey’s educational policies in
the region. They suggest that “all throughout history the educational process has been
perceived as a very influential agent of the socialization process with the power to shape,
reshape, refresh or build the social and psychological environment”14 Moving from this
theory they explore the role of Turkish schools in transforming society in Central Asia.
Considering the good reputation of these schools throughout the region one can conclude
that Turkish schools have made a positive contribution to the future of Turkic countries.

Another work on Turkey’s Educational Policies in the region is Yanik’s The
Politics of Educational Exchange: Turkish Education in Eurasia.15 This article assesses
Turkey’s educational exchange programs as a foreign policy tool. It examines Turkey’s
public and private educational ties with the Turkic populations of Eurasia. The author
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discusses the roles of Turkey’s educational activities in the Turkic peoples’ cultural
reorientation. This work gives the reader an idea of education’s importance which is a
tool of soft power in helping people identify themselves beyond giving descriptive and
statistical information.

Business: The majority of the Turkish business interests in the Caspian Sea
Basin lie in the energy field. Aras and Foster, in their article, Turkey and the Azerbaijani
Oil Controversies: Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline talk about the oil
controversies in the Caspian basin with a particular focus on Turkey’s involvement. This
article suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a great shift in Turkey’s
foreign policy. From a political perspective Turkey acted to spread the model of Turkish
government and society. From an economic perspective, Turkey has always wanted to
take the advantage of the mutual development opportunities that cooperation can create.

For Turkey, economic opportunities include “guaranteed access to vital energy
resources, lucrative oil transport revenues, as well as increased diplomatic clout and
strategic importance.”16 For the new republics these opportunities include the prospect of
attracting investment and technological expertise, as well as of establishing a secure route
for distribution of their products to the West. Particularly Azerbaijan, a Turkic-speaking
former Soviet possession that shares borders with Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Iran,
has attracted the greatest interest of Turkey among the newly independent states. The
authors argue that “the source of this interest is not only the linguistic, ethnic, religious
and cultural affinity shared by Turkey and Azerbaijan, but also the tremendous oil
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reserves possessed by the tiny Caucasian state.”17

There are some Turkish scholars who contribute to the literature by focusing on
particular pipeline projects which are in Turkey’s interest. In this context Bacik’s The
Blue Stream Project, Energy Co-operation and Conflicting Interests, analyzes the
discussions about the Blue Stream Project which envisages the transportation of Russian
natural gas to Turkey. The context of this article is Turkish politics and regional energyoriented relations. Bacik argues that “Turkey has contributed to the emergence of an
energy regime in Eurasia by connecting itself to the major energy markets through
complex energy projects”.18 Furthermore Oztun and Hepbasli’s article, Natural Gas
Implementation in Turkey. Part 2: Natural Gas Pipeline Projects is a comprehensive
source for Turkey’s natural gas demand and natural gas pipelines in which Turkey is
involved.

Although they are not many in number, some authors have studied business
relations between Turkey and the Turkic countries bilaterally. For example, Dikkaya and
Keles, examine Turkish investment in Kyrgyzstan, in their article, Foreign Direct
Investment in Kyrgyzstan. This article analyzes FDI characteristics in Kyrgyzstan in a
case study context and provides suggestions for FDI issues. This article basically touches
the issues of the importance of company and host country specific factors in FDI
decisions, the drawbacks of operating in the country and the effects of company
performances on FDI.
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It has been only sixteen years since the countries of this region of the world
gained independence. However the number of studies on the Caspian Sea Region is
expected to increase in the coming years. Although the existing literature is limited it has
been quite helpful and intriguing for this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: TURKEY’S HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL TIES WITH THE
TURKIC COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to shed light on common ties, which increase the credibility of
Turkey in the eyes of the five former Soviet states, between the Turkish peoples living in
Turkey and the Turkic people living in the Caspian Sea Basin in terms of language,
ethnicity and religion. I will start with explaining the historical identity of Turks to see
how far modern Turkey’s ethnic tie with the region goes back. Then I will explain
Turkish nationalism created by Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, and panTurkism. I will try to explore Ataturk’s approach towards pan-ideals and also panTurkism with relevance to the Caspian Sea Region. It is significant to understand these
two points in order to interpret today’s Turkish policies. Next I will explain linguistic
similarities of Turkic countries considering that language is an important tool that eases
any kind of relationship whether it is political, economic or cultural. Finally another
unifying factor, Islam as the major religious faith in Turkey and in the region, will be
explained.

2.2 Turkic People of the World and Pan-Turkism

2.2.1 Turkic People of the World
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Turks are defined by their language, Turkish, and by certain shared elements of
culture, history and religion. They maintained their identity while moving across Eurasia.
As Findley explains “when we track the Turks back in history we find not one route
ending in the West but radiating routes beginning in Eastern Asia, interconnecting along
the way, and ending at points all across Eurasia or, even since the 1960s around the
world.”19

The oldest known Turkish inscriptions are the Orkhon runes in the valley of the
Yenisei River in Siberia and in the valley of the Orkhon River in Mongolia in 1889.20
They include the oldest known material in Turkic language. In these inscriptions are
mentioned the Uyghur Turkish people and the Kirghiz people. The name Oguz, which
refers to a Turkic tribe, is used for the first time on these stone slabs.

The present Turkish territory is enclosed by the boundaries of the Turkish
Republic. The history of the contemporary Turkish republic is based on three roots which
are composed of the Anatolian heritage, the Islamic heritage which was born in the
seventh century in Arabia, and the Turkic heritage which goes back to the earliest Turks
in inner Asia. Turks are a part of the combination of Turkic-Islamic-European
civilization; they are Muslim by religion and they speak Turkic dialects.

Central Asian Turks, who have been moving to Turkey for centuries, and
Eurasian Turks compose a large segment of the Turks in Turkey. There are some Central
Asian tribes still living in Turkey. For example; the Yuruks, which form the largest
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Turkic group in Turkey, live in small groups from the region around Izmir. Yuruk is the
Turkish word for nomad and yuruks have preserved many of their Central Asian habits.
Turkmen tribes form another Turkish group in Anatolia. They have come togather around
the Salt Lake ( Tuz Golu ). The Kizilbas Turks live in Ankara and Tokat. They have
historical affiliations with trans-Caucasia. However the Kemalist regime with its
principle of nationalism has blended them with the rest of the Turkish population through
the teachings of the modern school system.

Turks living outside the Turkish territory are gathered in Azerbaijan, Afghanistan,
Western Turkestan ( Kazakistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan ),
Eastern Turkestan ( including Turkic peoples of China ), Southwest Asia ( Iran, Iraq,
Syria ), Russia, Europe and South Europe (Ex-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania),
and Cyprus.

2.2.2 Kemalist Ideology: Nationalism in the Turkish Republic

Before I analyze the effects of pan-Turkist ideology on the Caspian Sea Region
countries I will give some brief information on Turkish nationalism and Ataturk’s
nationalist ideas which form the base of contemporary Turkish policies.

Turkish nationalism is an old phenomenon. The 1908 Young Turks’ Revolution
activated the nationalistic awareness of the political leaders in the Ottoman Empire.
World War I and the break down of the empire accelerated the wave of nationalist
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inspirations.

The ideas of Ataturk, who is the founder of the Turkish Republic, are gathered
under the ideology of Kemalism, the central pillar of which is nationalism. The year 1923
marks the beginning of a new era in the history of the Turkish Republic. On July 24,
1923 the Lausanne Treaty was signed and Turkey was admitted to the new international
community of free nations. In October Turkey was proclaimed as a republic and Kemal
Ataturk was elected as the first president. Kemalist philosophy is based on six principles.
In 1937 these principles were later formally incorporated into the constitution as
republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism. Among
these principles nationalism is the primary principle and all other principles are derived
from it.

From these principles we find that Ataturk has always been the advocate of
nationalist policies rather than pan ideals like Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. In
Ataturk’s Eskisehir talk we find his approach toward pan ideals. Ataturk said:

Neither Islamic Union nor Turanism can form a doctrine, a
logical policy for us. In order that our nation should be able
to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life it is necessary
that the state should pursue an exclusively national policy
and that this policy should be in perfect agreement with our
internal organization and be based on it.21

The nationalist aspect of Kemalist ideology mostly found its expression in the
Turkification of the language. The foreign elements of the Ottoman language were

19

replaced with the genuine Turkish words. Ataturk stated that, “The Turkish nation which
knew how to defend its country and its noble independence must also liberate its
language from the yoke of foreign languages.”22 The Turkish Linguistic Society, which
was founded in July 1932, published Ottoman-Turkish and Turkish-Ottoman pocket
glossary and encouraged people not to use Arabic or Persian words.

Ataturk developed the Sun Language Theory (Gunes Dil Teorisi) concerning the
Turkic linguistics. He gave great importance to the issue of history as well as language.
According to Ataturk’s another thesis relating to the origin of the Turks, the Turkish
History Thesis, Turks formed the cradle of human civilizations in Central Asia and in the
view of this thesis Turkish was acknowledged as the mother of all languages. The
purpose of the Turkish History Thesis was to examine the roots of the Turkish nations
and development of Turkish history within the framework of world history. Prior to
Ataturk, the role of Turkish people’s literature and culture belonging to the pre-Ottoman
and especially the pre-Islamic ages were particularly neglected. The history of Turkish
nations was thought to be a part of the history of Islam or Ottomans. Moreover both the
Seljuk historians and the Ottoman historians did not leave enlightening works on the
cultural heritage of the ancient Turks of the pre-Islamic ages. Unlike past historians,
Ataturk suggested to study the early movements of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia to
firmly establish Turkish culture and history. By doing so; Turks would take their
appropriate place in the world history.

According to Ataturk’s thesis, in the light of archeological, anthropological and
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ethnological knowledge, all civilizations of the history of mankind originate from Central
Asia. Plentiful pre-historic artifacts and craft skills in the Central Asian sub-strata
indicate rich cultures dating back to the ages before the Christian era.23 This theory
suggests that a pre-historic civilization, which was developed in Central Asia, lived on
through the stone, bronze and iron ages. With the migration of people from Central Asia
to Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Egypt and Europe new civilizations were born and later they
were developed. The origin of the pre-historic peoples of Anatolia was also in Central
Asia. Here we see that Central Asia was a cradle of civilizations and left its mark on
many following civilizations. Central Asian influence was eventually seen in the cultures
of many other nations and peoples.

As Kocaturk explains Ataturk did not claim that “the races of mankind, history
and language come from one common origin” but he wanted to emphasize “how the
earliest civilizations of Central Asia took elements of their cultures to Anatolia, Europe
and other parts of the world as they migrated extensively”.24Currently patriotic feelings
are still pervasive and nationalism is still a dominant ideology in Turkey.

2.2.3 Pan-Turkism: The Union of all the Turks

As Khalid defines, “Pan-Turkism professes the goal of the political unity of those
who belong to the Turkic nation.”25 Pan-Turkist ideology aims to give Turks a common
soul and consciousness. The importance of this ideology in relation to the Caucasus and
Central Asia is that nationalist and separatist movements, which were on the rise
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especially after the Russian Revolution of 1917, were justified with this ideology. Upon
these nationalist demands the Russian empire was eventually transformed into a number
of republics with varying degrees of autonomy in the last decade of the 20th century. It
should be noted that Turkism, pan-Turkism, Islamism and pan-Islamism are closely
related concepts. As Hostler points out “there is a terminological chaos in Russian
sources reflecting the intermixture of nationalism with pan movements among the Turks
of the USSR.”26

The nationalist and reformist movements among the Eastern Turks were evaluated
within the scope of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in principle and most importantly
these ideas were spread to this region from Turkey. Historically Turkish policy has
moved toward Pan-Turkism in times of war in the twentieth century. This was the policy
of the Young Turks during the First World War and after the Russian Revolution of 1917.
Also, during the Second World War, pan-Turkist groups in Turkey supported the
Germans in their war against the Soviet Union with the hope to defeat Soviet troops and
free Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the Soviet command. Today,
nationalism still forms an important trait of Turkish policy.

2.2.4 Leading Ideologists of Pan-Turkism

2.2.4.1 Ismail Gaspirali

Gaspirali is an important figure in the history of the Turkic people in the Russian
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Empire. He undertook actions in the areas of education, language and social reform, and
politics. The whole organization of the Pan-Turkist movement in Russia was in the hands
of Gaspirali. He had profound influence on the nationalist awakening of Turkic people.
Accordingly, he is considered to be the real leader of the all-Turkish movement.

He went to a traditional Muslim school (medresse); he continued his education in
a Russian gymnasium and he ended up in Military Academy in 1865. In 1867, he left his
education in the academy to go to the Ottoman Empire and fight against the Greek rebels.
He spent the years between 1871 and 1875 in Paris and Istanbul. In 1882 he married
Zühre Hanim, daughter of a wealthy Tatar family from Kazan.27

During his lifetime, Gaspirali met several Russian intellectuals and prominent
figures of the Ottoman Empire. As Tuna suggests “his 1879 appeal to the Russian
authorities to publish a Tatar language journal shows that he had reached a certain level
of intellectual sophistication by this time and wanted to put his ideas into practice.”28

Gaspirali sought ways of conveying pan-Turkist ideas to people. After trying for
four years and making numerous trips to St. Petersburg, Gaspirali succeeded in getting
permission to publish a newspaper, Tercuman. His biggest idea was to introduce social
and religious reforms in the Turkic-Islamic world through congresses with wide
participation. He actively participated in all the Turkic congresses and during his life, he
organized two congresses with the same topic: The Union of Turco-Muslims of Russia.

23

He called for the unity and solidarity among all the Turkic people and he
expressed these ideas in Tercuman. His well-known motto was "Unity in language,
thought, and action."29 Gaspirali was also a supporter of women rights believing that
better education of women was a key to bringing the Islamic society into the mainstream
of modern life. Moving from this theory he initiated a new journal for women, Alem-i
Nisvan (World of Women).30 He was an advocate of equality in matters of marriage,
divorce, and inheritance.

He improved new teaching methods which gained popularity throughout Russia.
In 1912, Gaspirali traleved to India to demonstrate the effectiveness of his new method of
teaching. In February 1912 towards the end of his life, he attended a private meeting of
Turkic leaders from the Volga region, the Caucasus and Crimea in St. Petersburg to
discuss the viability of reviving the Union of Russian Muslims. In September 1914 he
died in Bahcesaray and his funeral was attended by more than 6,000 people who had
come from various parts of Russia and elsewhere to pay their last respects to the great
man.31

His experiences in Turkey and Western Europe inspired him to raise Turkic
people to the level of the west. He believed that this aim could only be achieved through
the extension of education to the masses. His starting point would be the linguistic and
spiritual unity of the Turks. He introduced curricular reforms encouraging children to use
their mother tongues. The idea of a common language was understood by Gaspirali as
“one shared by all Turks from Crimea to Heart, from Istanbul to Kashgar, and not only
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for the educated but as well for the simple people.”32He increasingly got interested in the
issues concerning Turkic people’s education. At the same time he tried not to anger his
Russian opponents. He concentrated his efforts in the cultural field and he avoided any
direct contact with current politics. He was hopeful about the future. He said; “I believe
that in the future the Russian Muslims shall be more civilized than any other muslim
nation. Give us the possibility to learn and the sciences should be admitted to the Tatar
schools, and in the Tatar language.”33

Gaspirali also supported the Djadid (Modernist) movement, which was initiated to
reinterpret religioun in Russia with a solid program. He guided the religious reform
aspect of the movement. He was enthusiastic to spread practical activism towards general
cultural progress and modernized education rather than abstract discourses. The Jadids
tried to introduce modernist ideas to the Turkic world through their works. They formed
new opportunities through their schools and theatres where people could socialize. Their
schools were places where the elites of the future would be trained. They put an emphasis
on the education of women and children.

When it comes to religion, Gaspirali considered Islam as part of the Turconational culture. Islam was an outstanding trait of the Turks and it was necessary to resist
Russification. Gaspirali frequently referred to the Kur’an since it both united the
modernists and the clergy.34
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2.2.4.2 Yusuf Akcura

Yusuf Akcura (1876-1933) is another eager supporter of pan-Turkism. He spent
many years in Turkey and he established strong political ties with Turkey. He was
regarded as a member of an all-Turkish society and served as a symbol of the unity of
Eastern and Western Turks.

As Hostler explains, Yusuf Akcura was born in Simbirsk, a district of Russia, and
he was educated in Istanbul and in Paris. He was a member of the Russian Duma
(Parliament) and he was a part of the All-Muslim Union ‘Ittifak’ Organization. He started
living in Istanbul after 1907. He took part in the works of Turk Dernegi ( Turkish
Association ) which aimed at the reformation of the Turkish-Arabic script.35 Akcura was
against European colonial policies and he wanted to be the voice of the nationalist
feelings of the Turks living in Soviet Empire and Turkey.

He dreamed of an Islamic-Turkish Empire. He became famous for his article
entitled ‘Three Political Systems’ in the Cairo paper in 1903. Principles of pan-Turkism
were explained in this article.

It can be regarded as similar to that of the Communist Manifesto of 1848 for the
Marxists. For this reason he is accepted as one of the founders of pan-Turkism. The first
principle seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various
nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second principle seeks to unify all Muslims living
under the governance of the Ottoman State and the third principle seeks a policy of
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Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity. Akcura was against the idea of pan-Islamism
because from his point of view, pan-Islamism was not reflecting the national feelings of
all Muslim nations.36 Islam does not make a distinction between people with regards to
their nations as opposed to nationalist ideologies.

2.2.5 World War I and Pan-Turkism

Pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism formed the driving forces of Turkish policy
during World War I. In other words, Turkey wished to unite with ethnically and
linguistically familiar peoples and with those of the same religion. In this direction the
Young Turks made their famous proclamation of November 23, 1914 with a Pan-Islamic
spirit. It was assumed that they used Islamic terminology in this proclamation to capture a
crowded audience. A part of the proclamation, which was signed by the Caliph, is as
below:

All Mohammedans living in the territories exposed to the
persecutions of the above named oppressive powers, such
as the Crimea, Kazan, Turkistan, Bukhara, Khiva, India,
China, Afghanistan, Persia, Africa and other countries,
must consider it, in concert with Ottomans, as their most
supreme religious duty to participate in the Holy War, with
their bodies and goods, keeping in mind the inspirations of
the Kuran.37

Turkic people of the former Soviet Union were on the side of the Ottoman Turkey
and its allies in the World War I. This was not a surprising result considering the
popularity of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in Russia.
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Enver Pasha was recorded as a symbol of the military aspect of Pan-Turkism in
the World War I. Enver Pasha was involved in the Caucasian offensive in 1914 as well as
in the Turkestanian struggle with the Soviets in 1921-1922. He is linked strongly with the
Turks in Russia and with pan-Turkism.

Enver Pasha was born in Istanbul on 22 November 1881. As Yilmaz states “his
family was originally from Monastir and their ancestry can be traced back to the
‘Gagavuz Turks.”38 Enver took part in the Tripolitan campaign of 1912. At the beginning
of the Balkan War he returned to Constantinople in 1913, where he was active in
overthrowing the cabinet of Kamil Pasha for capitulating to the Bulgarians.

During World War I Enver Pasha was responsible for the command of the Third
Caucasian Army on the Caucasian frontier. It was the assumption that such a victory
would increase, as Yilmaz identifies, “his power and fame, while opening the way for
more conquests in the east”.39

He arrived at Erzurum in December 1914 and the Caucasian battle began at the
end of that month. By January 1915 it was clear to both Ottomans and Russians that
Turkish offensive would fail. However, in spite of difficulties like cold, fatigue and
hunger the troops on both sides were still willing to fight and the battle continued another
fourteen days. It was impossible for Enver Pasha to be successful considering the
topographic and climatic obstacles during the winter months. Some scholars attribute
Enver Pasha’s failure to his own inexperience. For example; Rustow says that it was
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Enver Pasha’s “grandiose and amateurish conduct of the war”40 that caused the loss of
thousands of troops. The offensive resulted with astounding Turkish losses. There were
about 75,000 casualties, many of which were armed. On the Russian side there were
16,000 people killed and wounded, and 12,000 people sick.41 As Yilmaz suggests “his
rise was determined by military successes, and his fall would also be closely tied to the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire fighting on the side of the Germans during the First World
War.”42

New opportunities were born in the Turco-Muslim areas of Russia due to the
outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and new half-independent states appeared in
the region. As Hostler explains, although Enver Pasha was personally absent in the
Caucasus from 1917 to 1919 it was through his directives that the Azerbaijan-Turkish
military preparations got started. Enver Pasha decided to organize an army within the
Republic of Azerbaijan with the aid of the Army of Islam. A base was chosen at the
ancient Muslim town of Ganja and the Turkish Fifth Caucasian Division was moved
there. A few days later, Enver Pasha’s half brother Nuri Pasha arrived to take over
command of the Army of Islam. Enver Pasha planned to capture Baku in nearly a month
but the Turks received news that a German-Soviet agreement on Baku had already been
practically concluded. The Turks left their Fifth Caucasian Division in Baku and at the
same time the Thirty-sixth division moved northward along the railway toward Derbent.
The only victory that the Army of Islam could get was the occupation of Petrovsk.
Thirty-sixth Caucasian division continued its Pan-Turanian March along the shores of the
Caspian and in October occupied Petrovsk. Thus some external issues put an end to the

29

adventures of Pan-Turkists in the region.43

Bolsheviks and pan-Turkists had a common goal of fighting against imperialism
which was attributed to the West in general. Hostler explains that “Enver Pasha
unofficially planned the reestablishment of the kingdom of Timur and saw himself as the
ruler of the realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and
Afghanistan.”44 Enver Pasha kept the belief that the center of this empire would be
Turkey as part of his pan-Turkish movement. On the other hand the Bolsheviks, who saw
Enver Pasha and all Muslims as enemies of the imperialists, were supporting Enver
Pasha. Enver Pasha’s intention was also an alliance with the Bolsheviks in Bukhara in the
fight for Islamic ideals against imperialism. He worked to free Buhara emirate from the
Russians. He attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East called by the Third
International Soviets at Baku in September 1920 with these intentions. The Bolsheviks
supported the Holy War of Muslims against the imperialists. He intended to mobilize
Eastern Turkish resistance particularly the Basmachis against the Soviets and to set up an
independent state in Central Asia.45

Enver Pasha was killed in the Tajik Hills in action against the Soviets on 8 August
1922. In Turkey, periodicals such as Bozkurt ( Grey Wolf ) and Cinaralti ( Under the
Maple Tree ) while propagating the unity for all the Turkish peoples and liberation of the
Turks of the Soviet Union also described the exploits of Enver Pasha in Turkestan.

With his death on Turkestan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for the country
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and for the history of the Turks.46 It was acknowledged that “Enver Pasa spent his entire
life in a perpetual battle in both the political and the military fields in order to restore the
long-lost glory of an Empire which no longer existed.”47

2.2.6 World War II and After

The outbreak of the World War II (1939-1945) created new hopes for the Turkish
unification among the Turks in Turkey and Pan-Turkists in the Caspian Sea Basin as
well.

Particularly, the eruption of the German-Soviet War produced a great stimulation
among the Turks with the satisfaction of finding a powerful ally to fight against the
Soviets. The Turkish foreign officers advocating the German-Turkish cooperation were
actively engaged in the promotion of anti-Soviet schemes. Pan-Turkism was a helpful
tool of anti-Soviet propaganda in the Caspian Sea area and pan-Turkists were eager to
participate in the struggle against the Soviets. It can be noted that, along with these
events, pan-Turkism became even more popular. There was a rise in the number of panTurkist periodicals and youth organizations which were the cultural centers of Turkey.

Increased cooperation occurred between the Germans and the Turks on the issues
of intelligence gathering and military operations. Nearly all of the Turkish leaders in the
West and Turkey supplied the Germans with various documents and the Germans also
sought the opportunities for exchange of ideas.
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From the military perspective there were Turks from the USSR in the German
armed forces during World War II. These Turks were part of the pan-Turkist activity and
they fought against the Soviets. This was the most important aspect of World War II panTurkist activity. As Hostler explains, the Germans were aware of the Turkish potential to
make allies out of the Central Asian populations. The overwhelming majority of the
Turkish volunteers were recruited from among Soviet prisoners of war captured by the
Germans. As for the German objectives Turks fighting against the Soviets would be a
great contribution to German forces.48

On December 30, 1941 the high command of the Wehrmacht was directed to
establish a Turkestan legion consisting of members of the following nationalities:
Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Karakalpaks and Tajiks. Also a Caucasian
Mohammedan Legion was composed of Azerbaijanis, Dagestanis, Ingushes, Lezhins and
Chechens a Georgian Legion and an Armenian Legion.49

On the other hand the Turks were expecting some rewards in return for their help.
Turkish ruling circles were hoping that the Turks would be united by establishing
externally independent states. However it was in question whether the Eastern Turks,
who were at the center of these plans, were supporting Enver Pasha and other pan-Turkist
ideologists in Turkey. Some of these people believed that Turks who amalgamated in the
new Turkish republic were not entitled to be included under the term ‘true Turkish
nationality’. From their perspective they had lost their Turkish character long ago.
Despite the expectations of pan-Turkist circles Germany’s defeat against the USSR
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became the turning point of the expansion of Pan-Turkist feelings in Turkey.

2.2.7 Reactions on Pan-Turkism

At the time of the outbreak of the German-Turkish collaboration against the
Soviets during World War II., some private Turco-German diplomatic talks and the
unofficial negotiations of pan-Turkists in Berlin were found. Concurrently youth
organizations in Turkey were engaging in wide scale movements. As Hostler explains,
these noisy demonstrations were patronized by some activists from the older generation.
Common themes of these organizations were nationalistic passion for the ancient Turkish
symbols of the grey wolf or of leaders such as Atilla or Cengiz Khan.50

Zeki Velidi Togan was one of the sponsors of the pan-Turkist organizations that
emerged after the German-Soviet War. He was a scholar and a politician. As Paksoy
identifies, “he was a key figure in the uprising against control by the Bashmachi, a group
of disaffected intellectuals, Islamic patriots and others who opposed the new order.” 51
Zeki Velidi Togan established a secret society. The aim of this society was to create one
unified Turkish state as soon as the German victory was guaranteed. In the broadest sense
Zeki Velidi Togan and likeminded people viewed all of Central Asia as Turkestan.52They
also planned to aid in the organization of the liberation of the prisoners of war of Turkish
origin who were in German hands.

Another cluster of Pan-Turkists was led by the veteran politician, Dr. Riza Nur,
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poet, writer, journalist and army officer who died in 1942. He wrote a detailed book on
Turkish History published by the Ministry of Education in 1914-26.53 As Foss explains
this study gives the Turks dominance in world history by dividing them into the Turks of
the Motherland and the Turks of the Outer Homelands. According to Riza Nur, groups,
who do not belong to the Chinese, Egyptian, Indian, North African and American
civilizations, form the Turks of the Motherland, Central Asia.54

After the death of Riza Nur, Nihal Atsiz took the leading role of the pan-Turkist
intellectual movement. Atsiz was a secondary school teacher who was accused in 1944 of
spreading racist and Pan-Turanist ideals among his pupils. This circle published several
magazines among which was Tanridagi ( Holy Mountain ). According to Uzer, Nihal
Atsiz was an advocate of racism and Turkism. Like previous nationalists Atsiz was also
influenced by the expansionist and irredentist rhetoric of the political atmosphere of the
1930. The point that he differed from the earlier pan-Turkist thinkers was in the area of
religion. As Uzer explains “he was not openly denying religion but his anti-religious bias
was apparent in his articles.”55 Uzer notes that, for Atsiz “everything should be national:
language, literature, music and way of life.”56

In response to the above efforts to propagate pan-Turkism there were some
reactionary presentations against Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism at the 1954 Tashkent
Conference. As Hostler explains special interest was attracted by a paper written by
Babadjan Gafurov the first Secretary of the General Committee of the Communist Party
of the Tajik SSR. Gafurov claimed that “Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were the two
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ideologies that were under the special protection of International imperialism; America
was trying in every way to exploit these ideologies for its aggressive aims.”57 America
was pretending to protect Muslims and to fight for their independence movements.
However its actual aim was to organize military blocks in the Near and Middle East.
Gafurov’s lecture supported the conclusion that nationalism in Central Asia and in
Kazakhstan was primarily an expression of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and PanIranism.58

2.3 Language

Findley argues that “where different populations came into contact Turkic speech
has usually prevailed with the result that linguistic assimilation has been a crucial
element in the ethnogenesis of the Turkic peoples.”59Some scholars suggest that no factor
unites all Turks but language. In support of this claim, linguists insist that the unity of the
Turkic peoples is most apparent in language. There is resemblance among the Turkish
languages because they all belong to a larger Altaic family. Turkish languages that
divided into several courses in their historical evolution are as follows. According to
Deny, the French Turkologist, the Turkish dialects are divided into eight groupings:

North Eastern: This dialect is spoken by Mongolians, Yakuts, Tuva,Karagais and
other small Turkish speaking tribes

Hakas ( Khakass ): This dialect is spoken by the small tribes of the Abakan and
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Minusinsk area.

Altaic: This dialect is spoken in the region of the Altaic Mountains.

Eastern Siberian: This dialect is spoken by the tribes of the Chulim river region

Volga-Ural: This dialect is spoken by the Tatars of Kazan and Baskhirs.

Central Asian: This dialect is spoken in Chinese Turkestan, Kazakhstan,
Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan

South western: This dialect is spoken in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and the
Azerbaijanis in Persia, Northern Caucasus and Anatolia

Other: spoken in Crimean and Chuvash Nogais of the Dobruja and Kuban region

According to Deny; all of these Turkish languages are related with the Turkish
tongue except Yakut and Chuvash.60 It should also be noted that the skill of
communication has many variables other than being a linguistic matter. As Krader writes,
“communication by words depends to a great degree on a common language but many
other factors are involved.”61 Some of these factors are social, political and historical
factors. In Central Asia, for example, linguistic disunity is affected by political disunity.
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2.3.1 Dialectic Similarities between the Turkish Language and the Languages of
Central Asian Countries

2.3.1.1 Azeris

Azerbaijanis are the nearest Turkish kinsmen to the Anatolian Turks and their
language is closely related. Turkish language started to gain influence in Azerbaijan
during the period of Seljuk Empire.62 There are several Azerbaijani dialects but all Turks
of Azerbaijan understand each other without difficulty and can be understood by
Anatolian Turks. Azerbaijanis differ from the Turks in Turkey in their religious sect,
which is Shiite. However as Hostler explains, they are the nearest Turkish kinsmen to the
Anatolian Turks and their language is closely related.63

Turkish TV programs are watched in Azerbaijan with great interest. This transfer
helped to transfer some words in Anatolian Turkish to Azeri Turkish. For example;
grandchildren translate some words that are used in a Turkish TV series to their
grandparents while they are both watching the same program. As Karaman says, some of
the new words that Azeri newspapers have started to use are “saygi, bilim, kolay,
ekonomi, cadde, konu, mutlu”.64

2.3.1.2 Kazakhs

Ethnically Kazakhs are of Mongolian descendant but they have retained a
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primitive Turkish vocabulary. This pervasiveness of a pure Turkish speech throughout
the Kazakh steppe shows that the Turkish element is ascendant in Kazakhstan.65

In 1928, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the great Turkish reformer, instituted the Roman
alphabet as standard for Turkey. The Soviet colonial administration, which was affected
by this move, eliminated the use of the Roman alphabet in Kazakhstan. There, the
instruction of children was switched to the Cyrillic spelling and the use of thousands of
school books was halted. As a tool of writing Turkish the Cyrillic script was more fitting
than the Arabic.66 The Kazakh people did not resist to this change at the time. As Dave
explains, in authoritarian post-Soviet states citizens easily accept the official identity
categories in the absence of debates on important issues such as identity and language.
Dave says that “when claiming proficiency in the state language is both easy and risk-free
for the titular group, there are few incentives to fight a political battle over the language
issue and resist the language policy of the state.”67

2.3.1.3 Uzbeks

Turks form the largest group in Uzbekistan. Likewise Uzbeks are the largest
group of Turks in Central Asia with many small Turkish clans in neighboring republics.
The literary language of the Uzbeks is Chatagatai which was developed in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and in diverse parts of the Muslim Turkish world. The
Ottoman Turkish, which is the other prominent language developed in the same period
with the Chatagatai, was replaced by Turkish which is used currently. Today the
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language of the people in Uzbekistan is Uzbek while the old ruling class uses the written
language of Chatagatai. In general the Uzbek government pursues strongly nationalist
policies called "Uzbekization"; the intention is to distance Uzbekistan from Russia.68

Turkish and Uzbek proverbs show some similarities in terms of format and
content. This matters with regards to the unity of culture as well as language. Two of the
proverbs that both Turks and Kazakhs use are as follow:

Gapirganing kumus, gapirmagning altin. /Soz gumusse sukut altindir. / Speaking
is silver, silence is gold.

Bir gun tuz iggan yerga kirk kiin salam ber. /Bir fincan kahvenin kirk yil hatiri
var. / A cup of coffee has a 40-year memory.69

2.3.1.4 Turkmens

Turkmens form a link with the Western Turks since they do not differ essentially
from the Persian Azerbaijanis and the Anatolian Turks. Their language belongs to the
same group as Anatolian and Azerbaijan. Among the languages of Anatolia, Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan, the first two are more closely connected and the Azerbaijani can
understand Anatolian Turkish with more ease than Turkmen people.

Like other Turkic Republics Turkmenistan was given the right to choose its own
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alphabet. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a purely Turkmen literary language
developed and the unified Latin Turkish alphabet was eventually adopted in 1929-1930
considering the sounds that are not foreign to its own language.

2.3.1.5 Kirghizs

The Kirghiz language is a member of the Turkic subfamily of Altaic languages.
The Kirghiz have remained almost entirely unmixed and are on the whole the truest
ethnic representatives of the Turks. Their language belongs to the groups of Turkic
languages. After the alphabet was modified in 1924 and the unified Turkish Latin
alphabet was adopted in 1928 the literary language showed remarkable development. The
Latin alphabet was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet in 1940. There were attempts to return
to the Latin alphabet after the independence but this has never been implemented.

With the “Law on the Official Languages of Kyrgyzstan in 2001,” Russian was
accepted as the official language of Kyrgyzstan and can be used in public sphere along
with the national language, Kirghiz.70

2.4 Islam as a Shared Identity between Turkey and the Turkic World

There is not extensive information on Turkish religious life in the pre-Islamic
period. Turks’ religion was based on an ancient system of complex beliefs widespread in
Inner Asia. The conventional name for this belief system was Shamanism. Shamanism is
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a method to calm the body and mind and to get rid of stress in a mechanical way. It heals
not only the mind but also it is believed to heal the soul.71 In the period before Islam
shaman leaders were not only called for routine religious practice but also they were
called for medical needs. For example Krader notes that “a shaman is a curer who
practices his medicine in a state of trance or ecstacy” and he continues writing that “a
constant feature is the beating on a drum and singing songs which invoke Adam, Noah or
Daniel.”72

From the Middle Eastern point of view, the Turkish flux into the Islamic world
occured with the capture of Turkish nomads in border raids. Actually Islam was
introduced to the Turkish peoples of Anatolia with the Alparslan’s victory of the
Malazgirt battle. This happened long after the rise of Islam. The conquerors of Anatolia
were no longer the predominant Arab sources of the early Islamic conquests but rather
Turks. It is noteworthy that the roots of today’s modern Turks are found in Anatolia.
Turks were the descendants of the non-Muslim, non-Turkish peoples who inhabited the
region before the Battle of Malazgirt (1071). In a much quoted phrase, “we are both the
conquerors and the conquered.” Turks’ conversion to Islam had opened the gates of the
Middle East to Turks. Anatolia became the place then where the Turks mixed their inner
Asian nomadic heritage, their Islamic heritage and the ancient Mediterranean heritage of
agrarian civilization.73

From the victory of Malazgirt to the fourteenth century, most Turks converted to
Islam. This brought the first great civilizational divide in the history of Turks. The
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creation of a Turco-Islamic culture started with the Central Asian peoples’ entrance to
Islam. The Turkish adoption of Islam changed their identity. It has been suggested that
Muslim Turks sank their national identity in Islam as the Arabs and the Persians had
never done.74 As Cagatay explains Islam has become more than a faith for its believers. It
is also a particular set of belief systems and morals which command the practices of daily
life and socialization of the Muslims. Until the establishment of secular systems the
Turks in Anatolia and the Turks in Central Asia were gathered around “a joint faith, a
collective culture, a shared identity, and a common political goal.”75 In short Islam, one
of the great world religions, was the basis for most Turks’ identity. The significance of
this change becomes clear from the basic features of Islamic faith.

As the last monotheist religion Islam means “submission [to the one God],” and a
Muslim is “one who submits”. The Qur’an identifies Abraham as a Muslim and Muslims
see Islam as the religion of Abraham. Abraham has also submitted to God and he was a
monotheist. Actually, Adam is believed to generate an understanding of relations among
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism that proved profoundly important for later Islamic
societies.

The revelations that Prophet Muhammad (sav) received during his life were
compiled into the written text of Qur’an. The Qur’an includes many topics and characters
that are also found in the Bible and frequently mentions Jews and Christians. This is
because all of God’s prophets (nabi) and messengers (rasul) received the same
revelations.
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Although the Prophet Muhammed (sav) is regarded as the last prophet, Muslims
accept all the previous Prophets of God as they are acknowledged in the Qur’an. The
Prophet Muhammed (sav) was born in 570 C.E., and his prophetic mission continued
from 610 to his death in 632 C.E. The Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, includes all the
principles of Islam for the community of believers to follow.

Accepting Islam means announcing the oneness of God, tawhid. It means
accepting certain beliefs, summarized in this oft-quoted verse: “O you who believe, you
shall believe in GOD and His messenger, and the scripture He has revealed through His
messenger, and the scripture He has revealed before that. Anyone who refuses to believe
in GOD, and His angels, and His scriptures, and His messengers, and the Last Day, has
indeed strayed far astray.” (Qur’an 4.136)

When a person believes in Islam, he becomes a member of the Islamic
community, umma. There are certain rules that members practice. The most basic
principles are the “five pillars” of Islam: the profession of faith (shahada), prayer (salat
in Arabic, namaz in Persian or Turkish), almsgiving (zakat), fasting (sawm) during
Ramadan, and the pilgrimage (hajj). The obligatory prayer ritual occurs five times a day,
although of course one can also pray at other times; the pilgrimage is obligatory once in a
lifetime for every adult Muslim who is physically and financially capable of it. Fasting
time occupies a month in a year. During the fasting time people, rich and poor, go
without food and drink from dawn to dusk.
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The five pillars shaped Islamic societies in numerous ways. For example the
fivefold prayer helped Islamize the carpet making. Turkic carpets were used as prayer
rugs which are called seccade. Struggle ( jihad ) is a term meaning the struggle for inner
development. Another meaning of it is the struggle for the defense of Islam, the Holy
War. The latter was often referred to as Gaza. Originally it referred to the “raiding” that
bedouin tribes carried out among themselves. This Islamic word gave Turks a common
purpose, which transcended tribal difference.

By the time Turks began to convert to Islam the religion had already led to the
development of a civilization that went far beyond those basics. After the death of the
Prophet Muhammed (sav) there has been a political split notably between Sunni and Shii
Muslims, of whom the former ultimately became the majority. This split was mostly
because of the questions of how to choose a new leader for the community after the death
of the Prophet and how to understand that leader’s role. Sunni and Shii Muslims
represent the two sects in Islam. As Esposito explains, Muslims mention that “the
differences between Sunnis and Shiis do not have to do with dogma but rather are
political having to do with the qualifications for the head of the Muslim community.”76
Sunni Muslims, followers of the Sunnah (example of the Prophet), believed that “Prophet
Muhammad (s.a.v) had died without establishing a system for selecting a successor.”77
On the other hand, Shiis believed that selection of the head of the Muslim community
should be hereditary. Therefore they wanted Ali, Muhammad’s first cousin and closest
living male relative, to be the successor. Today, Sunnis constitute approximately 85
percent of Muslims and Shiis make up 15 percent.78
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In the period through the fifteenth century, both members of these two sects were
expanding. While the Turkish warriors were leaving their footprints through the military
and political expansion from Anatolia to India, Iranian ulema was spreading Persian and
Arabic literature with Sunni synthesis in the same region.

The examples of this Sunni synthesis include the establishment of medreses
(schools of higher Islamic learning) and the sufi tradition and teachings, which emerged
in the 12th century. This Sunni synthesis became the official religion of the Ottoman
Empire. (1300–1922). It also provided universal values and it became recognizable by
Muslims from different parts of the world.

Islam has a centuries-old history in Central Asia. Islam entered Central Asia in the
the mid-seventh century. It became the dominant religion of the region in the eighth
century. Tashkent and Buhara are the important cities of the Islamic world with their
“leading centers of learning and culture.”79 Islam has left a deep impact on the regional
people with its medreses and mosques of Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva, and other cities.
However as Gunn states “during 70 years of Soviet rule, the Islamic mosques and
medreses that had previously thrived in Central Asia were closed, destroyed, or converted
into museums or factories; Islamic literature was carefully controlled by the state, and
only a pale, state controlled "official" Islam was permitted to exist legally, though an
underground Islam continued.”80

In the pre-Islam era, Inner Asia provided the bedrock of Turks’ religiosity. Turks
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adopted religions that were present in their area at some point. By comparison Islam
covered all the periphery religions and served as a unifier for the Turks. In this sense
Islam is the next most decisive constituent of Turkic identity after language. Islam made
the Turks members of an international Islamic community and offered Turks universal
standards in law and ethics derived from Abrahamic tradition. Naturally, the Turks’
experience of Islam ranged across the wide spectrum that any great religious tradition
offers its adherents.81 Islam also allows people to adhere to different formats to practice.
For example there are Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey today or a wide region, from the
Balkans to China, hosts different traditions of Naksibendi or sufi order. Religiously
devoted Muslims today do not strike out against modernity but they engage the modern
world through the window of these different traditions. The whole Near East was
transformed by the Islamic conquests of the Arabs but the process of Islamization was
very slow and lasted until the twentieth century when some nomadic Turkish tribes of
Northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia were converted to Islam by Kazan Tatar
missionaries.

Currently, Islam is a strong part of the Turkish peoples’ culture in Central Asian
countries and Azerbaijan. However, the official Soviet atheism that lasted for 70 years
broke people’s ties with traditional Islamic teachings and practices. People are working to
reconstruct their Islamic identity within the five formerly Soviet Republics of Central
Asia. As Krader writes “the continuity of the Islamic tradition on the folk level is but a
part of the whole; the intellectual life no longer exists in the form which it formerly
had.”82Turkic people of the Soviet Union are trying to shape their own Islamic identity on
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the basis of their historical past.

There are also non-Muslim Turks. These people, historically, are Orthodox
Christians (the Gagauz of the Danubian delta, the Chuvash of the Volga region, and the
Yakuts and smaller groups in Siberia), Buddhists (the Tuvans of Siberia or the Yellow
Uyghurs of Gansu Province, China), and a few Jews (the Karaim of eastern Europe).83

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter reveals that Ataturk’s nationalist principle was far from pan-ideals.
Ataturk acknowledged that the origin of the Turks of today’s Anatolia was in Central
Asia but he never advocated pan-Turkism, which is the ideology of the union of all
Turks. Ataturk rather pursued territorial policies focusing on the development of the
newly founded Turkish Republic. In opposition to Ataturk’s nationalist principle, panTurkism suggests the gathering of all Turkic people of the post-Soviet region under the
control of the same state. Ataturk’s stance on pan-Turkism explain why Turkish leaders
strongly avoided pan-Turkist policies in Central Asia and Caucasus. As a matter of fact,
Pan-Turkist adventures, historically, put Turkey into trouble. The pan-Turkist policies of
Enver Pasha, who saw himself as the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan,
Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan and who was the commander of the 3rd
Caucasian Army in the World War I, drove Turkey to a complete catastrophe. Thousands
of qualified Turkish military troops got killed in their struggle against Soviets to help
Central Asians free themselves from Moscow’s authority. This is an important event that
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takes place in Turkish historical memory in a negative way. Additionally the defeat of the
Turkish-German alliance against Soviets put an end to Turkey’s pan-turkist adventures.
These historical events explain political leaders’ distance from pan-turkism. On the side
of the leaders of the Turkic Republics they are also comfortable that there is no place for
Pan-Turkism in Turkey’s official policy since they all wanted equal relations with other
countries and wanted to be respected.

Turkey has an ethnic link with the five republics which are the subjects of this
study. The Turks of Anatolia originally came from inner Asia and the Turks of the
republics are aware of their common origin with those of the Turkish Republics. This
sense of belonging has not been destroyed over time.

In the case of language no other factor unifies Turkic people better than language.
As French Turkologist Deny states dialects spoken in the regional countries are related
with the Turkish tongue.84 Islam is the last explained factor that Turkish people of Turkey
and the region can gather around.

As it is apparent from the factors listed above Turkey is in a more advantageous
position than any other country in the world in terms of integrating with the region and
exploiting the potential of the region with its cultural closeness and familiarity of the
language.
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE
REGIONAL COUNTRIES

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will explore what the common ties that are explained in the
previous chapter mean for the countries in practice by analyzing Turkey’s economic
relations with the Turkic republics. My systematic approach is to talk about the countries
in an alphabetical order.

I will start with Azeri-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan, which is the major oil
exporter of the region, is an economically significant country for Turkey, which is in
need of energy for its growing industry. Next I will analyze Turkish-Kazakh economic
relations. Kazakh economy displays strong growth with its gas producing areas and high
oil prices and is open to foreign investors. Turkey did not want to lose the opportunity to
exploit Kazakhstan’s openness to foreign investors and became one of the largest
investors in Kazakhstan. I will continue with Kyrgyzstan which is the only country that is
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite the institutional and
structural problems plaguing the Kirghiz economy, Kyrgyzstan is a promising country
with its open market economy. Turkmen-Turkish economic relations form the next
section in this chapter. Turkmenistan is a very important exporter of natural gas having
the 4th largest natural gas reserves in the world. Estimates place Turkmenistan’s natural
gas reserves among those of the world’s top 15 gas producing countries.85 It is important
for Turkey to engage in international pipeline construction business relations with
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Turkmenistan as a country, which needs natural gas for domestic consumption. The final
part of this chapter is on Uzbek-Turkish economic relations. Turkey wants to take part in
the reconstruction process of Uzbek industry and Turkey already has outstanding trade
relations with Uzbekistan.

3.2 Basic Drawbacks and Motivations to Invest in the Caspian Sea Region

The Caspian Sea Region offers some challenges for foreign investors as well as
opportunities. There is an unstable investment atmosphere in the post-Soviet region,
where proper tax regulations and legal frameworks are missing. The regional countries,
which gained their sovereignty at the beginning of the 1990s, are still in a period of
transition from command economies to liberal ones. This transition period, however, is
obviously not problem-free. The area has to deal with deficits, low output, unemployment
and high inflation rate.

Corruption is another pervasive problem of this region. The business groups
operating in the region are affected by corruption which prevents companies from
functioning well. This corruption might be normal to a certain extent considering that the
regional countries are facing challenges in their efforts to develop their economic
situation. One excuse local people pose for corruption is that the majority of the foreign
companies are not contributing heavily to the country’s economy. They are operating
independently rather than working in cooperation with local companies. In this way
people lose the opportunity to learn from foreign companies’ experiences and they feel
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alienated.

Foreign direct investments are crucial for the ex-Soviet states to be able to
modernize their economic structure and integrate to the rest of the world. Under Soviet
rule people of the Caspian Sea Region supplied Moscow with raw materials as their
primary economic activity. To free themselves economically from Moscow, people need
to diversify their economies. They are desperately in need of foreign capital and new
technology to become economically independent. FDI is also necessary to be able to
extract and deliver oil, gas, mineral and other raw materials to increase the level of
income. Their economic structure needs to be renewed with new regulations. At the same
time new road and rail networks and oil and gas pipelines need to be constructed.
Additionally businesspersons of the Caspian Sea Region need to export their raw
materials like copper and cotton to the outside world to generate hard-currency earnings.

It is worth mentioning that it is not as easy as it seems to make investments in
these regional countries. Under current regulations, state monopolies restrict the entry of
private firms into certain industries, such as pipeline construction. It has also become
hard for Turkey, which is perceived as a brother company, to become involved in the
region because of some economic policy constraints.

Turkey is aware that fostering commercial activities in the region will make a big
difference in the economies of the newly independent Turkic countries and will lead to
economic cooperation. Furthermore a cooperative atmosphere will establish closer ties
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among the ethnically and religiously diverse states that occupy the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Turkey also expect to gain major economic benefits from the development of closer
ties with the regional countries, which are seen as promising markets for the growing
Turkish industry. Especially for small sized companies it is profitable to invest in the
region in the absence of serious competitors at the initial stages of the republic’s
independence. It was an opportunity for the Turkish entrepreneurs to locate their
investment in a region where Western companies were slow in the region deferred by
unstable business atmosphere. On the other hand Turkish entrepreneurs had very limited
possibilities in Western countries where the market is more structured and the economy is
more developed when compared to the Central Asian market.

Among other investor countries particularly Turkey is quite motivated to do
business in the region. Indeed, potential for economic cooperation is quite substantial,
and the Turkish private sector, with the support of the government, has moved
extensively to exploit the region's economic potential. In addition to economic gains,
from a policy perspective, the expectation is that Turkey will become politically more
effective in regional and global politics because of cultural and ethnic links with the
region's large Turkic populations, which are undergoing profound political changes. This
view is also based on the belief that Turkey's secular and emerging democratic
credentials will enhance its importance as a model for the former Soviet republics.

Turkish business groups are aware that there are many opportunities for small and
midsized businesses in many sectors in Central Asia and the Caucasus because of a lack
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of competition and the existence of several positions offering business opportunities.
These benefits are valid for western investors as well. However, unlike Turkey, they need
to overcome language and culture barriers first. Americans and Western Europeans often
experience difficulties in negotiating and bargaining with their prospective Central Asian
clients. Turkey, on the other hand, enjoys the privilege of language familiarity and
cultural closeness.

Turkish people can adopt themselves more easily than Western business people to
the local conditions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Considering these factors, for the
Western company owners, who want to start business in the region, cooperation with the
Turkish companies may be beneficial. Westerners can benefit from Turkish peoples’
cultural affinities with the local people. As Winrow suggests, although Turkey doesn’t
have the capability to act as an original source it can act as a conduit for Western and
Japanese capital.86 Winrow suggests that “Western companies can provide much needed
capital and sophisticated technology while Turkish companies can provide quality labor
at a reasonable cost.”87 Turkish businesspersons can also provide the necessary
connections to start a business since they can establish social ties with the people
relatively easily. Therefore it is recommended for multinational corporations to establish
a base in Turkey to link up with Central Asia and the Caspian Region as well.88 By doing
so; they will also utilize the services of Turkish sub-contractors and personnel to secure
access to Central Asia.

Economic relations between Turkey and the regional countries bring mutual
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benefits as well. The new republics will gain by attracting investment and technological
expertise as well as a secure route for distributing their products to the West. As former
president Turgut Ozal recognized, Turkey does not possess the required capital, expertise,
and technology to meet the needs of the newly emerging republics. For this reason, as
Aras Argues, “Ozal marketed Turkey as a channel for Western and Far Eastern
investments to explore, produce, and distribute the former Soviet republics' oil, gas, and
mineral riches.”89

Despite all these advantages Turkish investors, who enter the region with great
enthusiasm, should question and calculate how the new republics would make payments
to fund the projects or to meet the costs of Turkish exports. In the economic sphere, As
Hale argues, “Turkish industry can fill some important gaps in the economies of the new
republics but it can not directly supply more than a fraction of the capital and advanced
technology that is ultimately needed.”90

3.3 Bilateral Economic Relations between Turkey and the Regional Countries

3.3.1 Turkey-Azerbaijan

3.3.1.1 Turkey’s Oil Demand

Turkey forms a strategic energy bridge between the major oil and gas producing
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areas in the Caspian Sea Basin and the consumer markets of the West. This feature of
Turkey makes it increasingly important to world oil markets. However Turkey lacks
significant domestic energy resources.

Turkey needs oil for its growing industry. It has been estimated that to maintain
the present course of its economic development Turkey will require the importation of
vast amounts of crude oil in the coming decades roughly 55 million tons annually by the
year 2010.91 Figure 2 below illustrates that Turkey’s oil production has declined by half
since 1991, when production peaked at 85,300 bbl/d. EIA forecasts that Turkey will
consume 618,000 bbl/d of oil in 2006, down about 4 percent from 2005 figures. In
general, as Turkey Energy Report indicates Turkish oil demand is mostly dependent on
the country’s economic performance.
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Source: Energy Information Administration

Figure 2: Turkey’s Oil Production and Consumption between 1986 and 2006

Turkey’s oil sector includes both state-owned and private oil companies. Turkish
Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) accounts for roughly 70 percent of Turkey’s domestic oil
output and this corporation is responsible for the oil exploration and production activities.
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources monitors the oil sector and makes
decisions on the new projects.

Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS) is the company that
dominates the storage and refining sector in Turkey. TUPRAS controls 85 percent of
Turkey’s domestic refining activities. TUPRAS became a semi-private corporation with
the Koc-Shell Joint Venture Group’s purchase of a 51 percent stake in TUPRAS for
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$4.14 billion in September 200592 The company , which is in charge of the oil transport
sector, is Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Boru Hatlari ile Petrol Tasima A.S/BOTAS)
and BOTAS owns the operations of virtually the entire Turkish pipeline network.

In December 2003, Turkish parliament passed a petroleum market reform bill.
The aim of this law is to liberalize pricing of oil and oil products, end restrictions on
vertical integration, and integrate pipeline, refining, and distribution functions.
Parliaments are planning to privatize both TUPRAS and POAS (Petrol Ofisis, Turkey’s
major petroleum product retailer). Also, as a result of this law, price ceilings and import
quotas on petroleum products were raised in early 2005.93

3.3.1.2 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project

According to Turkey’s Energy Report, Turkey had 300 million barrels of proven
oil reserves as of January 2006. During the first nine months of 2006, Turkey produced
an estimated 43,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil, of which 99 percent was crude oil.94
However Turkey’s growing industry needs more oil.
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Source: A to Z of Azerbaijan. http://www.azerb.com/az-ceyhan-map.gif

Figure 3: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

As mentioned above, Turkey is an important transit country. It lies between the
energy-rich countries of the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions and energy importing
countries in continental Europe. Turkish officials evaluated a number of projects that
would transport oil into Turkey without the use of Bosporus Straits which already has a
heavy traffic. Numerous Bosporus pipelines have been planned. The Baku-TbilisiCeyhan Pipeline (BTC), which bypasses the Bosporus Straits oil transit chokepoint, is the
first one that has been constructed.

The main economic goal behind this project, at the stage of feasibility studies,
was that it would create economic wealth for the three nations, Azerbaijan, Turkey and
Georgia, through which it passes. It is the first direct pipeline to deliver crude oil from
the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean without crossing Russian soil or passing through
the Bosporus or Turkish Straits. The 1,100-mile pipeline costs nearly $4 billion to build,
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and is operated by a BP-led consortium of 11 national and international oil companies.95
The Turkish section is 1,070 kilometres long. It includes 4 pump stations, two metering
stations and the Ceyhan marine export terminal96 This is such a large project that through
the Community Investment Program (CIP), the BTC and the South Caucasus Pipeline
(SCP) projects are working with 120 communities in Azerbaijan, 72 communities in
Georgia and 300 communities in Turkey.97

In May 2005, Azerbaijan began test filling in the Azeri section of the pipeline
during the opening ceremony of the pipeline.98 On 10 August 2005 the first volumes
reached the Azeri-Georgian border and a year after the opening ceremony the first tanker
at the Turkish port of Ceyhan was filled with oil from BTC.99 This stage by stage line fill
enabled the workers to ensure the integrity and safety of each section prior to introducing oil.

The line is estimated to have a peak capacity of more than one million bbl/d, and
Turkey is expected to earn between $140 and $200 million per year in transit and
operating fees from the project.100 The team that was leading the BTC project was also
leading the construction of the SCP project.

Some national and international environmentalist groups opposed the construction
of the BTC pipeline claiming that it has serious environmental and safety risks. They
argue that this pipeline construction causes damage to property, drinking water pollution
and is non-compliant with Georgian state environmental permit conditions. British
Petroleum (BP), the major company responsible for this project, responded to these
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claims by stating that Environmental and Social Impact Assessments were being carried
out by an international team of independent consultants. BP officials claim that they are
very careful not to damage protected ecological, areas or archaeological sites, to require
no resettlement of people, and to result in no permanent disruption to the livelihoods of
local populations. These assessments were even made available for public comment and
consultation in the mid-2002.

3.3.1.3 The South Caucasus Gas Pipeline Project

Turkey possesses limited oil and natural gas resources. Therefore special attention
has been paid to exploration and production activities in Turkey and abroad. The
southeastern part of the country, particularly Hakkari, and the northwestern part of
Turkey are the oil producing regions in the country. The country has oil in the Black,
Mediterranean, and Aegean Sea. Two foreign oil companies, which are Royal Dutch
Shell and Exxon Mobil, operating in Turkey extract oil from these areas. The production
costs for oil reserves are high in Turkey. Therefore the recent exploration activities have
focused on Turkey’s offshore regions.

In 2005, TPAO and its international partners drilled the country’s first exploration
wells in the Black Sea. The TPAO-Torreador-Stratic joint venture oversaw the Western
Black Sea Exploration and Development Project, while the TPAO-BP-Chevron joint
venture ran the Eastern Black Sea Offshore Project.101
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TPAO is also working for exploration and production projects along with the help
of the Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company (TPOC). One of the company’s most
significant overseas oil production assets is the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) Project in
Azerbaijan, which holds 5.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. TPAO has a 6.75
percent interest in the ACG Project, which produced an average 350,000 bbl/d of oil at
the end of 2005.102

TPAO is also part of the Alov Exploration Project in the Azeri part of the Caspian
Sea, which holds an estimated 5 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves and sizeable
natural gas reserves. The Alov exploration bloc formerly called Abikh Trend is located
110 miles (180 km) south-southeast of Baku, the Azeri capital.103 Exploration activities
are expected to be carried out between 2006 and 2008.

Turkey has signed an agreement to import natural gas from Azerbaijan’s large
Shah Deniz field. This gas pipeline is known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) or the
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). This is a 692 km long pipeline designed to bring gas
from the Shah Deniz Field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea through Georgia
and on to Turkey-Georgian border. As it is mentioned above this line’s route is parallel to
the BTC pipeline. The last point for the BTE pipeline is near Horasan in Turkey.

Construction on the $1.3 billion project began in late 2004, and the pipeline has
been active since late 2006 transporting gas to Azerbaijan and Georgia from Shah Deniz
Stage 1. This line is initially expected to carry 233 Bcf per year of natural gas to the
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Turkish market, and can be increased to 700 Bcf with future additions of compressor
stations. BP and Norway’s Statoil each hold a 25.5 percent stake in the project and serve
as co-operators, with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Russia's
Lukoil, Turkey's TPAO, France's Total, and Iran's NICO holding around 10 percent
each.104

According to information given on the BP website, “BP and Stat Oil, as the
operators of the Shah Deniz gas condensate development project and Azerbaijan Gas
Supply Company (AGSC) respectively announced that the first gas started to flow into
BOTAS’s gas transportation system on July 3, 2007.”105 Azerbaijan Gas Supply
Company (AGSC), which is responsible for the gas sales, sold the gas from Shah Deniz
Stage 1 to Azerbaijan, Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), BOTAS and the BTC
Company.

This gas is transported to BOTAS’s gas transportation system through SCP. The
pipeline was successfully tied to the Turkish pipeline system at the Georgian – Turkish
border.

3.3.1.4 Trade with Azerbaijan
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Figure 4: Trade Volume between Azerbaijan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005

Turkish businessmen are ranked top among the businessmen who make
investments in sectors, excluding oil sector, in Azerbaijan. Companies, which were
established solely by those Turkish businessmen or by partnership between Azerbaijani
and Turkish businessmen, have provided thousands of people with jobs.

As it is apparent from Graph 2, prepared by Foreign Economic Relations Board
(DEIK), Azerbaijan's foreign trade volume reached 4 billion 37 million U.S. dollars
between January 2003 and October 2003. Turkey has 4.32 percent of share in exports and
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7.68 percent of share in imports of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan has around 3 percent of
share in foreign trade volume of Turkey. Turkey’s trade volume in Azerbaijan reached
$800million in 2005. Variety of goods from electronic devices to automotive industry
tools are being exported to Azerbaijan. As it is apparent in Graph 2 trade between Turkey
and Azerbaijan shows an increasing trend starting from 2002. More than half of the
Turkish imports from Azerbaijan are based on mineral oil. Recently many Turkish and
Azerbaijani companies joined ‘The Seventh Turkish Exports Goods Fair’, which was
held in Baku in September 2003, to further improve economic relations.106

3.3.1.5 Eximbank Credits from Turkey

Upon the break up of the Soviet Empire the Turkish Foreign Ministry signed
“Agreed Minutes” agreements with the Turkic Republics to contribute to their
development projects to increase economic cooperation between Turkey and the postSoviet Turkic Republics. These agreements included articles about opening credit
accounts in the related republics’ state banks to finance some of their national
development plans.

64

Table 1: Eximbank Credits
COUNTRIES

TOTAL CREDITS

USED CREDITS

Azerbaijan

$250 million

$91.74 million

Kirghizstan

$240 million

$213 million

Kyrgyzstan

$75 million

$75 million

Turkmenistan

$134.76 million

$133 million

Uzbekistan

$375 million

$369 million

Source: DEIK ( Foreign Economic Relations Board )

Turk Eximbank opened a $250 million credit account in 1992 with an agreement
signed between Turkish and Azeri states. This account was specified as buyers’ credit
guaranteed by the Turkish state. Initially Turk Eximbank credits were used for Turkish
exportation projects and for emergent needs like medicine and nutrition. Azerbaijan has
spent $91.74 million of the credit till now.107

Turk Eximbank only meets the costs of goods and services which are provided
from Turkey to use for projects which are carried out by Turkish building contractors. In
addition to this Turk Eximbank pays for the articles that are exported from Turkey. The
only country that opened credit accounts for the Turkic Republics at the initial stages of
their independence was Turkey. Other organizations attempted to enter this market only
after they witnessed successful business experiences of Turkey.
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3.3.2 Turkey-Kazakhstan

3.3.2.1 Turkish Investment in Kazakhstan

Business relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan started immediately after
Kazakhstan’s independence. Turkey soon became active in all sectors of the Kazakh
economy from agriculture to hotel management.

Kazakhstan hosts a big part of Turkey’s investments in Central Asia. It is
estimated that Turkey’s investment is worth $1.5 billion.108 Turkey is the fourth biggest
investor in the country following the US, South Korea and England. The investment areas
that the US and England mostly focus on are the petrol and gas industry, electricity and
mining sectors. Turkish businesspersons mostly invest in the areas of telecommunication,
hotel management, agriculture, supermarket management, nutrition, products made from
iron, steel and copper, and services.

During the first few years of the Kazakh Republic Turkish companies mostly
started business in building construction. Recently Turkish companies turned their
attention to the production of goods and services. Turkey also achieved considerable
success in renewing the infrastructure of Kazakhstan’s industry and transportation.

There are 129 Turkish funded companies in the country and the capital of these
companies is worth $1.3 billion.109 Petrol, hotel management and construction, education
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and banking sectors constitute %80-90 of Turkish investments in the country. According
to the Foreign Trade Secretariat in Turkey, 54 Turkish companies working in the area of
building construction have taken the responsibility of 147 projects that are worth $3.2
billion.110 After Astana became the capital of the country, many state buildings and hotels
in this city have been constructed by Turkish businessmen. The major Turkish companies
operating in Kazakhstan are Alarko, Ahsel, Aysel, Emsaş, Enka, İdil, İsot, Koray,
Mensel, Tekfen, Üçgen and Zafer.

Among the important projects that Turkish companies have completed are Astana
International Airport, General Assembly Building, Presidential Residence, Regent
Ankara Hotel, Okan Intercontinental Astana, Children Rehabilitation Center, National
Museum, Ahmet Yesevi University, Astana Towers, GSM Telecommunication
Infrastructure, Kazakh section of Tengiz-Novorossisk pipeline, shopping centers,
highways and factories.

Turkish businesspersons also contribute to Kazakh peoples’ income by employing
them in foreign direct investment (FDI) and building construction projects. Turkish
investors have employed over 10.000 people. %85 of this labor force is composed of
Kazakh people.

Apart from these projects TPAO made considerable investments in Kazakhstan in
the area of energy. TPAO is a state-owned company that has the largest share in Turkish
investment in Kazakhstan. TPAO has established a joint venture with Kazakh Oil
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Company and created ‘Kazakturkmunay’ (KTM) Company. TPAO’s investment between
1994 and 1999, in this country is worth $272.9 million KTM is a company that produces
5000 barrels of crude oil daily.111

A recent deal that TPAO has signed with Kazakhstan is worth $750 million. This
agreement was signed to develop oil reserves in the northwestern Aktyubinsk region near
the Caspian Sea. The contract is expected to last at least 29 years, and Kazakhstan could
earn $1.8 billion in revenues. TPOA and Amoco will set up a 50-50 joint venture to
finance and implement the project. The first four years of the contract are set aside for
exploration and the following 25 years for production. Turkish officials estimate that the
region contains about 327 million barrels of oil.112These are the courageous attempts of
Turkey to have a say in the energy game in the region.

Kazakhstan has more economic projects to accomplish on its agenda. However
Turkey does not have much to offer Kazakhstan about their new projects because these
projects require high technology and capital which is beyond the limits of Turkey’s
economic capacity.
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3.3.2.2 Trade with Kazakhstan
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Figure 5: Trade Volume between Kazakhstan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005

According to the 2006 report of DEIK on Turkish-Kazakh Commercial and
Economic Relations, in the last 12 years trade relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan
have followed an increasing trend and trade volume, which was $30 million in 1992 and
reached $465 million in 2000. In 2001, however, trade volume was amounted to $210.1
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million resulting from the situation that Turkey did not import mineral oil, which takes a
significant place in Turkey’s importation products from Kazakhstan. Trade volume
increased again starting from 2002 and in 2005 it increased by 28% by exceeding
$1billion.

Among the products Turkey exports to Kazakhstan are industrial machines,
plastic tools, carpets, products made from steel, iron, aluminum and plastic, furniture,
detergents, sugar and motor vehicles. In the future Turkey’s export is expected to be on
textile, ready-made clothing, home products, agricultural and construction machines and
food.

Turkey’s export to Kazakhstan has shown a stable increase between 1995 and
1998. In 1999 Turkey’s export rate decreased by 55 % when compared to the previous
year due to the financial crisis in Russia. Kazakh foreign trade was dependent on the
Russian economic situation and the 1998 Russian economic crisis affected Kazakh
economy negatively. People preferred to buy Russian products, which were cheap at that
time, to Turkish products. This crisis also affected Turkish business in the country.
According to Kazakhstan Country Report, which was prepared by KOSGEB in 2004,
indicates that prior to the crisis there were 250 active Turkish companies; today only half
of these companies are able to continue operating in the country. After the Russian
financial crisis was over Turkish-Kazakh relations were recovered. In 2000 Turkey’s
exports volume increased by 22.8% again. In 2001 exportation rate showed only a slight
change with a 1% percentage increase and in 2002 Turkey showed a 32% percentage
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increase in its exportation to Kazakhstan. However Turkey’s export rate for Kazakhstan
was still behind the level of export rate in 1998 considering that Turkey’s general export
rate was 12 % in 2002. Kazakhstan’s share was % 0.4 in Turkey’s total exports.

According to KOSGEB’s report, Kazakhstan’s 72 % of exported commodity to
Turkey is related with mining sector. Nearly half of Turkey’s import from Kazakhstan is
composed of copper and copper-made products. Other than copper Turkey import
cereals, leather, inorganic chemical materials, lead and products made from lead and zinc.

Turkey’s import rate increased steadily until 2001. However due to the severe
economic crisis in Turkey Turkey’s imports rate decreased by 74 % in 2001. Turkey
experienced a strong financial crisis in 2001 and this led to the contraction of the
economy. Chronic inflation undermined Turkish economic performance. Nominal and
real interest rates were high, and unstable. The public debt burden was high and rising.
Because of all these negative signs Turkey's growth record was weak and volatile.
Eventually Turkey’s imports indicators started to reach its previous levels starting from
2002. Despite these developments in Turkish exports to Kazakhstan the level of Turkish
exports rate was still behind 1998 rates. This was because of the situation that
Kazakhstan’s share in Turkey’s total exports was little with only a 4 percentage of total
share.113

3.3.2.3 Eximbank Credits
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Turk Eximbank has opened a $240 million credit account for Kazakhstan. $55.7
million, $40 million of which has already been spent, is left for funding trade projects and
$184 million, $173 million has already been spent, is left for investment projects.114

Decisions to fund new projects are made by Turk Eximbank officials after a
critical evaluation process. Turkey is willing to support all kinds of development projects
which will bring mutual benefits to Turkey and Kazakhstan.

3.3.3 Turkey-Kyrgyzstan

3.3.3.1 Turkish Investment in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is distinct from other Turkic Republics due to its membership in the
WTO. Although this membership gives Kyrgyzstan the opportunity to be a partner of the
global economy, Kyrgyzstan’s institutional and structural problems plague the
development of its trade. The Kyrgyzstan Report, prepared by TICA in 2004, states that
the Turkish-Kazakh trade was worth $100 million in 2005, four times the 2001 figures.
Turkish exports constitute 90 percent of the bilateral trade volume, making it a key trade
partner for Kyrgyzstan.115

Turkish entrepreneurs were among the first foreign investors to bring technology
and investment to the newly developing Kyrgyz economy and Kyrgyzstan was quick to
instigate its liberal and democratic transition policies to reach macroeconomic
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stabilization. Kyrgyzstan has one of the most open trade policies among former Soviet
Union countries.116 That 90.7 percent of Kirghiz national income came from its foreign
trade in 1991 may be appreciated as a sign of its openness to the outside world.117

Turkish investments intensify in the areas of tourism, nutrition, beverage
production, banking, furniture, tea packaging, plastic, education and production of
building construction equipments. We learn from Dikkaya and Keles that one of the
important business groups operating in Kyrgyzstan is the ATA Group, which was
established in 1990. This group has three main business branches which are Detergent
(Detas Co.), Food (Nobel Co.) and Furniture (Nobel Co.).This group, like any other
business group, first made a feasibility study in Kyrgyzstan through personal
acquaintances. When they saw that there is not much competition in the Kirghiz market
they didn’t want to miss this opportunity. They sought out the best investment fields and
soon they took a leading role in the market. There are two more major foreign direct
investment motives in the region. One of them is the low labor costs and the other one is
Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to other countries in the region, such as Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan.

The ATA group has two factories and 300 workers in Kyrgyzstan. The group has
a market share of 80 percent in detergent and is also well placed in the market for its
chocolate products. This group also sells furniture from Turkey. They have a well placed
market in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well as in Kyrgyzstan. This kind of foreign trade
has an important place in this group’s revenue.118
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Ucko Plastik Co. is another company that has been operating in Kyrgyzstan since
1996. It has three separate business branches which are Bishkek Plastic Co. (plastic),
Yukselen Ortaklar Co. (candy) and Hedef Co. (sugar and salt). Primary products, which
are produced in Kirgizstan, of the company are plastic products, sugar and salt. This
company is also exporting candies from Turkey. This company exports its products from
Turkey to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as well. A big part of the company’s
revenue comes from these four foreign markets.119 Beta Group is another Turkish
company that operates in the area of tea production and packaging and has a significant
market share in Central Asia. Beta Group diversified its investment areas by opening a
shopping center called Beta Store and a restaurant called Beta Gourmet. Plaskap is
another Turkish company that produces plastic lids for beverages in its factory which was
opened in 1998 in Biskek.120

In the area of building construction Turkish entrepreneurs have undertaken a
smaller number of projects in Kyrgyzstan when compared to other Turkic Republics.
Turkish contractors have completed 18 projects starting from 2002. System Engineering
completed the construction of Hotel Biskek and undertook the responsibility of this
hotel’s management with its Kirghiz partner. Some of the major projects that have been
completed are Manas International Airport, Biskek Coca-Cola Factory, Hotel Biskek
Pinara and Biskek-Os Highway Rehabilitation Project. Anadolu Group owns Coca Cola
Biskek, 90 % of which belongs to the Turkish side, in association with Coca Cola
Company. This company has 233 sale centers and has a 39 million tone production
capacity.
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Turkey has an important place in banking and flight sector. Demir Kirghiz
International Bank is one of the three big banks and the first international bank in
Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish partner of this bank owns 70 % of this bank. Kyrgyzstan has
only two airways operating in the country. One of them is Turkish Airways and the other
one is British Airways.

Additionally; six Kyrgyz companies have been operating in Turkey since 2003.
Their total investment is worth 393 billion in Turkish Liras.121

3.3.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Investing in Kyrgyzstan

There are some disadvantages as well as advantages of investing in Kyrgyzstan.
Some of these disadvantages are lack of regulatory rules, an unstable tariff system and
unsatisfactory banking services resulting from the transformation of Kirghiz economy
from Soviet style to a liberal one. There is no deposit insurance and the transaction fees
are very high within the banks. One governmental regulation that makes things difficult is
that acts which are passed on a particular date can affect transactions before the date
these acts are approved. For this reason, the companies are forced to make some extra
payments and edit their documents to make them in accordance with the laws. Apart from
these the biggest problem is to get money from the Kirghiz creditors.122

Investors in food business are not concerned about the quality of personnel. This
situation directly affects the quality of products. The country offers cheap labor but
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employees are not working as they are expected to work.123 Actually the problem with
this country is that the communist work ethic is still pervasive. Thus employees can not
adopt themselves to capitalist work practices overnight.

One of the main obstacles that businesspersons have to deal with is a working
infrastructure. There are no serious infrastructure problems in the capital city, Bishkek
but the case is different for the other cities. Some cities experience irregular electricity
cutoffs, tax, bribery, high turnover rate and difficulty in finding qualified employees. Red
tape and the insufficiency of infrastructure affect small businesses negatively. However
these companies seem to be content with cooperating in the region. They are in a
leadership position in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover they wish to expand their businesses to the
neighboring countries of Kyrgyzstan.

The Turkish business groups are still satisfied with the current performance in
spite of these drawbacks. They are making profits out of low competition in all sectors.
FDI motives of the companies are mostly driven by Turkey’s economic conditions. Many
groups decided to exploit economic opportunities when they faced the 2001 economic
crisis. The company chose Kyrgyzstan to start a business mostly by their close contacts in
the Kirghiz market. Lack of competition smoothed the progress of the company in the
market. The other FDI motives in Kyrgyzstan were that cheap labor costs and
Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to other countries in the region such as Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan.
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In fact companies can make even more profits if they form partnerships in the
region. This choice is not risk-free either; the problem with joint ventures is that the
partner, who is expected to handle the drawbacks of the region, should be carefully
chosen.
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3.3.3.3 Trade with Kyrgyzstan
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Figure 6: Trade Volume between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey between 1992 and 2004

According to the Kyrgyzstan Country Report prepared by TIKA, trade volume,
which was amounted to $3.2million in 1992 in Kyrgyzstan, reached $57.1 million in
1997. Turkey’s trade volume in Kyrgyzstan increased starting from 2001 resulting from
the fact that Russia’s financial crisis of 1998 and Turkey’s financial crisis in 2001 was
over.

Turkey’s exports to Kyrgyzstan are composed of woven textile goods, carpets,
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electronic machines, plastics and plastic made products, cauldrons, soup, furniture,
aluminum and aluminum made products.

According to Kyrgyzstan Country Report prepared by Small and Medium Sized
Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB), Turkey’s export rate increased by 5.2 %
in 1997 and the trade volume was amounted to $29.6 million. In 1998 Turkey’s export
rate decreased by 16.3 % and this decreasing trend in exports continued in 1999 and
2000. In 1999 Turkey’s export volume to Kyrgyzstan declined by 44 % and in 2000
Turkey’s export rate decreased even more than it was in 1999. However in 2002 Turkish
export rate reached its level of 1999 with a 37 percentage increase. However Turkey’s
export volume to this country has not yet reached its level which was reached before the
Russian financial crisis.

Product groupings such as fruits and vegetables, cotton, electronic machines and
silk have an important place in Turkish imports from Kyrgyzstan. Turkey’s imports
volume from Kyrgyzstan increased by 28.5 percentage in 1997 when compared to the
previous year. In 1998 Turkey’s import rate decreased by 20.4 %. One year later
Turkey’s import from Kazakhstan declined even more than 1998 with a 59 percentage
decrease. This decreasing trend in the imports rate continued in 2000 as well with a 15.5
percentage. In 2001 Turkey’s import rate increased by 156 %. The following year
increasing trend in imports continued and imports from Kyrgyzstan increased by 150 %
reaching a $15.7 million worth budget. Nearly 55 % of import is composed of eatable
fruits and vegetables.
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3.3.3.4 Eximbank Credits

Credits from the Turkish Eximbank have done much to stimulate trade and
business links between the two countries.Turk Eximbank opened a $75million credit
account for Kyrgyzstan.124 Half of this credit would be used for national development
projects and the second half was for financing trade in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz business
groups used only $12.4 for development projects while they used all the money given for
commercial projects.

3.3.4 Turkey-Turkmenistan

3.3.4.1 Turkey’s Need for Natural Gas

Turkey’s need for natural gas has increased recently. According to Turkey’s
Energy Profile Report, Turkey had 300 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of proven natural gas
reserves as of January 2006.125 In 2004, Turkey consumed 793 Bcf of natural gas while
only producing 24 Bcf of natural gas.

The share of natural gas in primary energy consumption has been suggested to
increase to 27 % in 2010. Natural gas consumption which is now 10 bcm, will reach 54
bcm by 2010, increasing five times.126 Domestic natural gas production is expected to
increase 250 million m3 in 1997 to 620 million m3 in 2000 and then the gas production
will be decreased to 130 million m3 in 2005 and around 90 million m3 in 2010. These
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figures show us the importance of natural gas imports for Turkey.127
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Source: Energy Information Administration
Figure 7: Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption

To meet the natural gas demand Turkey has been in pursuit of multiple
international pipeline connections.

Turkey wants to be a part of international pipeline construction business primarily
because it needs natural gas for domestic consumption. Turkey’s gas demand is
increasing rapidly and the prime consumers are industrial users and natural gas-fired
electric power plants. Because of the severe economic problems the natural gas demand
decreased from about 1.6 Tcf in 2005 to under 0.9 Tcf in that year, a 45 percent decrease
according to Botas’s estimates.128 Another issue that these numbers indicate is that
Turkey has more natural gas coming from different contracts than it is expected to
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consume. To date, Turkey has signed deals for around 1.8 Tcf per year of natural gas
imports in 2010, more than 25 percent above the Botas forecast for Turkish natural gas
consumption (1.4 Tcf) in that year.129

3.3.4.2 Turkmen-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline

Turkey has rather debatable gas pipeline links with Russia and Iran. Turkey wants
to further diversify its natural gas sources. To this end, Turkey has looked to other natural
gas-rich countries in the region. There are a number of projects under construction or in
the stage of planning. The question is whether or not Turkey is able to provide the
sufficient funding for pipeline construction projects. The strongest motivation for Turkey
to buy natural gas is the industrialized West and the newly industrializing central and
eastern Anatolian regions.

Turkish foreign policy makers are especially interested in bringing Turkmen
natural gas to Turkey. The representatives from Botas and Turkmen Oil and Gas Ministry
got together in a meeting in February 1996 to reach a decision on the gas pipeline
options. According to Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two countries
on 14 February 1996 Turkey would purchase two billion cubic meters of natural gas in
1998, 5 billion cubic meters between 1999-2004 10 billion cubic meters between 20052009 and 15 billion between 2010-2020.130

A number of routes have been discussed for the Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe gas
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pipeline. The French Sofregaz Company offered a few possible routes and several
options for the gas transportation to the Turkmen government in January 1998.131 One of
these plans located the starting point as Shatlyk gas deposit in Turkmenistan. The road
would go from the east to the west of Turkmenistan and parallel to the operating
Turkmen Iranian Korpeje Kord Kuy gas pipeline.

Eventually in May 1999, BOTAS signed an agreement in Ashgabat to build a
1,050-mile natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that would travel underneath the
Caspian Sea, across Azerbaijan and Georgia, and on to Turkey.132 When it reached Baku
it would be connected with the SCP, which is also known as “Trans-Caspian Pipeline”.
The Turkmen option would carry between 16 and 28 billion cubic meters of gas annually
to Turkey and then to Europe.

Within a few months major oil companies, General Electric, Bechtel, Royal Dutch
Shell, established a joint venture to work on this project. In spring 2000 this group had to
stop the construction process due to the arguments that erose from among the TransCaspian participant nations over allocating quotas for Azerbaijan's use of the pipeline.
Furthermore upon the discovery of the Shah Deniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan this gas
pipeline lost its importance.
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3.3.4.3 Trade with Turkmenistan
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Figure 8: Trade Volume between Turkmenistan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005

Turkmenistan is the region’s third largest Turkish trade partner after Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. As Figure 6 shows the volume of bilateral trade nearly doubled between
2001 and 2005, increasing from $175 million to $345 million. Turkish trade makes up
about 5 percent of Turkmenistan’s total trade.
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Some of the major products that Turkey exports to Turkmenistan are electronic
devices, both whole and individual parts in addition to products made from iron and steel,
and soap.

KOSGEB’s report on Turkish-Turkmen economic relations explain that Turkey’s
trade volume with Turkmenistan was amounted to $28.5 million in 1992 but it showed a
continuous increase and reached $191 million in 1997. However the 1998 financial crisis
in Russia affected regional countries and Turkey’s export rate showed a decreasing trend
but increased by 11% in 1999.

The trend of Turkey’s increasing export to Turkmenistan continued in 2000 as
well and the export rate increased by 13,6 % when compared to 1999. The export rate
reached a high point in 2000 and remained same as it was in 1999 in 2000.

Cotton is the main raw material source for the Turkish textile industry. Therefore
Turkey imports cotton in large amounts from Turkmenistan. For example, Turkey spent
$91 million on its cotton imports, which was worth $97 million in 2000.Among the other
products that Turkey imports from Turkmenistan are knitting wool and raw leather.
Turkey’s decreasing trend of imports from Turkmenistan between 1995 and 1998 has
changed starting in 1999 when Turkey’s import rate increased by 60 %. In 2000 it
increased by 52,8 %.133
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3.3.4.4 Problems that Businesspersons Face In Turkmenistan

Like the other NIS of Central Asia, Turkmenistan poses some challanges for
foreigners. Turkish entrepreneurs face some problems in Turkmenistan. One of the
biggest problems of trade relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan is about
transportation. There is no direct transportation link between Turkey and Turkmenistan
and this causes difficulties in transmitting goods and services to Turkmenistan. People
need to pass through Iranian territory to reach Turkmenistan and they need to pay
transaction fees to the Iranian government. The telecommunication network is also
insufficient in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen government is aware that these kinds of
problems are making investment in the country unattractive for foreigners. Therefore
among the plans of the Turkmen government is to implement communication and
transportation development projects in cooperation with foreign investors until 2010. An
underdeveloped banking system, insufficient tariff system and lack of legislation in
Turkmenistan are among other reasons that make trade difficult.

Additionally most of the time people in Turkmenistan use a barter system instead
of using cash.134 In Turkmenistan one dollar equals 5.200 manats and in Turkey one
dollar equals 21.000 manats. This difference in Turkey’s exchange rate and
Turkmenistan’s exchange rate makes it difficult for Turkish tradesmen to make profits for
their businesses.
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3.3.4.5 Eximbank Credits

Agreed Minutes, which was signed between Turkey and Turkmenistan on 2 May
1992, included an article stating that Turk Eximbank would open a $75 million worth
credit account for State Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of
Turkmenistan (Vnesheconombank of Turkmenistan).135 Within this context Turk
Eximbank and State Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of Turkmenistan signed a
Financing Trade Agreement. This credit was specified as buyers’ credit. According to the
Turkmen officials’ list that they submitted to Turk Eximbank this credit was used for
medicine, purchase of veterinary medicine, climatic devices and equipments for hotel
construction.

In January 1993 a $16 million credit account was opened due to the Turkmen
demands for a hotel construction in Ashgabat.136 With this project Turmenistan’s credit
limit reached $91 million. Turk Eximbank credits also helped Turkmens finance their
$43.76 million refnirey projects which are Turkmenbashi Refinery CCR Unit and
Turkmenbashi Refinery MSCC Unit. However Turkmenistan had some difficulties in
making payments back to Turkey and so signed ‘The Delaying Debt Agreement’ in
August 2000. Turkey worked as a co-financer for these projects.137 In these projects
Turkey worked in cooperation with COFACE (France), ONDD (Belgium) Eximbank.

All these credits have been guaranteed under the state guarantee letter, which
ensure the payment of dept in a certain period. Additionally Turkey launched assurance
mechanisms which are called escrow accounts. Recently all debt that Turkmenistan owes
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to Turkey has been paid.

Totally Turkmenistan used $133 million out of Turk Eximbank credit which is
worth $135 million.138 Turkey is willing to work in Turkmenistan as long as Turkish
companies undertake new projects in Turkmenistan and new guarantee mechanisms,
which are approved by Turk Eximbank, are established. Furthermore Turk Eximbank
supports Turkish exporters with short term credit and insurance programs.

3.3.5 Turkey-Uzbekistan

3.3.5.1 Turkish Investment in Uzbekistan

Chufrin notes that “Uzbekistan maintained the most integrated economy of the
Central Asian region through its effective use of its resources.”139Upon gaining their
independence Uzbeks tried to maximize competition rather than cooperation as a national
strategy to strengthen the Uzbek economy. Olcott states that “Uzbekistan has the
capability to become a regional producer of textiles, processed foods, and clothing.”140

Turkish investors mostly focused in the sectors of textile, automotive, tourism,
banking and foodstuff. For example, Bursel Holding is the biggest investor in Uzbek
textile industry. The partners of this holding are the Uzbek government and Japan
Mitsubishi Company. They produce shirts, underwear, socks and fabric. The cotton used
for production comes from the local cotton fields. Also Tekfen opened a thread factory,
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which is “Papfen”, in Uzbekistan in 1998.141 Tekfen manages this factory and is also
responsible for marketing activities. These are the big Turkish companies. Although
small and medium sized companies were investing at the initial stages of the Republic,
big industrialists also started to enter the Uzbek market starting from 1995.

As in other Central Asian states, Turkish construction companies are very active
in Uzbekistan, with over 50 projects.142Koc Holding operates in the automotive industry.
Koc Holding established a joint venture called Tashkochavto in collaboration with the
Uzbek company, Uzatozlash. This company offers service in providing the necessary
pieces for automobiles. Another Koc investment is Samkoçauto which started operating
in Semerkand in 1998. Samkoçauto’s business focuses on the production of automobile
and vans and exports them to Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Additionally, Arcelik,
which is the branch company of Koc Holding, started business in the area of home
appliance in Uzbekistan.

Turkish companies working as building contractors are highly active in
Uzbekistan. According to the data by the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat gives us
Turkish building contractors have undertaken the operation of 63 projects the total cost of
which is $1.589 billion. The major companies are Alarko, Ekpar, Gama, Makimsan,
Mensel JV, Tekfen, Yapı Üretim, Yüksel and Zafer and the major projects that these
companies have completed are Taskent International Hotel, Radisson SAS Hotel,
Tashkent International Trade and Exhibit Center, Aquapark, Tashkent Airport Tower,
Central Bank Building, Coca-Cola Factory, British American Tobacco Factory, Papfen
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Thread Factory, Horezm Sugar Factory, renovation of American Ambassadorship and the
terminal buildings of Semerkand, Buhara and Urgenç Airports.

Turkish companies, which are Dedeman Holding and Aysel Construction
Company, are active in the area of hotel management as well. Dedeman opened a hotel in
Tashkent in 2006. Turkish business groups also serve in banking sector. Ziraat Bank of
Turkey manages Utbank, which has a $5 million capital, in collaboration with Pahtabank
of Uzbekistan.143

Apart from the investment areas that have been mentioned above, it is also
possible for Turkish entrepreneurs to invest in the areas of medicine, health, foodstuff
and the stock market in the future.
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3.3.5.2 Trade with Uzbekistan
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Figure 9: Trade Volume between Turkey and Uzbekistan between 1992 and 2005

As Figure 9 illustrates, trade volume, which was amounted to $75.5 million in
1992, showing an increasing trend, exceeded $300 million in 1997. It has been observed
that Turkey’s trade volume declined resulting from the decrease in Turkey’s general
exportation volume starting from 1997. Turkey’s main exportation to Uzbekistan occurs
in the areas of technology, copper and energy. Trade volume decreased to its lowest level
in 2001 and started to increase again from then on. In 2003 it increased by 40 % when
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compared to 2002. In 2004 and 2005 Turkey’s exportation volume did not change much
but due to the increase in imports from Uzbekistan trade surplus started to decrease in
2004 and 2005. This was because of the heavy purchase of copper and copper-made
products as well.

One of the major problems that foreign investors face in this country is that Som,
which is the Uzbek monetary unit, is not convertible. Luckily banks have been allowed to
sell foreign currency starting from 16 June, 2003 and so Som has been convertible.
However there are still some limitations in practice.144 The banking sector in Uzbekistan
is not developed enough and companies sometimes face unpredictable problems. It takes
a long time to transfer money. Companies, particularly the ones operating outside
Tashkent, are experiencing important problems because of the insufficient banking
system. Also the high level of state intervention in the economy slows down the foreign
investments in the country.

3.3.5.3 Eximbank Credits

Uzbekistan is the only country that pays its credit debts on a regular basis among
the Turkic Republics. Turkey and Turkmenistan signed a Goodwill Agreement stating
that Turk Eximbank would give credits to Uzbekistan.

It was estimated in 1999 that Turk Eximbank had given credits worth $375
million, of which $125 million would be used for funding exportation and $250 million
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of which would be used for development projects. Uzbekistan spent a significant portion
of this credit. Uzbekistan used $124.6 million of exports credits and $244.5 million of
project credits.145

Uzbekistan tries to reform its industrial sector. It is important to watch for the
latest improvements in the industrial sector and let the Turkish investors benefit the new
opportunities in the sector.

3.4 Conclusion

Trade analysis, in this chapter, reveals that Turkey’s trade volume with each of
the five countries shows an increasing trend only after 2001. This is the result of two
economic crises: the 1998 financial crise of Russia and the 2000 and 2001 economic
crises of Turkey. Foreign trade of the ex-Soviet states was dependent on the Russian
economic situation. During the 1998 economic crises in Russia, people of the region
preferred to buy Russian products, which were cheaper than Turkish products. Turkey
also experienced a strong financial crisis in 2001 and this led to the contraction of the
economy. Interest rates and public debt increased and economic growth became unstable.
This economic weakness was inevitably reflected in Turkey’s foreign trade and
investment.

One common theme, which attracts attention when Turkey’s investment capacity
in the region is considered, is that Turkey enjoyed the privilege of exploiting the Central
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Asian Market in the absence of serious competitors. Post-Soviet countries are still in a
challenging transition from Moscow’s command economy to a liberal economy. There
are unstable tariff systems and unsatisfactory banking services and they lack regulatory
laws. Some of them have long conducted business by using their local monetary units,
which do not exactly match the value of Turkish lira and this has resulted in a loss of
money for Turkish businesspersons. These types of structural problems prevent big
companies from doing business there and small and medium sized Turkish companies
enjoy the privilege of being monopoly companies in their sectors.

During the Soviet rule, the regional economies were agricultural based. Farmers,
who produced raw materials for Russia, fell behind the technological developments in the
world. As a result of this situation, one of the major product groups that Turkey exports
to these countries are electronic devices both partial and as a whole. Another major
product of Turkey’s exports is automobiles because post-Soviet governments have been
unable to develop an automobile industry and to the demand for passenger automobiles.
Many new cars are foreign, exclusively Audi, Mercedes or Volvo. On the other hand,
Turkey mostly imports commodities like copper, leather, silk, mineral oil and cotton from
the Turkic countries. Turkey uses cotton, leather and silk for its textile industry which has
an important place in the Turkish economy.

One of the findings of this chapter is that the Turk Eximbank has done much to
stimulate trade and business links in the region. One point that is common to all five
republics is that they received Eximbank credits from Turkey for their national

95

development projects and financing trade.

One crucial area where Turkey’s economic interests lie is energy. It is important
for Turkey’s domestic energy consumption to supply oil and gas from the region’s energy
reserves. The two profound projects that Turkey was able to realize are the Baku-Tbilisi
Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline Project.

The BTC Project serves to interests of Turkey in two ways: It is the first
constructed pipeline which bypasses the Bosporus Straits, and Turkey has the privilege of
earning transit and operating fees from this project since the pipeline passes through
Turkish territory.

The Bosporus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the
Dardanelles link the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. However
this Turkish waterway is no longer an appropriate energy transit route because an
increasing volume of tanker traffic from the Black Sea can lead to accidents in the narrow
straits and it is quite busy because it supplies Europe with oil from the Caspian Sea
Region. The BTC pipeline was the best option for Turkey because Turkey does not want
to take the risk of heavy traffic in the straits.
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE
REGIONAL COUNTRIES

This chapter aims to explain Turkey’s engagement in the Caspian Sea Region
from a policy perspective since we are now acquainted with Turkey’s economic position
in the region. The time period that will be analyzed is from 1991 to the present. The
methodology used in this chapter is to analyze the five countries according to their
alphabetical order.

It is significant to examine the initial interactions between Turkey and the five
Turkic countries following the break up of the Soviet Union since this initial stage reveals
how enthusiastic the involved sides were to develop their traditional friendship into future
cooperation.

Following the initial relations of the early 1990s, I will continue with Turkey’s
constructive policies that contribute to these countries’ national development. Fields that
give Turkey and the regional countries the opportunity to establish close relations are
culture, education and communication which are analyzed in this chapter. I also looked at
Turkish military aid in support of the US security policies in the region. Also this chapter
explains Turkey’s attempts in the complex energy game which gathers worldwide
attention and which is quite complex.
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4.1 Political Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan
4.1.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Azerbaijan

Since the establishment of the republic in 1923, Turkey has avoided pan-Turkic
policies and has not shown special interest in the Turks living outside Turkey. Turkish
politicians have considered supra-nationalist policies as adventurous and have been aware
of the dangers of such policies since the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Thus “when
faced with the opportunity to establish close relations with the Soviet Republics after
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika policies”, as Aydin argues, Turkey still preferred to
keep some distance not to give the impression that it was seeking to undermine the
USSR.146 Foreign private companies and individuals were trying to create contacts with
these countries but Turkey avoided establishing official relations with the Soviet
Republics until the mid 1991s.

However Azerbaijan was an exception and the earliest governmental connection
with Azerbaijan occurred when the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, visited Turkey
in January 1990. We can say that Turkey has a special relationship with Azerbaijan
among all the Turkic Republics in the Caspian Sea Basin. Azeris, who live in Azerbaijan
and in some adjacent areas and whose dialect is closest to the Turkish spoken in
contemporary Asia, acknowledge the Turks living in Turkey as their brothers. They often
refer to the phrase, “We are two states and one nation” to express their sympathy for
Turks in Anatolia. In the northeastern corner of Turkey there are still families or their
descendants who have migrated from Azerbaijani lands. The Turks and Azeris have
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always been conscious of this kinship. The two countries are linked by strong historical,
cultural, and linguistic ties.

Aliyev’s first visit to Turkey was in 1990. During this visit Turkish politicians
were very cautious in their speeches knowing that Azerbaijan was still not an
independent state and was part of the Soviet Union. For example, when asked about
Turkey's view of events in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1990, then President Turgut Özal was
very careful, arguing that Turkey was concerned solely with its own internal problems,
and that the Azerbaijan crisis was an internal affair of the Soviet Union. Additionally he
emphasized that “Turkey was not nurturing aspirations of a Turkish empire that would
encompass the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union; rather it would continue to follow
Atatürk's policy of non-entanglement in foreign disputes, and the principle of ‘peace at
home, peace in the world’.”147

Azerbaijan has remained as part of the Soviet Union as the Azerbaijan Soviet
Socialist Republic from 1920 to 1991. Azerbaijan participated in the referendum about
the preservation of the USSR which took place in March 1991. The idea that came out of
this referendum was that people were supporting the preservation of the USSR. However
Azerbaijan declared its independence on 18 October 1991 and prepared a new
constitution and with this action Azerbaijan had declared itself as a presidential
Republic.148

Turkey became the first country to recognize Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan reacted
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warmly to Turkey’s interest. As an example of this closeness, in January 1992, Ayaz
Mutalibov visited Turkey. “We want Turkey to represent us to the outside world” said
Hasan Hasanov, the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan.149 Furthermore Salih Mehmedov
advisor to the Azeri Parliament and an academician at Baku University said, “If the
Turkish world is a body Turkey is its eyes and brain.”150

Ebulfez Elchibey got elected as the president in June 1992. Turkish politicians
increased their hopes to realize their policy goals in Azerbaijan especially after Elchibey,
who was a strong advocate of Turkey, became the president of the country. Following
Elchibey’s death, as letters of condolences emphasized, Elchibey was a strong Turkish
nationalist and during his life he had served to advance the position of the Azeri Turks in
the Turkish world.151

The Azeri leader attended the 1992 Ankara meeting, which took place among the
presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan.152 A declaration emphasizing common cultural values and the intention to
recreate common cultural elements including language was announced after this meeting.

At this summit Ozal delivered a message by saying that “if Turkey had used the
opportunity that was born after the break-down of the Soviet Union appropriately the
twenty first century would be the Turks’ century.”153 After explaining the brotherhood
among the Turkic world and pointing out the strength of solidarity and cooperation
among the Turkic people he added, “Our peoples are expecting this kind of cooperation
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because we are from the same origin; we are branches of the same great tree and we are a
big family”.154

Azerbaijan, in response, put Turkey in its foreign policy priority list. Azerbaijan
adopted the secular and multiparty system of the Turkish model. For example, twenty
two parties were registered following the 1992 election. Because of their secular
education during the Soviet era Azeri politicians and intellectuals felt close to secularism.
Zakir Hasimov, the Undersecretary in the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Ankara, underlined
that “they approved of the secularism of the Turkish model and had established their new
state according to this principle.”155

When Azerbaijan won its independence, the new nationalist president of
Azerbaijan, Ebulfez Elchibey, pursued an openly pan-Turkist policy. “He championed
close ties with Turkey and the adoption of the Latin alphabet for Azerbaijani Turkish."156
He was an admirer of Ataturk and a friend of Turkey. However he did not stay long in
office. He was dismissed in a coup, which attempted to disarm mutinous paramilitary
forces, in June 1993.157 This coup provided the opportunity for Aliyev’s return to power.
Elchibey’s dismissal seemed to underline Turkey’s plans to see Azerbaijan as a main
base to expand its influence in the Caspian Sea Area.

In the opposite direction to what the Turkish leadership was thinking Elchibey’s
replacement with Aliyev was not a situation against Turkey’s interests. Many political
analysts say that Aliyev was a more independent- minded leader than people had
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expected. Like Elchibey, Aliyev, a member of the Soviet Politburo in the Brezhnev era,
also tried to strengthen ties with Russia. At the same time Aliyev pursued a pro-Western
policy. As Larabbe and Lesser point out “the success of Turkey’s policy in the Caucasus
depends to a large degree on a continuation of the westward-leaning policies pursued by
President Aliyev in Azerbaijan and President Shevardnadze in Georgia.”158 Therefore
Aliyev’s pro-western approach complemented Turkish foreign policy goals. On the other
hand, Aliyev’s moderate policy towards Russia was mainly because he regarded Russia
as the main power of the region. This development did not mean that Turkey was no
longer important for Azerbaijan but that Azerbaijan had started to follow a more
pragmatic and realistic policy by balancing relations with Russia Turkey and Iran.

4.1.2 Turkey’s Reaction towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

A conflict has been going on between the South Caucasian nations of Azerbaijan
and Armenia over the disputed area of Nagorno Karabakh since the beginning of 1988.
As Cornell notes, “the conflict has led to over twenty thousand casualties and almost one
and a half million refugees, a refugee flow which has resulted in a considerable crisis
especially in Azerbaijan, with the number of displaced persons numbering close to one
million.”159 The occupied territory of Azerbaijan has been cleansed ethnically of its Azeri
population by Armenian forces within the course of warfare.

During the course of warfare some clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani
forces increased public tension in Turkey from time to time and this led Turkish policy
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decision makers to feel pressured to take military action against Armenia. One particular
event that caused Turkey’s concern for the peace of Transcaucasia was when Soviet
forces entered Baku following attacks on the Armenian minority in January 1990 and
several hundred Azeri demonstrators were killed.160 There was widespread sympathy for
the Azeris in Turkey resulting from the close historical and cultural ties. Turkish people
organized mass meetings to demand the Turkish government action against Armenian
forces. However the Turkish government adopted a very cautious approach insisting that
the events in Azerbaijan were purely an internal Soviet affair.

Another clash that renewed Turkey’s concern for the Azeris was the events of 26
February 1992. Armenian forces captured the suburb of Khojali next to Stepanakert and
massacred some 500 civilian on 26 February 1992.161 This event ended the détente
between Azeri and Armenian forces. The Khojali tragedy reignited widespread public
protests in Turkey and provoked President Turgut Ozal to suggest that “we should
frighten the Armenians a little.”162 However Turkish Prime Minister Demirel again did
not share Ozal’s view. Demirel criticized the President’s remarks as very mistaken since
they would prejudice the chances of a settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.163

Historically Azerbaijan has remained weak in the face of Armenian military
superiority. It has been suggested that a part of the responsibility in this weakness
belongs to Turkey for Turkey has been reluctant to help Elchibey. Turkey, on the other
hand, preferred to rely on international institutions for the resolution of this case.
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Turkey raised the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict before the Conference on Security
and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe and the Atlantic Cooperation Council (ACC)
condemning the alteration of frontiers by force. United Nations had stayed in the
periphery of the conflict but, as Cornell says, “the CSCE was the only institution to have
made significant efforts to achieve a lasting solution.”164Turkey confirmed that Nagorno
Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan. This had little effect on the Armenians who captured
the town of Shusha, the last Azeris stronghold in Nagorno Karabakh, in May 1992. This
marked the first significant military victory of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave
during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Turkey found it threatening when Armenian forces
also attacked the western end of the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan close to the frontier
with Turkey. The Turkish military was worried about the possible Russian advance in the
Trans-Caucasus. Even in the face of this critical event, the Turkish Prime Minister
Demirel avoided applying military means.

Demirel decided to resolve the crisis by diplomatic rather than military action.
According to some scholars’ interpretation Demirel could have acted with the assurance
he got from the United States because the United States expressed that “it would act
against any change in the status of Nagorno Karabakh or Nakhichevan on the basis of
force.”165 Moreover Russian military officials’ explanation also affected Turkey’s
decisions, which were on the side of diplomatic rather than military action. For example,
at the time of the crisis, which occurred in May 1992, Russian commander Marshal
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov declared that “Turkish military intervention could result in the
outbreak of a third world war.”166
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Although the Turkish government avoided intervening militarily in the region,
news alleging that Turkey had sent equipment and military personnel to help the
Chechens and Azeris have frequently appeared in the Russian and Armenian media.
Turkish officials denied these statements, declaring that, “in addition to some bilateral
agreements (that is, modernization projects) only a limited number of military officers
from the new republics were in Turkey for training.”167 Moreover Chief of Staff Mattei
Dogan Gures stated frankly that “the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity rather
than Transcaucasia was the military’s first priority.”168 This attitude of politicians and
military men certainly excluded serious military action for Azerbaijan in its crisis.

Turkish officials most of the time took action in accordance with NATO decisions
and peace programs. Azerbaijani officials, on the other hand, have never concealed their
desire to integrate themselves into NATO's military structure. The Partners for Peace
program was seen as a link in this regard by military commanders in Baku. Turkey was
perceived as a unique bridge that would allow Azerbaijan to get closer to the zone of
interests of the north Atlantic bloc.

Scholars and academicians agree on the issue that Turkey’s policy toward
Azerbaijan is mostly shaped by Turkey’s relations with Armenia. Any kind of action that
eases Ankara’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh put relations with Baku into trouble. The
events of September 11 have also affected the Caspian Basin region. With Russia seeking
better ties with the United States and NATO, Ankara and Yerevan have begun quietly to
explore ways to improve relations.169 Actually the only way to improve relations is to
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settle the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The common approach of Turkish officials is that it
is unlikely to improve diplomatic relations with Armenia without settling down the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

4.1.3 Turkey’s Energy Politics towards Azerbaijan

4.1.3.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project

Azerbaijan is an oil-rich country. However new pipelines need to be built to
transfer the energy to international markets since the Caspian resources are landlocked.
The issue of Caspian energy pipelines has assumed increasing importance resulting from
the fact that the way through which the oil will be transported is geopolitically very
important. Furthermore as Larabbee and Lesser say “a modern version of the 19th
century Great Game has emerged in recent years with pipelines replacing the railroads as
the main means for exerting political influence.”170

The EU and the US are interested in the proliferation of pipelines in exploiting the
crude oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian region. The European Union (EU)
Member States and the US have promoted the development of east-west transportation
corridors to deliver energy to European markets. Turkey, on the other hand, is not a
significant energy producer but it might be a key transit state due to its geographical
location. Consequently, Turkish policymakers can use this energy card to influence the
West by emphasizing its strategic value.
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Turkey has been seeking for the best option to bring the Azeri oil to the country.
Although the shortest route for a pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean can be
constructed by passing through the Armenian territory, the Karabakh conflict makes this
route unachievable.171 Aydin argues that “this, coupled with the US opposition to passing
the pipeline through Iran, left Georgia as the only possible route for the western line;
however, Georgia, too, has been struggling with a number of internal conflicts, a situation
that has obviously been in Russia's interest.”172 On the other hand, the US has supported
the BTC project politically from the beginning. Furthermore, as Aydin points out, “the
arrival of the US advisers in Georgia after the September 11 attacks, among other things,
has given a boost to the BTC project.”173

In March 1999 Richard Morningstar, the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin
Energy Diplomacy, explained why the US backed multiple pipelines and energy
corridors. Morningstar noted that “such a proliferation would strengthen the
independence and prosperity of the former Soviet republics as well as encourage
economic and political reforms; regional cooperation would be enhanced, and US
companies would benefit from commercial opportunities.”174

Turkey initially proposed to finance the Baku-Batumi pipeline project, which
offered very advantageous conditions, to Azerbaijan International Operating Company
(AIOC) before proposing the BTC project. This project would allow Turkey the
opportunity to control the flow of Azeri oil however AIOC did not approve this proposal.
According to the analysis of Aras and Foster, “before it fully realized the politically
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charged nature of the debate and the complexity of the factors involved, the AIOC
consortium decided to transport its oil to Western markets via an existing pipeline to the
Russian port of Novorossisk.”175 Then the consortium changed its course and decided to
transport its oil by tanker through the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean via Turkey's
Bosphorus Straits. Oil from the Chirag offshore field in Azerbaijan reached to the port of
Novorossisk in November 1997.176

Transporting oil through the Bosporus Straits raised objections from Turkey due
to the great environmental threat posed by the increased shipping volume. Aras notes that
“The Bosporus is one of the most difficult and busiest waterways in the world to
navigate.”177 Aras adds that, “nearly 45,000 vessels pass through the Straits each year,
and there are frequent accidents.”178 The Azeri officials were aware of the situation that
the Turkish government would not want to allow the massive increase in the Bosporus
traffic that would result from the usage of the Black Sea route for Azerbaijani oil.
Therefore the AIOC began to look for various alternative routes. One such route would
involve the transport of oil from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the
Mediterranean. Ankara highlighted that Ceyhan has a greater capacity to handle shipping
volume than Novorossisk, the Russian port. Moreover due to the smooth climate
conditions of the Mediterranean, Ceyhan is rarely shut down in a year. As expressed by
Ahat Andican, a former government minister and an influential figure in shaping Turkish
policy toward the Turkic republics of the FSU, "the total output from the Caspian and
Central Asia will eventually be 50 to 60 million tons a year, but the Baku-Novorossisk
and Baku-Supsa routes have a combined capacity of 16 million tons [a year]”.179
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Therefore the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was seen as the most inevitable and stable option.
Some critics of the Baku-Ceyhan route had attempted to bring the Kurdish insurrection in
eastern Turkey to the forefront of the debate, portraying that it was a potential threat to
the pipeline's security. But, by the end of 1997, this argument seemed to lose its force,
given that the Turkish army began to have considerable success in suppressing Kurdish
military activity.

Turkey was far from being alone in advocating the Baku-Ceyhan route. Jim
Norosky, vice-president of U.S. oil giant Amoco (which holds a 17.01 percent stake in
the AIOC), also suggested that “the Baku-Ceyhan route was preferable, despite the extra
cost imposed by its greater length” and he suggested that,” such extra cost should be
offset by tax breaks or other measures.”180 Turkey had also succeeded in gaining the
support of Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev, who was in favor of giving priority to
the direct Baku-Ceyhan line.

In March 1998, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan met the president of the AIOC in Turkey.181 The primary purpose of
the meeting was to brief the four other countries about the feasibility of the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline. These states confirmed their support for the project. Turkish and U.S. officials
went to great lengths to influence the decision. In Ankara, John Wolf, the U.S.
government's Caspian representative, said that the Azerbaijan International Operating
Company "must stop using the process of negotiations to block the solid test of BakuCeyhan in the marketplace."182 Eventually on 18 November 1999, leaders of the involved
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parts signed an agreement to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.The US
President Bill Clinton was also present at the meeting as a witness to the parties'
commitment.

In May 2005, Azerbaijan began test filling in the Azeri section of the pipeline
during the opening ceremony of the pipeline.183 On 10 August 2005 the first volumes
reached the Azeri-Georgian border and a year after the opening ceremony the first tanker
at the Turkish port of Ceyhan was filled with oil from BTC.184

Pipeline projects through Turkey such as the Baku Ceyhan or the Trans-Caspian
pipelines are political issues. Therefore the Western support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
Pipeline, when regarded from a policy perspective, was especially important for the US
to boost Western influence in the region at that time. These pipelines are equally
important for competing Russian influence in the region as well as to maintaining the US
containment policy towards Iran. Iran could provide an existing network of pipelines
easily expandable to transport oil and gas from Central Asia to Europe and South Asia.
International oil companies are advocating this cheap pipeline solution however this case
has developed into grand geo-strategic competitions.
4.1.4 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Azerbaijan

4.1.4.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Azeri Education

Education, which is expected to build bridges between Turkey and the Turkic
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Republics, is an important tool of Turkish foreign policy. There are some organizations
working to increase the educational standards of the Central Asian countries.

TICA is one of the most involved organizations of the Turkish Foreign Ministry,
to develop relations between the Turkic Republics and Turkey. This relationship between
Turkey and the Turkic Republics is exercised in the following areas; the agreement for
cooperation in economy, trade, transportation, communication, tourism and sports, the
search for Turkish investment, the opening of Turkish cultural centers, student and
teacher exchange programs, academic conferences, providing scholarships for university
students, opening Turkish language schools, offering training for banks, the foundation of
Turkish banks, broadcasting to Eurasia and providing of help in the training of public
administrators and bureaucrats.185 TICA has a coordination office in Azerbaijan operating
since 1992.

TICA is working actively in the area of education. TICA’s projects within the
context of ‘Support for the Education System in Azerbaijan’ aims to help the education
system in various regions of Azerbaijan reach international standards and operate in
modern facilities.

TICA’s Baku Program Coordination Office obtained materials including reading
books, student desks and chairs, teachers’ desk and chairs, bookshelves, blackboard,
computer, printer, cassette player, satellite dish and DVD players. According to the
announcements made on TICA’s official website, School Number 149, which is part of
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the Ağdam Rayon Tahsil Branch, is one example, the needs of which were met by TICA.
Migrant children having migrated from upper Karabakh as a result of political discord are
receiving education at this school.

TICA carried out repair and maintenance work within the framework of the
request by the school’s management for the establishment and fit out of a Turkish
education classroom.186
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Table 2: Number of Turkish Schools in the Region

COUNTRY

The Community of Gulen

Turkish

Turkish World Research
Institute

Ministry* of
Education

Number of
Number of

Number of

Number of
High

Number of High

High Schools

Universities

Universities
Schools

Schools

Azerbaijan

1

Kazakhstan

11

1

1

2

27

1

3

2**

Kyrgyzstan

2

11

1

1

Turkmenistan

4

16

1

1**

Uzbekistan

7

18

1

Source: Aras, Bülent (2000) 'Turkey's policy in the former Soviet south: Assets and options', Turkish
Studies, 1:1, 36 – 58
* Turkish Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics,
http://www.meb.gov.tr/Stats/ist97/MYHTML45.htm, (accessed 01.18.2008)
**These are departments located in different universities of countries mentioned

Other than TICA, there are more Turkish communities working in the area of
education in Azerbaijan. One strong example is the Gulen Community which displays
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special interest in education. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, followers of
the Gulen Movement have been vigorously involved with the new Turkic Republics.
They have founded nearly eighty high schools in the Central Asian countries.187 In
Azerbaijan they opened eleven high schools and also the Caucasian University. (see
Table 2) M.F.Gulen, who is a moderate Islamic scholar, encourages ties to the newly
independent Turkic states.

Members of the Gulen Movement see Central Asia as the cradle of Turkish
Sufism and historical homeland of the Turkish people.188 It is not only a matter of making
profits out of their businesses but also a mission to introduce the Turkish Islamic culture
and help them in their struggle to open up to the outside world. Human resource of this
community is composed of entrepreneurs, students, teachers and journalists.

Teachers and administrators working in Turkish schools see themselves indebted
to Central Asia and they want to make contributions to this region’s development in order
to pay back to the Sufis who provided great historical service to Anatolia and the Balkans
to bring peace. As Sen says, “having had a close relationship with the Seljuk and
Ottoman Beys, many dervishes and sheiks inculcated Islam throughout the countryside
and spread the new devotional life towards the frontiers.”189 Sen notes that “for Gulen
they were the so called colonizer dervishes and ghazis who devoted themselves to God’s
service and who played a decisive role in the Islamization of Anatolia and the
Balkans.”190

114

Gulen’s community separates itself from other groups with its Turkish identity
along with its Islamic identity. Currently Turkish schools continue their educational
activities successfully with a sufficient educational infrastructure. Islamic circles, on the
other hand, generally work to spread Islamic identity rather than Turkish identity. To this
end Islamic groups heavily opened Quranic schools and built mosques and neighborhood
centers to increase Islamic awareness.191 These institutions play a crucial role in teaching
and disseminating religious values and practices.

These efforts of Turkish groups have been fruitful. The Turkish schools are
people’s favorite schools in Azerbaijan. Students affiliated with these schools return to
their countries with awards from science Olympiads. Moreover teachers offer classes in
official Turkish as an elective subject by the Azerbaijan Department of Education in
some schools based on an application by the school administration due to student
requests to learn Turkish.

4.1.4.2 Turkish Policy in Culture

One of the Turkey’s policy goals was to promote Latin the alphabet and Turkish
language in Azerbaijan in the last decade of the 20th century. It would be easy to
communicate once Azeris started to use the Latin alphabet. The use of a common Turkic
alphabet within the Turkic world would even be better. In accordance with Turkey’s
goals, Azeri academician Kamil Veliyev also argued that “without a common language
and a common alphabet it would be impossible to solve major problems” and he
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advocated that “Anatolian Turkish should be the common language for Turkic
peoples.”192 At the beginning of February 1992 the Azerbaijani government decided to
abandon the Cyrillic alphabet and revert to the Latin alphabet.193 Azerbaijan’s adoption
of the Latin alphabet was regarded as a success, by some sources, for Turkey’s and the
Turkish model by some sources.

Turkey has tried to be active in the religious field as well. A revival of Islam had
occurred in the Turkic Republics following independence. However there were some
deficiencies to truly practice Islam. They needed books on religion and their mosques
needed repairing. Although their aims were different, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia
began to send Korans and other religious books to the republics and experts were sent to
teach Islam. Considering that the majority of the population is Shiite in Azerbaijan, Iran’s
eager help was quite considerable. Iran distributed tens of thousands of copies of Koran.
Turkey sent thousands of books to the Muslim Republics. Not only the Turkish state but
also the Turkish private sector was involved in this issue. Turkish voluntary organizations
also provided books on religion and Turkish culture.

Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs sent imams to the Azeri community to
teach Islam and built mosques to let people practice their daily praying ceremonies.

As a non governmental endeavor TICA also works in the area of culture with the
intention to emphasize common values with the Turkic states to move closer to them.
TICA explains in its website that it supported the foundation of Turkology Department as
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part of the Turkey Research Institute of Azerbaijan Slavian University and supplied the
needs of this department such as desks, computers, curtains and air conditioners.194

4.1.4.3 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan

Turkey has devoted great attention in the field of telecommunications and
transport since 1991. Ankara has been able to create a dependent relationship for access
to international lines. The Turkish Communications and Transport Minister Yasar Topcu
went to the Turkic Republics accompanied by fifteen deputies and a large number of
bureaucrats and journalists and inaugurated a 2500-line capacity digital telephone
exchange established by the Turkish PTT in Azerbaijan.195 Since 1991 Turkish
companies such as Netas and Turkcell have assumed an important profile in the strategic
sector providing the infrastructure for telecommunications. In 1999 Netas was operating
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan through its subsidiaries, Ultel and Vesnet, respectively. In
the growing sector of mobile telecommunications, Turkcell plays a leading role running
GMS services in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.196 Indian and Pakistani companies also
helped the Central Asian Republics to modernize and improve the poor telephone system
inherited from the USSR.

Important steps were also taken in the field of broadcasting. Turkish Radio and
Television Corporation TRT INT Avrasya TV Channel began broadcasting to the Turkic
Central Asian states and Azerbaijan on April 27, 1992, the day when the Turkish Prime
Minister started his tour to the Turkic Republics.197 Avrasya TV was supposed to further
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the existing cultural and social ties with these countries and to form a solid bridge. As
Baharcicek mentions, the Turkish broadcasting “was an important move that could
develop closer cultural relations and understanding among the people of the region and
contribute to Turkish political influence.”198

Upon the demand of Azerbaijan Ministry of Agriculture, TICA started the project
for the restoration of Abseron, Guba and Gence Chemistry Research Stations’
infrastructure. TICA contributed to the installation of modern equipment for the
laboratories organizing various training programs for the personnel and increased
personnel standards in 2004. Moreover TICA has offered technical cooperation to the
Azeri Ministry of Tariffs based on the protocol signed on June 7, 2002 between the
Turkish Republic Prime Ministry and Ministry of Finance. Within the scope of this
project TICA offered consultation services about tariff system in Baku and internship
opportunities in Turkey.199

Other than TICA, Turkish institutions such as the Turkish Standards Institute, the
State Statistics Institute and KOSGEB began to offer technical training and consultancy
services for diplomats from Turkic Republics as well.

4.1.4.4 Turkey’s Contributions in Azerbaijani Transportation

Turkey wanted to develop transportation projects so that Azeris and Turks would
not be dependent on land links so that the geographical gap between the two countries
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would be lessened. Turkish Airlines had already initiated direct flights to Baku. However
it was more difficult to improve land transport than to improve airway transportation.

Turkey focused its attention on Georgia. Georgia bordering Azerbaijan could
provide the Anatolian Turks with a land bridge to the Turkic world. For this purpose
Turkey adopted a plan to build a highway, which would join the Caucasian region
extending from Kars to Baku, along the Black Sea Coast within the EU’s transport
corridor program between Europe, Caucasus and Asia. Jung and Piccoli explain that
Turkey and Azerbaijan signed several agreements for the joint use and restoration of
Georgia’a Batumi airport. They add that “even more important is the intended
construction of a direct rail link between the Turkish and Georgian cities of Kars and
Tiflis which once completed would be connected to the railway to Baku.”200 These are
planned projects to ease the geographical distance which is still important in this age of
fast communication. One project that Turkey has already achieved through TICA is the
renovation of highways in Azerbaijan.

4.2 Political Relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan

4.2.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Kazakhstan

The Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic became the Republic of Kazakhstan on 10
December 1991. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was supporting the unity of the
USSR but when the three Slav Republics established the CIS on 8 December 1991
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Kazakhstan also declared its independence on 16 December 1991. Kazakhstan became
the last of the former Soviet Republics to declare its independence after the Soviet Union
had effectively collapsed.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, Kazakhstan followed a policy line, which
encouraged the country to keep equal distance with other countries, including Turkey.
There were some reasons for Kazakhstan to keep itself distant from Turkey. As Bal
explains, firstly Kazakhstan’s territory is the largest among the Turkic Republics and it is
also rich in natural resources. Moreover Kazakhstan possesses nuclear weapons inherited
from the USSR.201 Bal notes that “these reasons in general and additionally the Western
world’s interest in Kazakhstan since the early days of its independence gave Kazakhstan
a feeling that it was superior to the other Central Asian Republics.”202 The second factor,
affecting Kazakhstan’s approach towards Turkey, was related with the ethnic
composition of the country.

It has been suggested that Kazakhstan remained impartial towards the Turkish
model not to disturb the large Slavic groups in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s ethnic
composition had been an excuse for Nazarbayev’s reluctance to give full support to some
aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy. For example; Nazarbayev evidently refused to sign a
statement implying the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an
independent state.203 It was the Turkish officials’ strong wish from the Turkic Republics
to recognize North Cyprus. It has been argued that the Kazakh president had some
concerns in approving North Cyprus as an independent country because parallels could
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be drawn between the position of the Russian minority in Kazakhstan and that of the
Turks in Cyprus. Kazakhstan’s large Russian minorities put significant pressure on the
Kazakh leadership. The third factor may be regarded as valid for all Turkic peoples.
Kazakh people were not willing to have another big brother and feared that Turkey might
seek to play this role.204 Kazakhs believe that their country’s geo strategic position is
sufficient to make it a regional power.205 Lastly, Turkey’s decreasing interest towards
Kazakh politics, particularly after President Ozal’s period, was an important factor
preventing the two countries from moving close to each other.

Despite these factors Kazakh people have shared a desire to develop their
relations with Turkey. President Nazarbayev expressed this wish as well. For example
when Nazarbayev was asked in an interview by the Washington Times whether he saw
Kazakhstan as directed more to the North, to the Russian and European traditions or to
the South and Islamic traditions that lay deep in the country’s roots his reply was: “As
you know Kazaks are Muslims and historically Kazaks belong to a Turkic group of
people; the Soviet states have separated us from maintaining a relationship with those
cultures and those peoples so naturally we are inclined toward Turkey and the Southern
Muslim states.”206

Nazarbayev, as an expression of his sympathy for Turkey, paid his first official
visit to Turkey on 25 September 1991 after the unsuccessful August coup in Moscow.207
When Kazakhstan declared its independence on 16 December 1991 the Turkish
parliament was the first to recognize Kazakhstan only 30 minutes after the declaration of
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independence.

The Kazakh President wanted Kazakhstan to be identified as a Turkic Republic
and therefore attended the Ankara Summit of the Presidents of the Turkic Republics in
October 1992. By doing so the Kazakh president hoped to improve the political relations
with Turkey and the Turkic Republics. However at this summit when Ozal proposed a
common market Nazarbayev did not welcome this offer enthusiastically. He said, “Now a
Turkish common market is a subject of secondary importance. Above all a unity should
be achieved among the Republics created by the disintegration of the USSR.”208

Actually several conferences regarding the newly emerging Turkic world were
held outside Turkey. One of these conferences was organized by Kazakhstan Democratic
Party in Alma Ata in January 1992.209 The participants appealed for the establishment of
a Turkic state stretching from Kazan to Alma Ata gathered around the idea of Turkism.
However these initiatives did not receive official Turkish support. Ankara, has always
kept itself distant from such movements.

Turkish officials have always been aware that any kind of pan-Turkic movements
are not popular among Turkic people of the post-Soviet region and are repressed by the
Central Asian governments. Therefore Ankara cannot have control over pan-idealistic
movements. Additionally extremist pan-Turkic groups are not popular in Central Asia
and their activities are closely monitored and sometimes repressed by governments. From
an economic perspective of the 1990s the Muslim republics were reluctant to install
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Turkish monopolies. They encouraged instead the involvement of Russians and Turks
together in economic and trade projects and ventures. Furthermore Kazakhstan has its
own agenda independent from Turkey and Russia. For instance, Kazakhstan, as a
republic of minorities has been inclined to encourage Kazakhs to return home, in order to
alter the demographic balance.

Kazakh leaders favored the Turkish model in economy. Now and then Kazakh
leadership expressed that Kazakhstan was attracted by the economic development that
Turkey successfully achieved so quickly. At the same time, Kazakh leaders did not
preclude other success stories. For example, they looked at Asia for economic models.
Strategically Nazarbayev was careful not to leave Turkey out either. He said that “the
only state in front of them was Turkey” and he added that “South Korea is close to us”
but their historical ties with Turkey and Turkish success in the short term was
necessitating to give priority to Turkey.210

Kazakhstan perceived Turkey as a representative of the Western style of
democracy and of moderate Islam in contrast to Russia or Iran. Turkey was supposed to
bring US economic and financial support to Kazakhstan. Actually support for Turkey
would be stronger if Western businessmen had shown up immediately following the
declaration of independence to make investments in the country with the efforts of
Turkey.

In the eyes of Kazakh leaders Kazakhstan and Turkey shared some similar
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features. The constitution describes Kazakhstan as a democratic, secular and unitary state
and grants full rights to all citizens.211 Furthermore Kazakhstan makes similar claims as
Turkey to being a bridge between Asia and Europe, emphasizing its strategic position in
the region.

The Turkish people, affiliated with whether governmental or private
organizations, have tried to be very active in attempting to expand their economic and
cultural roles but, like other states involved in Kazakhstan, they have not been able to
make much impact on a generally problematic environment. Although there is political
pluralism to some extent Kazakhstan is not a democratic state. After the collapse of
communism the president rigged elections jailed oppositionists and undermined
parliamentary power in order to strengthen their executive rule.212 Islamist groups are
present in Kazakhstan leading the country to instability. In contrast to their broader
appeal in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan however the Islamist groups in Kazakhstan tend to
be concentrated in specific regions and among specific ethnicities namely among Uzbeks
living in cities along the borders.

4.2.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Kazakhstan

4.2.2.1 Economic Relations

Kazakh leaders had been positive about economic cooperation but their general
approach was not to support groups based on religion and ethnicity. The goal of the
124

Kazakh foreign policy makers was to improve political and economic relations with
Turkey but at the same time not to block other options. For example, Kazakhstan signed
twelve joint venture projects with foreigners immediately after gaining its
independence.213 Nevertheless Turkey was also important for Kazakhstan. Turkey would
connect this country to Europe by recreating the Silk Road. To bring this idea from
theory into practice, Kazakhstan organized a meeting in Alma Ata on 22-24 April 1992 at
which the opening of a Trans-Asia railway was proposed arguing that the Silk Road had
become important again and that this road would belong to the Turks.214 Also, in
reshaping itself, Kazakh leadership expressed that Kazakh people thought of Turkey as a
good example with its development and modernization history starting from its
independence in 1923 to present time.

Kazakhstan supported Turkey in the operation of the BTC Pipeline. In March
2001 the Kazakh President offered an interesting argument. He said that oil from
Kazakhstan’s East-Kashagan field would be transported through Baku-Ceyhan.215Kazakh
oil was worth considering as an alternative. It could back up any deficiencies in the Azeri
oil. However, as Larrabee and Lesser say, “industry spokesmen now claim that reserves
in Azerbaijan are sufficient to make Baku-Ceyhan commercially viable even without
Kazakh oil.”216

Other than these projects, TICA contributed to Kazakh economic development
with its projects at the state level. One of the contributions of TICA is the ‘Modernization
Project of Kazakh Ministry of Economics.’ Within this project TIKA offered consultation

125

services, expert training courses and provided software for economic development
programs. TICA also established an education center for training the labor force in the
business fields where foreign investors are heavily making investments.

4.2.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Kazakh Education

One of the major educational projects of Turkey is the establishment of Hoca
Ahmet Yesevi International Turkish University in cooperation with the Kazakh
government. Ahmet Yesevi is the first Sufi mystic who lived in the 12th century and a
prominent leader for the whole Turkic world. He gathered his poems in his masterpiece,
Hikmet (Wisdom), in Turkish. He was the first intellectual to use Turkish language in a
period when all other intellectuals were writing in Arabic and Persian. This project is
important for both countries considering that future policy initiatives are launched not
only but governmental circles but also they are planned in universities.
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Table 3: Number of Turkic Students in Turkey in 2001
COUNTRY

Middle

Tomer

Pre-College

College

Grad. School

TOTAL

School

Azerbaijan

64

61

313

212

650

Kazakhstan

93

21

384

127

625

82

421

208

721

7

877

86

970

Kyrgyzstan

3

7

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

TOTAL

4

3

164

171

1999

2

635

6

2872

Source: Turkish Ministry of Education

Kazakhstan welcomed the opening of Turkish high schools, the total number of
which is 14. (see Table 3). Kazakhstan also responded positively to Turkey’s offer and
sent 1,109 students for higher education and 169 students for secondary education in the
1992-1993 education term. In 2001, there were totally 625 Kazakh students continuing
their education in Turkish schools in Turkey. (See Table 3)These students, whose
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countries have fallen behind the world in technology, are taught the knowledge and skills
related to recent technological developments. By doing so, these schools contribute to the
development of Kazakhstan.

Additionally TICA opened its Program Coordination Office in June 1995 in Alma
Ata and TICA’s most recent project in the area of education is about Kazakhstan’s
statistical activities. TICA shared its experiences in compiling and recording statistics in
accordance with the Turkish Statistical Institution (Turkstat). With the help of Turkish
statisticians the first Agricultural Census was conducted and the preparation of
questionnaires, methodology activities etc, has been completed in 2006.217 This project
also offered consultancy services, working visits and on the job training activities. The
statistics is an important field in this age of communications and technology and this
project will enable Kazakhstan to plan its future.

4.2.2.3 Cultural Relations

During Nazarbayev’s visit to Turkey on 29 September 1992, Turkish and Kazakh
officials signed a Cultural Cooperation Agreement.218 It was decided that the tombs of
Seyh Ahmed Yesevi and his teacher Hodja Aslan Baba in the city of Turkestan in South
Kazakstan would be repaired by Turkey. Seyh Ahmed Yesevi is an important figure for
Turks. Seyh Ahmed Yesevi, who lived in the 12th century and who was an influential
religious leader of his time, helped the founders of the Ottoman Empire by uniting people
around Islam.
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Ankara wanted the Latinization of the languages in Central Asia. For this reason,
Turkish media circulated its newspapers and publications in the Muslim republics and
hoped to make Turkish the dominant language of the area. However, as Bal explains,
unlike other Turkic Republics, Kazakhstan did not welcome the quick adoption of a Latin
alphabet to replace Cyrillic. Nazarbayev remained neutral on this issue. Although Kazakh
leaders believed that using the Latin alphabet would further draw them near to the
Western world they never intended to change the alphabet. In addition to economic and
practical reasons the large Russian population in Kazakhstan would never allow this
change.219

TICA also made some cultural contributions to Kazakhstan. TICA chose specific
projects that would increase the cultural awareness of the citizens of the two countries on
common Turkic-Islamic values. With this aim in mind, TICA has provided financial
assistance for printing the books which are, ‘Principles of Turkism’ by Ziya Gokalp and
‘History of Turkish Folklore’.

The TICA Alma Ata Program Coordination Office has also helped Philosophical
and Political Sciences of Kazakh Institute organize a conference on Farabi’s Heritage and
World Culture. Farabi is an important Muslim scholar who united metaphysics and
politics. TIKA printed the articles presented at this conference. Division of KazakhTurkish Traditional Ornaments as part of the Traditional Kazakh-Turk Arts was opened
in 2000 following the protocol signed between TIKA and Kazak Korkut Ata Kizilorda
State University Presidency. Moreover ten different carpeting courses are being given in
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Kazak-Turk Crafts Center which operates in coordination with Kazakh Turkish
Traditional Ornaments Division.220 Furthermore TICA opened Alma Ata Cultural Center
in Kazakhstan in 1997. Some of the activities carried out in this center are organizing
educational conferences, exhibits and offering series of courses in arts and sciences.

4.2.2.4 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Kazakhstan

After Kazakhstan proclaimed its independence Ankara assisted in rebuilding the
telephone, computer, television and satellite communication systems cut by Moscow in
1992. Turkey was willing to renew telecommunications and transportations networks and
became quite successful in this area. As Robins says “Turkey’s public sector
telecommunications giant was quick off the mark in providing equipment free of charge
to the value of some $25 million to the five republics.”221 Since then Turkish private and
joint venture communication companies Netas, in particular, have strengthened this link
with factories opened in Kazakhstan. As Jung and Piccolli mention “Netas was operating
in Kazakhstan in 1999 through its subsidiaries Ultel and Vesnet, respectively.”222

In the growing sector of mobile telecommunications, Turkcell also plays a leading
role running GMS services in Kazakhstan. Other than Turkey, Indian and Pakistani
companies also help the Central Asian Republics to modernize and improve the poor
telephone system which was left from the Soviet period.

Turkey was enthusiastic to develop cultural links in Kazakhstan, which was seen
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as an area of expansion, through broadcasting. TICA’s goals in Kazakhstan were to
provide 24 hour non-stop and qualified broadcasting, to deliver this service to all parts of
country, to encourage media officials to open new channels, and to exchange ideas about
TV and radio programs in order to get closer ties between the countries. In this direction
TRT-Eurasia Channel started broadcasting in Kazakhstan in 1992.223 This channel, by
emphasizing common values and fostering close relations between the two countries,
would serve as an agent of Turkey in the country. However three years later Kazak
officials ceased the broadcasting because they couldn’t afford to meet the broadcasting
costs. In addition to this some republics were cautious about allowing broadcasting
directly to their citizens without official oversight.

In addition to these developments a technical cooperation agreement was signed
between TSE and the standardization of institutions Azerbaijan, Bashkiria, Chuvashistan,
Kazakstan, Kirgizstan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Tatarstan, Turkmenistan. Besides the
Unity of Standardization between Regions (Bolgelerarasi Standardizasyon Birligi ) was
established among Turkey and the Turkic Republics.224

4.3 Political Relations between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan

4.3.1 Initial Interactions of Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Following the Independence of
Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan declared its sovereignty on 12 October 1990 and Askar Akayev was
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elected as president unopposed on October 13, 1991 following the August Coup on 31
August 1991. The Communist Party was banned.

Following the declaration of independence the Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan
Roza Otunbayeva, who has explored the best possible ways to promote friendly political
relations, gave importance to Kyrgyzstan’s relations with the US, Europe and the regional
countries. After the declaration of independence Kirghiz President Akayev paid an
official visit to Turkey on 22 December 1991. Akayev, in Turkey, said that their aim was
to recreate the ties which were broken during the Communist period with their brother
country, Turkey, and to improve their relations in all aspects.225 When Akayev received
the letter proving Turkish recognition of Kyrgyzstan’s independence from Demirel, he
poetically defined Turkey as “the morning star” that would guide the path of the Turkic
Republics.226 Akayev saw Turkey as an important country providing the model of a
secular state which looks more to the West than to the Islamic world. Kyrgyzstan’s goal
was to establish a state built around the ideals of democracy, secularism, respect for
human rights and the rule of law. During his visit to Ankara in December 1991, the
Kirghiz President gave emotional speeches emphasizing Turkey’s leadership role in the
Turkic world. Also Kyrgyzstan opened its first embassy in Turkey.

Turkish political leaders were also satisfied with the Kirghiz President’s closeness
to Turkey. President of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, visited Kyrgyzstan in 1991. During this
visit to Alma Ata, Ozal signed a protocol defining future relations.227 This protocol
addressed issues regarding the expansion of relations in all fields, especially direct
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contacts between business firms as well as between governments. Following
Kyrgyzstan’s Declaration of Independence Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin also visited
Kyrgyzstan officially along with other Turkic Republics. The aim of this visit was to
examine the needs and deficiencies of this country and to prepare for future projects.
During this visit some agreements to promote relations particularly in the areas of culture
and education were signed.

Kyrgyzstan, without committing itself to following the Turkish model, welcomed
the main characteristics, in particular secularism and a market economy of that model.
Kirghiz leaders see Turkey and the Turkish model as an instrument to understand the
West and Western culture. They quite often underline the strong ties between Turkey and
Kyrgyzstan in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, religion and history but like other
newly independent Turkic republics, Kyrgyzstan wanted equal relations with Turkey
while trying to open up to the outside world.

Turkey’s successful economic transformation and democratization of its social
structure was being closely watched by Kirghiz politicians. Kyrgyzstan was also decisive
to change its centralized economy to a market economy. At every opportunity the Kirghiz
Prime Minister pronounced Turkey’s economic progress as a meaningful goal for the
entire Turkic world. At the 3rd Economy Congress, which was held in Izmir between 4-7
June 1992, Deputy President Kulov of Kyrgyzstan said: “We are now studying Turkey’s
economic system in detail; we will soon change to a free market economy and we want
extensive cooperation with Turkish businessmen.”228 Turkey had limited sources to aid
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Kyrgyzstan economically. Despite this fact in order to establish better relations with
Kyrgyzstan, Turkey volunteered an assistance of 75 million dollars.229

A liberal and democratic system appeared to be created out of the break up of the
Soviet system in Kyrgyzstan. However the government and elections turned out to be
corrupt. After the collapse of communism the Kirghiz president, who is accused of dirty
elections, responded severely to criticisms and weakened parliamentary power in order to
strengthen the executive rule.230 There are also Islamist groups, many of them originally
extending from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in this country. Radical Islamist groups, which
are concentrated in specific regions and among specific ethnicities, threaten the political
and economic destabilization in the country. In relation with this situation one of the
features of Turkey that the Kirghiz leaders appreciate the most was the secular character
of the Turkish model. They wanted to maintain a moderate form of Islam in the country
and to achieve this they wanted help from Turkey. For example Kyrgyzstan asked Turkey
to build a mosque in Bishkek and wanted religious books.

Neither the efforts of Kyrgyzstan nor the efforts of Turkey to get closer in the last
years of the 20th century can be interpreted as a sign of pan-Turkic policies. However
some explanations of Turkish leaders had been interpreted in this direction at that time.
For example, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel declared in February 1992 that
“with the disintegration of the Soviet Union a gigantic Turkish world was currently being
formed stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.”231 This declaration
was interpreted as sing of Turkey’s pan-Turkic policy intentions. Apparently slogans,
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which referred to an enlarged Turkish world, would undermine the trust between Turkey
and Russia. To fix the situation Demirel made another speech in Kyrgyzstan emphasizing
that, Turkish politicians were considering Turks as a big family but they were not
actually pursuing pan-Turkic policies. It was Turkish politicians’ approach to refer to
Central Asia and Azerbaijan “as a new Eurasian community populated by Turks”.232 It
was not the wish of Turkish policy makers to administer Turks in other parts of the world
but they wanted to integrate Kirghiz people with the rest of the world.233

Although there are some organizations displaying pan-Turkic leanings the
regional leaders have always been against any kind of ultra nationalist formations.
Kirghiz leaders are of the same view as well. Kirghiz leaders are in favor of nationalism
rather than pan-ideals. This is because, as Fawn says, “nationalism provides a critical
source of social cohesion for states in the midst of profound transformation.”234 They are
opposed to the setting of a supranational mechanism to coordinate the Turkic world such
as Turkic Common Market or Turkic Bank. Knowing the sensitivities of the Turkic
leaders, the Ankara Declaration, which was published as a result of the First Turkic
Summit, made no reference to any organizations based on ethnic grounds. Furthermore
the Kirghiz leaders wanted their population to think themselves as a national community
distinct from the former Soviet Union. As Huskey suggests, “designed in part to prevent
the rise of pan-Turkic sentiment in Central Asia, the formation of separate republics in
the 1920s developed pan-Kyrgyz, pan-Uzbek and pan-Kazakh communities in areas
where the forces dividing these ethnic groups such as tribalism and regionalism were
often as potent as the forces uniting them.”235
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4.3.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Kyrgyzstan

4.3.2.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Kirghiz Military

Turkey supports Kyrgyzstan militarily as well. Turkey, which is a NATO
member, trains Kirghiz servicemen. Recently Turkey and Kyrgyzstan decided to act
together to fight against terrorism. The Turkish and Kyrgyz presidents decided to create
an expert group to combat international terrorism in October 2000.236 The Turkish
delegation donated some money for non-lethal military equipment to the Kirghiz armed
forces. This was the third Turkish donation since the 1999 incursion of Islamist
insurgents into Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 Turkey granted $210,000 to Kyrgyzstan for the
purchase of modern communications equipment and agreed to fund logistical and
military technical assistance for over 3000 Kirghiz armed forces personnel.237 This
donation was to support Kyrgyzstan against the Islamic incursions in August 2000.

Another military agreement signed between General Staff Head of Logistic
Deparment Unal Ozsipahioglu and Kyrgyz Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of
General Staff Nuredin Comoyev in June 2000 foresees military cooperation in the realm
of education, science and technology in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek. This agreement
includes training of Kyrgyz military units, increasing defense and assault capacity of
these units and financial and technical assistance to Kyrgyz army. According to the
agreement, the Turkish General Staff will offer equipment and technical assistance worth
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of one billion U.S. dollars to the Kyrgyz army. Ozsipahioglu said at a press briefing that
“Turkey's main goal is to help Kyrgyzstan to fight against terrorism and help it maintain
security not only in its own land but also in its border regions.”238

4.3.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Kirghiz Education

Historically education has been the most effective tool to create a peaceful
society. This function of education is also applicable to the NIS of Central Asia and the
Caucasus in transforming the society.

Turkish and Kirghiz leaders have started to work for educational projects in 1992.
The Ministers of Education of the Turkic Republics and Turkey met at the First
Conference of Ministers of Education of Turkish Republics in Ankara in 1992.239 One of
the decisions taken in this meeting was the creation of a common Turkish language apart
from emphasizing student exchanges and cultural activities. The Second Conference of
Ministers of Education of Turkish Republics took place in Bishkek between 29
September and 3 October 1992.240 In this conference participants decided to create a
‘Common Program of History and Literature in the Turkish World’. A commission was
created to make initial preparations. It was also seen as an important step to begin
preparations to adopt the Latin alphabet for the unification of the Turkic world.

Turkey has been cooperating with Kyrgyzstan to establish vocational training
schools, high schools and even universities. Many of these activities are coordinated with
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the contributions of TICA, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education.

There are thirteen high schools and also Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University
funded by Turkey in Kyrgyzstan.241 As Balci, Demir and Akkok explain the curriculum
of these schools is the same as in schools in Turkey. Additionally the Turkmen/Kyrgyz
language and the Russian language are taught as elective courses. These schools provide
one year for teaching a foreign language. The instruction in social studies is in Turkish
however the science and math courses are taught in English. Four of these schools were
opened by Turkish Ministry of Education. The remaining schools were opened by the
Sebat Education Company in Kyrgyzstan.242

Kyrgyzstan also welcomed Turkey’s offer and sent 384 students for higher
education and 344 students for secondary education in the 1992-1993 educational term.
Totally there were 721 Kyrgyz students receiving their education in Turkey in 2001.(see
Table 3)

Kyrgyz parents mention as one of the reasons for sending their children to
Turkish schools, mention the close relationship between the Turkish and
Turkmen/Kyrgyz people because of cultural, religious and linguistic affinities. One
Turkmen parent said: “Students who finished in these schools will have important
positions in Turkmenistan in order to take the country to world standards because they
can attend universities in any Western country with the qualifications gained at this
school.”243 Moreover the common characteristics of Turkish school students, as
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frequently stated by all the participants, are being “well-bred, hard working, honest, goal
oriented, self-disciplined and rational individuals who appreciate the modern way of
living.”244 Generally these activities are regarded as a welcome supplement to Turkey’s
official endeavors in cultural and educational cooperation with the Turkic states.

4.3.2.3 Cultural Relations

Turkey and Kyrgyzstan display mutual willingness to get closer in terms of
culture as well as education. Kyrgyzstan reacted positively to the Turkish offer of
adopting a Latin based alphabet, which was seen as an important instrument for the
unification of the Turkic world.

Both Turkish and Kirghiz leadership saw a common alphabet as a significant tool
to ease the relations between the two countries in the areas of culture, education and
economics.

As a sign of close relations the Ankara meeting on 30-31 October 1992 among the
presidents of the Turkic Republics, was held245and the idea of using a common Latin
based alphabet was raised in the Ankara Meeting, which was held in 1992 among the
presidents of the Turkic Republics. The intention of this meeting was to reproduce
already existing common values the most important of which was language. The leader of
Kyrgyzstan also attended this meeting. The declaration which was announced following
this meeting emphasized the common cultural values between Turkey and the Turkic
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Republics. Turkish leaders were enthusiastic in exploiting the historical opportunities in
the best possible way influenced by the spirit of this meeting. Kirghiz leaders also gave
emotional speeches upon this gathering in Ankara.

Tunegun Kasymbegov, advisor to the Kirghiz president and head of the
Commission on Culture to the Kirgiz Assembly, said that, “we Turkic peoples used to
have one common language” and stressed that the reason why there was currently no
common language was because “some Turkic peoples were subject to Russia, China and
Iran.”246 He talked about the will of Kyrgyzstan to adopt the Latin alphabet and reminded
the audience that the Kirghiz president had established a commission in the Kirghiz
parliament to administer the adoption of the Latin alphabet. In response to these claims
Turkish Minister Koksal Toptan promised to publish the necessary books in Turkey and
send them to the Turkic Republics.247 Furthermore Anvarbek Mokeev, who was an
undersecretary at the Kirghiz Embassy, even advocated the development of a common
written language based on Anatolian Turkish in the long term.248 Despite this positive
exchange of ideas, Kyrgyzstan never implemented the alphabet change. Actually
Kyrgyzstan wanted to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet but because of
economic problems they did not have the opportunity to put theory into practice.

Additionally TICA, which is a unique technical assistance organization affiliated
with the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, operating in 37 countries across 3 continents
including Europe, Asia and Africa, established a new computer library, which would
serve 300 students, in the Brigadier, General Aliev Police Academy in Kyrgyzstan. This
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lab would enable security personnel to record criminal data to assist in the struggle
against crime. TICA’s Bishkek Program Coordinator Office has been operating in
Kyrgyzstan since 1993, and particularly in 2006, TICA was quite active implementing 51
projects in the country. The educational and social projects include provision of on the
Job Training for Teachers, training for Kirghiz Police Radio Media Members, training
support for Kyrgyz TV Personnel, Support for Kyrgyz News Agency, Equipment and
Expert Support for the Kyrgyzstan KABAR International News Agency. Some of the
cultural projects provided Support for the World Folk Epics Festival in Bishkek and
Support for the Kyrgyzstan Cultural Week Celebrations.249

4.3.2.4 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan

Turkey established technical cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan. A
technical cooperation agreement was signed between the TSE (Turkish Standardization
Institute) and the matching standardization of institution in Kyrgyzstan. Also Unity of
Standardization between Turkey and the Turkic Republics was established.250
Additionally The Turkish Standards Institute and the State Statistics Institute (TICA) and
the Center to Develop and Support Small and Medium Scale Industry (KOSGEB) began
to offer training technical and consultancy services in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan was still using the poor telecommunication system inherited from the
USSR. In order to modernize the telephone system in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey installed a
2500-line capacity digital telephone exchange established by the Turkish PTT.251 Turkey
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was also enthusiastic to broadcast Turkish programs in Kyrgyzstan. Turkish Radio and
Television Corporation (TRT INT), Avrasya TV Channel began broadcasting in
Kyrgyzstan on April 27, 1992.252 Avrasya TV was described as cementing the existing
cultural and social ties with these countries and forming a solid bridge between Turkey
and Kyrgyzstan.
4.4 Political Relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan

4.4.1 Initial Interactions of Turkey and Turkmenistan Following the Independence
of Turkmenistan

On October 1991 the Turkmen voters opted for independence in their national
referendum and the next day the Supreme Soviet declared the country’s independence.
Eventually the Republic of Turkmenistan was born.

After Turkmenistan’s Declaration of Independence Turkey became the first
country to recognize it and to open an embassy in Turkmenistan and Turkmenistan in
return opened its first Embassy in Turkey. Saparmurat Turkmenbashi also paid his first
visit abroad to Turkey in 1991.253 Turkmenbashi with his seventy delegates spent four
days in Turkey. This visit led to several agreements related with economic, commercial,
scientific and technical co-operation communications. Both sides’ leaders launched
regular flights as a result of this visit.

Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenbashi, had very positive thoughts about Turkey. He
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welcomed the characteristics of the Turkish model, secularism and market economy in
particular. Furthermore Niyazov, personally, was an admirer of Ataturk and he even
called himself as Turkmenbashi which has a similar meaning with Ataturk. Ataturk
means ‘father of all Turks’ and Turkmenbashi means ‘head of all Turks’. While returning
from Turkey to Turkmenistan, Turkmenbashi said:

We are expecting many things from Turkey. Firstly we want to be
recognized by Turkey. I explained in Turkey that we would give
citizenship and soil to those who want to come to Turkmenistan from
Turkey. We not only regard Turkey as a gate open to the West, but with its
big potential we regard Turkey as a partner which will show the path to
the Turkmen economy. It is possible to establish a Turkic common
market.254
Turkmen leaders, like other Turkic leaders, attended the 1992 Ankara Summit.
Newspapers reported that it was the first time a meeting had taken place among the
Turkic states in history and with this meeting the Turkish world was about to be officially
born.
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It should be noted that Turkish politicians were not pursuing pan-Turkic

policies but held this meeting to revitalize the common cultural values. Turkish President
Turgut Ozal promised to explore the needs of Turkmenistan and to give support to
Turkmenistan at all levels.

This meeting the first major visit to Turkmenistan took place in March 1992.256
The Turkish Minister of Education Koksal Toptan, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, State
Minister Serif Ercan, officials from the Ministry of Education and Foreign Ministry, and
businessmen and members of the Turkish Press participated in the visit, to a total of a
hundred and fifty people. Several decisions were taken during this visit for future
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cooperation.

Despite these developing relations in the last years of the 20th century, meetings
and contacts between Turkey and Turkmenistan cooled down later on. This is partially
related with Turkmenistan’s neutral status in its external policy. As London explains
“neutralism is somewhat related to isolationism although it does not actually rule out
foreign contacts rather it is isolation from political commitments to either the West or the
East.”257 Turkey respects Turkmenistan’s choice of such a neutral line but this kind of
policy does not offer a profitable basis to engage in collective actions in fields such as
security or economy. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, sees neutralism as the best option
to protect itself. Turkmenistan is among the richest countries in the world in terms of
hydrocarbon resources and Turkmen leaders saw neutrality as the best way to protect its
raw materials from becoming an object of discord between the regional centers of power.
The leadership thought that this neutrality would also ensure the country’s territorial
integrity and security.
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4.4.2 Turkey’s Energy Politics towards Turkmenistan

4.4.2.1 The Blue Stream Project

Source: www.economist.com/images/20070414/CEU957.gif

Figure 10: The Blue Stream Project

The Blue Stream Project was a complex project because it combined the issue of
oil pipelines with those of gas pipelines. Turkey used to meet its natural gas demand by
deliveries, which reach the country via Bulgaria, from Russia. To increase natural gas
delivery to meet rising needs Turkey and Russia decided to build a gas pipeline through
the Black Sea to the Turkish port of Samsun. From Samsun the gas would be delivered to
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the Anatolia. The Russian Energy giant Gazprom has concluded a joint venture with the
Italian ENI to realize the Blue Stream Project. This is a very important project for
Turkey’s energy politics. Therefore Turkey is careful not to hamper Russia from using
the Bosporus Straits as an energy transit route.258

The problem with the Blue Stream was that there were problems between Iran,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. They had different claims on the ownership of Caspian
resources. Turkmenistan took a position on the side of Iran and against Turkey. Analysts
argue that Turkey has a chance to avoid dependence on Russia with the Transcaspian Gas
Pipeline (TCGP) project. Opponents of the project also argue that the Blue Stream would
damage relations between Turkey and such states as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, which
would stand to benefit if Turkey buys its gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia instead
of Russia. The Turkmen President Niyazov and the Azeri President Aliev were concerned
about Turkey’s pipeline selections. Aliev said, “Turkey doesn’t need Blue Stream.”259

Moreover the technical feasibility of the Blue Stream Project raised some
questions. The Black Sea section of the Blue Stream would be the deepest gas pipeline in
the world and that the Black Sea is one of the most polluted seas in the world is an
important problematic issue to consider. This presents dangers of pipe corrosion from
acidity and possible pipe collapse as a result of hydrostatic pressure. The Black Sea is
also susceptible to earthquakes, which could not only result in costly repairs but could
present environmental hazards.
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Despite these discourses Turkey and Russia initiated this pipeline officially in
November 2005 with the attendance of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

4.4.2.2 Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project

Turkey’s foreign policy towards Turkmenistan is mostly shaped by the energy
issue. Turkey has been looking for alternative gas supplies to decrease dependence on
Russia. Turkey’s search for alternative routes is a challenging path, however. For
example one gas deal with Iran, planned by Necmettin Erbakan, who was in office as the
prime minister of Turkey in 1996, with Iran severely annoyed the US administration
because the US administration decided that this gas deal was violating Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act. Upon the US’s reaction Turkey planned to combine the Iran-Turkey
pipeline for a larger project. This project would aim to bring Turkmen natural gas to
Europe via Iran and Turkey. Washington finally accepted that Turkey’s gas deal with Iran
does not violate the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Turkish officials were thinking about
signing an agreement with Iran to create a competitive environment. Eventually this
would lead to a decrease in the cost of natural gas in Turkey. However this project has
never been realized and it remained on paper.260
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Source: www.transatlanticpolitics.com/category/russia/

Figure 11: Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project

Turkey’s other plan was to bring gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey. The Clinton
administration was also advocating that a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan
to Baku and on to Turkey as part of the east-west transportation corridor.

Turkey organized a meeting for foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan and Georgia to build support for its preferred pipeline route. Some
agreements were signed concerning the development of the Trans-Caspian pipeline at the
Istanbul Summit Meeting in November 1999 of the Organization for Security and CoOperation in Europe OCSE. The key document was a multilateral agreement on the
construction of the pipeline between Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey and Turkmenistan. This
document was a follow up to one already signed on 29 October 1998 between
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Turkmenistan and Turkey on the export of Turkmen gas to Turkey. The two countries
agreed on 30 bcm per year. Turkey would consume 16 bcm and the rest would be reexported to European markets.261 Moreover Niyazov signed an agreement with the
Minister of Energy of Turkey. This agreement offered the two companies, Botas and 21.
Asir Turkmenin Altin Asri, to sell the Turkmen gas to the Turkish and European markets.
Turkmenistan has the greatest gas reserve and potential to create a satisfactory business
environment that would encourage major gas projects rather than discourage investors.
However any development in the Turkmen-Georgian section has not yet been achieved.

4.4.3 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Turkmenistan

4.4.3.1 Economic Relations

Turkmenistan has one of the least developed economies of the former Soviet
republics. It has been reflected in the speeches of Turkmen leaders that Turkmenistan
welcomed the market economy example of the Turkish model. Turkmenistan, like the
other Turkic Republics, has tried to transform its centrally planned economy into a
market economy. Turkmenistan saw Turkey as a model in this transformation and wanted
to be a friend of Turkey to find its path to success. Turkmenistan and Turkey enjoy good
economic relations. Turkey gave Eximbank credits which were worth $75 million to
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, is Turkey’s largest trade partner in
Central Asia. Also Turkmenistan offers a huge regional market for Turkish construction
companies.
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Some projects towards the goal of promoting Turkmen economy have been
implemented by TICA. TICA sent a group of experts in economics to Turkmenistan
between 6-12 June 2004 to exchange ideas with administrators in the Turkish Ministry of
Economics and Finance working in the area of taxes. The two parts designated areas
where Turkmen officials need help and they also made a schedule of proposed events.

During this visit the Turkmen side had been informed about taxing applications
and financial politics of Turkey. Turkmen officials prepared a list of topics on which they
need training and submitted this list to TICA. TICA announced, in its website, that it
would start the necessary training programs upon the signing of Financial Cooperation
Protocol directed towards Eurasian Countries between TICA and Turkish Ministry of
Finance.

4.4.3.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Turkmen Education

Turkey made some contributions in Turkmen education system as it did in other
Turkic Republics. There are 20 Turkish schools established by Turkey in Turkmenistan.
Four of them were opened by the Turkish Ministry of Education and sixteen of them
were opened by Baskent Education Company262 (See Table 2). One of these schools is
called Turgut Ozal High School and the university’s name is International TurkmenTurkish University. The curriculum of these schools is the same as in schools in Turkey.
Additionally the Turkmen/Kyrgyz language and the Russian language are taught as
elective courses. These schools leave one year for teaching a foreign language. All
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courses are given in English except social sciences classes.

The Turkmen parents provide their reasons for their preferences for the Turkish
schools, such as “the opportunity to learn four languages (English, Turkish, Russian and
Turkmen/Kyrgyz languages); more discipline, the training of students as well-behaved
and hardworking individuals; the high quality of instruction (e.g. education at world
standards); and the opportunity to develop computer skills.”263

Turkmenistan also positively responded to Turkey’s offer and sent 1,185 students
for higher education and 519 students for the secondary education in the 1992-93
education terms. Turkish Ministry of Education gave scholarships to close to one
thousand students for their undergraduate and graduate education. (see Table 3)

TICA has opened a coordination office in Ashgabat and has been actively
working in Turkmenistan since 1997. The most important project of TICA in terms of
culture is the restoration of the mausoleum of Sultan Sancar. Sultan Sancar represents a
shared treasure of Turkey and Turkmenistan and TICA’s projects bring the two countries
closer by revitalizing this common historical and cultural heritage. TIKA has restored the
mausoleum of Sultan Sancar and organized a conference on Sultan Sancar and His
Period following the opening ceremony of the mausoleum on 18 November 2004. Sultan
Sancar is the last Seljuk leader who lived in the 11th and 12th centuries. This story of this
project goes back to 2001. Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party,
has promised to restore the tomb of Sultan Sancar during his visit to Turkmenistan. This
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tomb is among the World Heritage List of UNESCO.

TICA also met the modification and installation costs of Turkmen-Turk Library,
which is based on a 222m² area and has books more than 10.000 books, 8000 of which
are Turkish books. This library is a division of World Turkmens Humanitarian
Association, the president of which is Saparmurat Turkmenbashi.

Regarding the alphabetical change Turkmenistan welcomed Turkey’s offer of
Latin alphabet. The Turkmen leader Saparmurat Turkmenbashi said that they would
begin to use the Turkish Latin alphabet and the Turkish books donated by Turkey.
Turkmenbashi believed that to use the Latin alphabet would bring Turkmen people
spiritually closer to the civilized world.264

4.4.3.3 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan

It was important for Turkey to give technical training and consultancy services to
respond to Turkmenistan’s demands on its way to development. Staff members are like
the wheels of a working industry. Being aware of this Turkish institutions such as
Supporting Small and Medium Scale Industry (KOSGEB) began offering courses to train
Turkmen staff. Also diplomats from Turkmenistan attended courses organized by the
Turkish Foreign Ministry. Turkey and Turkmenistan also signed a technical cooperation
agreement between the Turkish Standardization Institute and The Standardization
Institute of Turkmenistan.265
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Turkey also helped Turkmenistan to modernize Turkmenistan’s transport and
telecommunications system. Turkish companies along with Indian and Pakistani
companies helped Turkmenistan to improve the poor telephone system, which remained
from the USSR. Turkey launched phone lines for digital telephone exchange in
Turkmenistan.

To develop closer cultural relations and understanding among the people of the
region and to contribute to Turkish political influence Turkish Radio and Television
Corporation TRT INT Avrasya TV Channel began broadcasting in Turkmenistan on the
day the Turkish Prime Minister started his visit to the Turkic Republics. This channel was
a bridge between Europe and Asia. The TV programs beamed to the Turkic Republics
were met with pleasure.

4.5 Political Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan

4.5.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan was founded as a Union Republic of the USSR in 1924. This republic
declared its sovereignty in 1990 and became independent on 1 September 1991. Islam
Kerimov arose as Uzbekistan’s leader and the Communist Party was renamed as the
People’s Democratic Party.

Turkey was an example for the Uzbek Republic in terms of economic reforms, the
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balance between religion and state and the experience of overcoming ethnic and cultural
difficulties. These features of Turkey made it a useful model for Uzbekistan. The
apparent approach of the Uzbek leadership was that, because of the ethnic and linguistic
links between the Uzbeks and Turks, Uzbeks were attracted by the Turkish model.

Kerimov visited Turkey between the 22nd and the 24th of December 1991. In his
speeches and declarations he described the path that Uzbekistan would follow:
As the state of Uzbekistan we are taking Turkey as an example in all its
aspects. We will establish the state from A to Z by taking Turkey as a
model. If Turkey supports us no one else can enslave the Uzbeks.266
Uzbek leadership was an admirer of Ataturk and Uzbek leaders hoped to realize
what Ataturk had succeeded in Turkey. The principles of Ataturk were parallel to those
that Islam Kerimov wanted to install in Uzbekistan. Another important indicator of
Uzbekistan’s warm welcome to Turkey and the Turkish model was that Kerimov gave
the headquarters of his country’s Foreign Ministry to Turkey to use as its embassy.267
These factors suggest that Turkey enjoyed unrivalled prestige in Uzbekistan by the ethnic
links with Uzbeks and by its economic success.

One area in which Uzbekistan has been rather reluctant to adopt from Turkey’s
political system was a multiparty system. The Uzbek political system was not yet ready
for plural democracy. One important factor which causes instability and disunity in the
country is that Uzbeks are the major diaspora in the region.268 They form considerable
minorities in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and some Kirghiz leaders supported by
some Kirghiz people are threatening to intervene in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to defend
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their co-ethnics or drive them towards secession. Moreover some Tajik intellectuals are
dreaming to regain Samarkand and Bukhara, the lost Islamic lands of Tajikistan, back.
For these reasons stability was obtained at the price of repressing almost all dissent inside
and outside Kerimov’s administration in Uzbekistan. In other words, President Kerimov’s
priority is to guarantee a stable political environment, even at the cost of undermining the
basic rights and liberties of the Uzbek people.269

An exchange of official visits occurred between the two countries’ leadership in
1992. The Turkish Ministers visited Uzbekistan between the 28th of February and the 6th
of March 1992 with the aim to observe the needs of these countries on the spot and obtain
information for future projects. This visit helped to improve cultural and educational
relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan. Eight agreements in different fields were
signed in Uzbekistan.270

While the two parties’ leadership was trying to get closer, nationalist fractions
were surfacing in Uzbekistan. For example Aras says that “The leader of the banned Erk
Party in Uzbekistan, Muhammed Salih, argues that Turkmenistan is more than a
geographical term; it also means an ethnic term.271From nationalists’ perspective,
Moscow is blamed for dividing Turkestan into different nations such as Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan.

Furthermore these movements had close relations with nationalist parties in
Turkey but this closeness and support of Turkish parties were not approved by the former
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Soviet states’ governments. Islam Kerimov was against a supranational mechanism
which would coordinate the Turkic world. He was clear in expressing his limitations in
his involvement of any pan-Turkic movement. On the Turkish side, although there were
nationalist fractions leaning towards pan-Turkic policies such as The National Movement
Party and its local organizations gathered around the ideal of Turkism. Turkey’s general
approach towards purely ethnic ideologies was negative. Most importantly Uzbekistan,
similar to the other Turkic Republics, was still a weak state. It needed to restructure and
modernize the economy, build its state from scratch, and it had to deal with its own
domestic problems like public health problems, high inflation and unemployment.

In general, Uzbekistan welcomed some of the aspects of the Turkish model such
as secularism market economy and closeness to the West. Uzbekistan wanted to benefit
by Turkey’s experience in economic transformation from a centrally controlled economy
to a market economy. Moreover Turkey was expected to help Uzbekistan attract foreign
investments. Turkey, on the other hand, was willing to meet Uzbekistan’s expectations
and to establish joint business councils with Uzbekistan. For example the first such
council, the Turkish Uzbek Council, was set up as early as November 1991.272

As mentioned above although the multiparty aspect of the model was nominally
welcomed in practice it has not been accepted and the authorities claim that for the sake
of stability implementation of democracy has been delayed.
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4.5.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Uzbekistan

4.5.2.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Uzbek Military

Uzbekistan is the most strategically located country among the Central Asian
states. While it has the largest population and the most significant military capability, it
has also been a center of regional tension. In Uzbekistan radical Islamist groups, which
are Hizb-üt Tahrir, Al Qaida and The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) cause
political instability. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is based in Tajikistan
and in Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan and which tends to attack the Fergana
Valley, the area between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, is one of the greatest
threats to Central Asian security.273

In 1999, Tashkent was plagued with several bombings which have been linked to
the IMU.274Three suicide bombings blasted outside the embassies of Israel and the US.
Innocent Uzbeks were killed at this event. The IMU was probably behind car bombs in
Tashkent in February 1999 that aimed to assassinate Uzbek President Islam Kerimov and
that killed 16 persons.275 The IMU also launched a series of attacks in 2000.To combat
the threat of the IMU, the Uzbek government has preempted with a policy of arresting
thousands of alleged terrorists.276 However this policy backfired as the repression of
human rights and civil freedoms has promoted radicalism and militancy within
Uzbekistan.277
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Following the August 2000 Islamic incursions Turkey immediately offered
Uzbekistan financial aid. Turkey promised to train Uzbek-counter terrorism teams in its
military academies. Under a 16 October 2000 military cooperation agreement the two
countries further agreed to jointly fight international terrorism and other criminal
activities and discussed the possible transfer of Turkish arms and other military
equipment to Uzbekistan’s armed forces.278

Moreover the events of September 11th opened new opportunities for Turkish
diplomacy, especially in the military field. Currently Turkey is providing important
military assistance to train and equip the Uzbek army in the war against terrorism. This
assistance has helped ease the tensions evident in the mid and late 1990s and has given
Turkish-Uzbek relations important new impetus.279

Turkey and Uzbekistan became partners in countering terrorism however
Uzbekistan creates a contradictory situation by its own human rights abuses. According
to the Human Rights Watch Report there are major abuses of the rights to freedom of
religion, expression, association, and assembly. Moreover Uzbekistan justifies its human
rights abuses by referring to the global campaign against terrorism. The same report
states that “the government justifies this campaign by referring to the “war on terror,”
failing to distinguish between those who advocate violence and those who peacefully
express their religious beliefs.”280 Although Turkey shares Uzbekistan’s concerns about
Uzbekistan’s security threats and supplies aid and military education to this country281,
Uzbekistan’s weaknesses in the areas of democracy and human rights are likely to
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impede Turkish-Uzbek relations in the long term.

4.5.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Uzbek Education

Turkey invited students from Uzbekistan between the years 1992 and 1993
following Prime Minister Demirel’s official visit to the Turkic Republics as part of
cooperation in education. These students learned Turkish in their first year and the next
year they attended Turkish universities and colleges. However a major problem in the
educational exchange program occurred when Uzbekistan called its students back to
Uzbekistan.

The Uzbek government believed that Uzbek students in Turkey would be
influenced by the Uzbek opposition in Turkey. It was suspected that some of these
students were attending street demonstrations with members of the Uzbek opposition. In
the 1992-93 academic year 1120 students and in 1993-94 244 students were called back
to Uzbekistan. By 1997 only 438 Uzbek students were registered at Turkish schools.282 In
2001 there were only six Uzbek students continuing their education in Turkey. (See Table
2)

People of this region believe that the Turkish schools make a big contribution to
the improvement of close relations between Turkey and the host countries. There are 25
high schools and one university established by Turkey. (see Table 2) Parents increase
their knowledge of Turkey through their children and the teachers and administrators
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working in these schools get extensive information on Turkey’s politics, economics,
social and cultural life through their Turkish colleagues. Special days of Turkey are also
celebrated by all students and parents, such as the foundation of the Turkish Republic and
the annual commemoration of the death of Ataturk.

Moreover Turkish teachers establish close friendships with local people by
inviting students’ parents to their homes for dinners to introduce Turkish meals, family
patterns and culture. It is not hard to see that the most important factor that carries these
schools to success is teachers’ work with enthusiasm. They feel part of the Turkic world
and see what they are doing as a historical mission since they share the same religion,
history and a similar culture with the Turkic people. They are also in good relations with
the Turkmen government which supports Turkish schools.

These schools give people hope for a better future. Administrators and teachers
believe that their students are offered a high-quality education and they will carry their
countries to the world standards by catching up with the universal values.

Education can be used as one of the most direct means to mould the political
culture of a target country by attempting to create a generation of elites familiar with and
sympathetic to the culture and to the country that provides the education.283In this
direction, Uzbeks strongly believe that the Turkish schools train the future bureaucrats,
leaders and technocrats who are equipped with various skills such as language, computer
and leadership skills. After graduation students hope to get into the Turkish universities
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and find a good job in Turkish companies. They trust in themselves since they can work
in any part of the world with their foreign language, which is English, and academic
skills. Students who are trained in Turkish schools are the pioneers in the development of
their countries.

4.5.2.3 Cultural Relations

Uzbekistan has an important place in the Islamic culture. Moreover Tashkent was
chosen as the Capital of Islamic Culture in 2007 by ISESKO which is a subsidiary
organization interested in education, science and culture of the Organization of the
Islamic Culture.284 However, Uzbeks, under the Communist Soviet Rule, have felt the
negative government pressure in openly confessing and practicing their religion.
Religious teachings at schools were banned and people were exposed to atheist
propaganda. By the late 1980s, as Kendzior argues, “the Soviets had succeeded in
curtailing religion in Uzbekistan by removing its outward manifestations: closing
mosques and madrasas; banning sacred texts and languages; outlawing non-statesanctioned religious leaders and congregations.”285

Within this context Kerimov says that they were raised up in nihilist and atheist
conditions without knowing the value of Islam. He adds “To my understanding Islam is a
democratic regime and encourages love for human beings. Islam means purification. It
doesn’t allow you to exceed certain moral limits.”286During the presidency of Islam
Kerimov mosques and religious schools increased in number.
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Turkish officials opened educational centers in Uzbekistan to teach Islam and
they sent imams to serve people at mosques. TICA and other numerous voluntary
organizations gathered books and Qurans to send to their Uzbek brothers. Apart from
Turkish religious aid, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya and Egypt have sent Korans and
other religious books to the Headquarters of the Religious Board in Tashkent and helped
to build new mosques and seminaries.

TICA’s presence in the country was felt by its financial aids as well. TICA has
donated a $5000 financial source for the project which would generate electricity from
solar power. TIKA has also provided assistance to Uzbekistan in various areas such as
training for Uzbek diplomats, Uzbek radiobroadcasters, building greenhouses and
milling.

In the case of alphabet reform, although Uzbekistan considered both Arabic and
Latin alphabets, it later decided to adopt the Latin alphabet which would strengthen the
relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan by easing communication between the two
sides. At the same time the adoption of the Latin alphabet brought Uzbekistan closer to
the West. Kubicek notes that “scholars in Uzbekistan proposed to create a common
language from the various Turkic tongues spoken in the region, and received initial
backing from President Islam Kerimov.”287 On this issue Kerimov said that in the case of
the alphabet they would make a decision between the Arab and Latin alphabets and their
preference would be on the side of the Latin alphabet.288
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4.6 Conclusion

Turkish leaders were quite satisfied that the ex-Soviet states had approached the
Turkish development model with great willingness. The Turkish model offered a Western
type of political and economic system. The common features of this model are a secular
and democratic political system, a liberal economy and closeness with the West. For
these features, Turkey had credibility in the eyes of the Turkic governments. Since the
characteristics of the Turkish economic and political system were supposed to integrate
these states with the rest of the world it was crucial for the states of Central Asia, which
was called as “periphery”, “isolated” or landlocked, to connect to the global system in
this new post-Soviet international system.

One of the findings of this chapter is that despite the alleged brotherhood between
Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey avoided the option of helping Azeris with military
intervention during the discourse of warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey
and Azerbaijan shared the same goal to liberate occupied Azeri territory from Armenia.
Moreover there was great public pressure resulting from the common socio-cultural ties
on Turkish government to fight with Armenia militarily in cases of severe crises such as
the massacre in Khojali in1992. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s only ally in this conflict, however
Turkey officially did not respond to the expectations of the Turkish citizens and the Azeri
government. Turkey avoided military confrontation with Russia who has been on the side
of the Armenians. Above all, Turkey’s general stance in case of conflicts is to apply to
the international institutions for a resolution. Turkey prefers to work in cooperation with
the UN and CSCE in Europe to alleviate the conflict.
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In all the republics Turkey has been actively implementing educational policies.
The role of education is crucial in transforming the economic, political and cultural
systems of the former Soviet Republics. The Turkish Ministry of Education and some
private groups like the Gulen community have opened high schools and universities in
these states. These schools have been able to build up a good reputation throughout the
region. Students gain awards from the international scientific contests. Most importantly
they contribute to the reformation of society by turning out to be responsible and well
behaved individuals as graduates from Turkish schools.

Like education, culture is another field that Turkey gives importance to achieve
its policy goals. As London notes “the advantage of cultural exchange probably is the
contact it creates and the possibility that some stereotyped prejudices old or new can be
eliminated.”289One major goal of Turkey in the area of culture is to promote the Latin
alphabet and Turkish language. All republics except Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan changed
their alphabets. A common language and a common alphabet would ease any kind of
relationship whether it’s political or economical. Common language would strengthen the
Turkic identity and bring people closer.

Turkey has been actively working in the area of religion as well. Following the
independence of republics people of the region have made their needs well known to
Muslim communities outside the region. In response to this demand Turkish Ministry of
Religious Affairs and some voluntary organizations sent thousands of books on Islam.
Fuller says that “As a result there is a profusion of literature in local Central Asian
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languages about Islam and its meaning.”290 Turkey also tried to meet peoples’ demands
about learning Islam by opening religious centers.

Turkey has the strongest energy link with Azerbaijan. Not only oil but also natural
gas is exported from Azerbaijan. Turkey needs natural gas for domestic consumption and
Turkey’s first gas supply from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz-Guneshli field started to flow in
2007.

Turkey’s choice of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas exporting country proves that
common socio-cultural ties are important for Turkey in doing business with other states.
Turkey can buy oil from Russia and Iran as well. However Turkey is not comfortable in
doing business with these two countries as much as it is comfortable with Azerbaijan.
Cultural patterns of Turkey and Russia are quite different with the former based on an
Ottoman-Islamic heritage and the latter based on a Christian- heritage. Moreover there is
a 500-year history between Turkey and Russia and they are considered to be
“archrivals.”291 As far as Iran is concerned Turkey is not enthusiastic to engage in
business relations with this country considering the conflicting relations between Iran and
the US, which is a strong ally of Turkey.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 Findings

This thesis reveals that both Turkey and the five Turkic republics were eager to
expand their relations in every field into future cooperation following the break up of the
Soviet Union. During the time period between 1991 and 1993 Turkey had its closest
relations in the Caspian Sea Region. In these years official and work visits occurred and
several agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation were signed.

Turkish leaders were quite satisfied that the ex-Soviet states had approached the
Turkish development model with great willingness. Since the characteristics of the
Turkish economic and political system were supposed to integrate these states with the
rest of the world, it was crucial for the states of Central Asia which were described as
“periphery”, “isolated” or “landlocked” to connect to the global system in this new postSoviet international system.

The Turkish model offered a Western type of political and economic system. The
common features of this model are a secular and democratic political system, liberal
economy and closeness with the West. For these features Turkey had credibility in the
eyes of the five Turkic republics. Moreover the US presence in this region had positive
impacts on Turkish policy. The US’s major concern in the area is to prevent the spread of
radical terrorist activities and to limit the Iranian influence in both political and economic
terms. Turkey, in this context, as an ally of the US, could avoid the US’s such concerns
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by acting as a stabilizing factor in the region. For Turkish policy makers, on the other
hand, a US dimension, supporting Turkey’s economic and political interests, is quite
attractive. In the view of this background information on Turkish-American agreement,
we can better understand US’s moves towards supporting Turkey. From a policy
perspective, the US supports Turkish development against Iranian influence. Turkey
offers its model of secularism in a mostly Muslim population, parliamentary democracy
and a free market economy.

These republics’ political leaders all expressed their wish to follow the guidance
of Turkey in their path to democratization and marketization and extended their goodwill
and desire to be close partners with Turkey in the future. They have a communist political
culture separating them from democratic societies and they looked to Turkey in their
efforts to establish democratic systems. As Kazemin and Ajdar stated “there is an elite
class that was reared and socialized in a highly restrictive and controlled Soviet
system.”292

Numerous speeches of Turkic leaders of the period emphasized that they had
chosen Turkey as the leading country to help them integrate with the rest of the world. It
was reflected in these speeches that common ethnic, historical and religious ties
explained their preference for Turkey as the best country to help them in their transition
from Soviet rule to independence. Turkey shares a friendly history rooted in the Ottoman
Empire with those countries. Their ethnic commonality as Turks dates back to 2000 BC
from origins in inner Asia and they all speak Turkic dialects. Adding to these assets they

167

are the members of the same religion, Islam. For example the Kirghiz president Akayev
saw Turkey as “the morningstar of the Turkic world showing guidance to other
Republics”293 or Azeris consider Turkish people in Turkey as part of their nation. As
Aras says “The historical and linguistic ties Turkey maintains with much of the region
allows for it to be perceived a s a model for these countries to leave their Soviet past and
enter today’s society in their unique identities.”294 Turkey enjoyed the privilege of its
common ties with the Turkic countries in easily establishing the initial contacts with
these countries. In other words Turkey’s past experiences with regard to the Caucasian
and Central Asian region served as strong references for its role as the major actor in the
future.

Factors other than common ties that help to fully understand Turkey’s role and
function in the Caspian Sea Region are to act as a bridge between the regional countries
in the Caspian Region and the West to offer a successful development model, which was
mentioned above, for the developing countries of the region.

Turkey was quite attractive for Central Asian Republics as a strong member of the
Western alliance. As political observers state “throughout 1991–1992 nearly all Central
Asian leaders mentioned that they perceived Turkey as the model to follow since they
believed that their relations with Turkey could ease their entry in to the Western world;
those countries established an extensive network for cultural, economic and, to a degree,
military cooperation with Turkey.”295
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Moreover having gained independence, many Caspian states became determined
to move away from Russian influence. The mean that would be used to realize their wish
would be to seek to enter the Western alliance. Turkey would be the bridge between the
Turkic states of Central Asia and the West. Turkey was supposed to attract foreign
investment and to build contacts between the sides by using its familiarity with the
culture and similarity of the language. Consequently this would contribute to the
economic development of the countries by providing capital and sophisticated
technology. Another way of looking at the Turkic countries’ willingness to join the
Western alliance is that countries like to act in the same direction with the compatible
states as the best policy option to preserve themselves. As London mentions it, “many of
the newer states which undergo a stage of rampant nationalism have no choice but to
affiliate with others of similar interest.”296

Particularly Turkic leaders tied their hopes to Turkey’s EU membership. Turkey,
as an EU member, would be the agent to meet European entrepreneurs and natural
sources of the Caspian Sea Region. However it is in question if this expectation can be
fulfilled considering that Turkey is still far from changing its status from a candidate to
full EU membership.

As mentioned above Turkey’s offer of a Western type of development model
received positive responses and this gave the hope to Turkey to become a major player in
the region. However one disadvantage for Turkey in its historical past was the possibility
of leaning towards pan-Turkism, the ideology to unify all the Turks. Turkic peoples’
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reactions to pan-Turkic tendencies have always been negative.

The five post-Soviet republics were against any kinds of pan-movements at a time
when they were trying to build their own nations and identities. Rather they were fans of
Ataturk who pursued territorial policies with his famous motto “Peace at home, peace in
the world”. For example Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov was an admirer of Ataturk
and he even called himself as Turkmenbashi, which has the same meaning with Ataturk,
the head of Turks. Ataturk’s nationalist principle was distant from pan-ideals. Ataturk
acknowledged that the origin of the peoples of today’s Anatolia was in Central Asia but
he never advocated pan-Turkism, which is the ideology of the union of all Turks. Ataturk
rather pursued nationalist policies focusing on the development of the country. Actually
Turkic leaders’ admiration of Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, increased Turkey’s
credibility in the region. In opposition to Ataturk’s nationalist principle, pan-Turkism
suggests that the gathering of all Turkic people of the post-Soviet region under the
control of the same state. The pan-Turkist policies of Enver Pasha, who saw himself as
the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and
Afghanistan, and who was the commander of the 3rd Caucasian Army in the WW I,
brought Turkey to a complete catastrophe. Thousands of qualified Turkish military troops
were killed in their struggle against the Soviets to help Central Asians free themselves
from Moscow’s authority. This is an important event that holds an unfortunate place in
Turkish historical memory. Additionally the defeat of Turkish-German alliance against
Soviets put an end to Turkey’s pan-Turkist adventures. These historical events explain
political leaders’ distance towards pan-turkism. Except some marginal groups Turkish
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official policy has never supported any pan-Turkic formations.

Violent conflict is an ongoing problem in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Causes of these conflicts can be defined as a mix of religious, ethnic and political in
addition to foreign interests. The Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic conflict between the
Azeris and the Armenians and it is a border clash that Azeris and Armenians experience
in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. The boundaries of Caucasian states like those of
Central Asian and Middle Eastern states have been drawn artificially. Ethnically defined
republics have been separated with artificial lines. As Ajdari and Kazami say
“Everywhere people with the same religion, customs and language live on both sides”297
of the frontiers. On the other hand Oliker and Szyana suggest that the major cause of a
regional conflict is “the regimes themselves; their weaknesses and volatilities leave them
increasingly unable to withstand challenges posed by other fault lines.”298

The focus of attention here is not to discuss the causes of conflicts but Turkey’s
common approach towards these conflicts. This thesis shows that despite the alleged
brotherhood between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey avoided the option of helping
Azeris with military intervention during the course of warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Turkey and Azerbaijan shared the same goal to liberate occupied the Azeri territory from
Armenia. Moreover there was great public pressure resulting from the common sociocultural ties on Turkish government to fight with Armenia militarily in cases of severe
crises such as the massacre in Khojali in 1992. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s only ally in this
conflict. Turkey did not officially respond to the expectations of Turkish citizens and the
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Azeri government. Turkey avoided military confrontation with Russia which has been on
the side of Armenians. Above all Turkey’s general stance in case of conflicts is to apply
to the international institutions for a resolution. Turkey prefers to work in cooperation
with the UN and CSCE in Europe to alleviate the conflict. Actually this is the visible side
of the iceberg. It has been alleged that Turkey provides equipment and military personnel
to not only Azeris but also to Chechens in their struggle against Russia. It is an
interesting phenomenon that numerous solidarity groups have emerged with this intention
of helping Turkic people of the region. As Aras points out “there are an estimated 4-5
million Turkish citizens who regard the peoples of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia,
Georgia, Abkhazia, Azerbaijan and other places as their relatives.”299 These types of
solidarity groups influence the Turkish government as lobbyists. Their demands rank
high on Turkey’s domestic political agenda during the Chechen War, the Abkhazian
crisis and with the entry of Russian troops to Azerbaijan.

The hypothesis that the stronger the socio-cultural ties are between Turkey and
the Turkic states the closer the foreign relations between Turkey and the Turkic countries
are is applicable to all five republics. The Turkic states welcomed Turkey’s educational
and cultural policies with great willingness. In all the republics Turkey has been actively
implementing educational policies. The role of education is crucial in transforming the
economic, political and cultural systems of the former Soviet Republics. Turkish Ministry
of Education and some private groups have opened high schools and universities in these
states. These schools have been able to build up good reputation throughout the region.
Students gain awards from the international scientific contests. Most importantly they
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contribute to the reformation of society as turning into very well behaved and responsible
students.

From a policy perspective, educational projects can be considered as a tool of
Turkish foreign policy. As Yanik mentions the goal is “to create a stratum of people who
will be well versed in Turkish culture and language, which then would act as a bridge
between their countries and Turkey.”300 Other scholars like Akkok and Balci also foresee
that “these schools will serve the political and economic goals of Turkey in relation to the
Central Asian countries.”301 Graduates of these schools are perceived as the pioneers to
establish successful foreign relations with the West and Turkey as well. In short the
politics behind the Turkish schools and student exchange programs is the improvement of
political and cultural relations between Turkey and the republics.

Turkish schools are among the favorites in the region. In these schools students
meet the Western economic and political culture. They learn English, which allow them
to work in any part of the world. It is significant for students to learn about market
economy at a time of their countries’ transition from a centrally planned economy to
market economy. Among the schools founded by Turkey, especially vocational high
schools serve to realize this goal. Students learn the essentials of market economy, which
is something these students are not familiar with as being individuals raised up in a
socialist system. Additionally it is a great opportunity for students to use new
technologies since ex-Soviet republics have fallen behind the developments in agriculture
and industry. Vocational high-schools also provide skilled manpower for the factories as
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well.

Parents are also quite satisfied about the behavioral changes they observe in their
children. The identity formation of both the students and the states give people a hard
time. From this problematic period emerges the use of drugs and alcohol. Thankfully the
educational training, given by devoted Turkish teachers, ameliorates this crisis of society
by turning students into well behaved individuals. The common characteristic features of
the students are “being well-bred, hard working, honest, goal oriented, self-disciplined
and rational individuals who appreciate the modern way of living.”302 These schools have
had a positive influence on the shaping of the students’ identity. As Akkok, Balci and
Demir say parents think that those schools “seemed to fill a value gap which has emerged
in the transition period.”303

Like education, culture is another field that Turkey gives importance to achieve
its policy goals. As London notes “the advantage of cultural exchange probably is the
contact it creates and the possibility that some stereotyped prejudices old or new can be
eliminated.”304

One major goal of Turkey in the area of culture is to promote the Latin alphabet
and Turkish language. All republics except Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan changed their
alphabets. A common alphabet would ease any kind of relationship whether it is political
or economical and a common language would strengthen the Turkic identity and bring
people closer. The switch from Cyrillic to Latin may also be interpreted as a move away
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from the Russian sphere of influence at a time when they want to position themselves in
the post-Soviet space and they want to implement their own unique identities.

Apart from its ideological and political aspect, adopting the Latin alphabet is
practical as well. On this practical side the Latin alphabet is often cited as important for
computer compatibility. As Nazarbayev told to the Assembly of Peoples, "Latin script
dominates in communications”.305 The young and old generations are affected by this
switch in different ways. It is hard for old people, who are the least likely to learn
English, to adapt to the new alphabet. The young generation, on the other hand, has less
difficulty in learning Latin alphabet. Turkey had a similar experience of adoption of a
new script. One of Ataturk’s reforms was to change the Arabic script with the Latin script
in 1938. Like the people in Central Asia, the young Turkish generation found themselves
cut off from their cultural past resulting from the script change. Turkic peoples of the
region experience the same hard transition as well. The future generations will feel
foreign to their literary heritage since the vast majority of literature is in Cyrillic.

Turkey also puts emphasis on institutions which would increase peoples’
consciousness of common Turkic values. Turkey especially offered courses on Turkish
art and opened Turkology departments in universities. It was Turkey’s hope that its
contributions in this field would lead to partnerships in economic and political fields.
Turkey funded projects like printing books or conferences on pan-Turkism not to
revitalize the ideology but to strengthen Turkic identity which would lead to a
rapprochement of Turkic peoples. Local people were quite satisfied with Turkey’s
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contributions in the cultural field. The Turks of the Soviet Union have also been aware of
their common origin with those in the Turkish republics. This has not been destroyed
through time.

As it is apparent from the factors listed above Turkey is in a more advantageous
position than any other country in the world in terms of integrating with the region and
exploiting the potential of the region with its cultural closeness and familiarity of the
language.

Central Asia is an honored region in the Islamic world with its cities of Bukhara
and Samarqand. These cities, which have important Islamic teaching and learning centers
and where famous religious figures have lived, are directly linked with the Islamic
culture. Historically the people of the Eastern Turkish world have been affected by the
developments and initiatives from Istanbul, the former capital of the Caliph and the
Turkish sultans. These people were drown toward Islamic culture and society.

However the offensive period under Soviet control has weakened this link. For
example; Kendzior states that “the Soviet regime had succeeded in curtailing religion in
Uzbekistan by removing its outward manifestations: closing mosques and medreses;
banning sacred texts and languages; outlawing non-state-sanctioned religious leaders and
congregations.”306 Now that the regional countries are free from Soviet rule, people
returned to learning their faith as they had in the past.
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People of the region have made their needs well known to Muslim communities
outside the region. To meet this demand, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs and
some voluntary organizations sent thousands of books on Islam. Today the Turkish
Republic, which is the inheritor of the Islamic civilization, still has influence over the
cultural and religious lives of the Turkic people and pays attention to these peoples’
demands. Fuller says that “As a result there is a profusion of literature in local Central
Asian languages about Islam and its meaning.”307

Generally speaking the strong interest towards Islam is not a consequence of
political Islam emerging from the region but rather it is a way to improve solidarity
between people. In support to this idea Fuller says that “the nomadic traditions of
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan all emphasize traditions of folk
Islam.”308Islam also has the function of strengthening nationalism. In this respect Kazakh
President has mentioned that “Islam could serve to strengthen a sense of Kazakh
nationalism.”309Eventually a combination of Islam and nationalism is likely to strengthen
an awareness of a shared civilization.

With regard to Turkey’s economic interests in the region Turkish trade relations
in the Caspian Sea Region started in 1992. We find that Turkish economy follows a
similar pattern in its relations with the Azerbaijani and Central Asian markets. The values
indicating the total costs of trade volumes are quite close to each other. The only two
countries which reached trade volumes above average are Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
with the former having a $1 billion trade volume and with the latter having a $800
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million trade volume in 2005.

Trade analysis reveals is that Turkey’s trade volume with each of the five Turkic
countries shows an increasing trend only after 2001. This is the result of the two
economic crises: 1998 financial crises of Russia and 2001 economic crise of Turkey.
Foreign trade of the ex-Soviet states was dependent on the Russian economic situation.
During the 1998 economic crises in Russia, people of the region preferred to buy Russian
products, which were cheaper than Turkish products. Presumably half of the Turkish
companies operating in the region were closed. Turkey also experienced a strong
financial crisis in 2001 and this led to the contraction of the economy. Interest rates and
public debt were high and economic growth was volatile. This economic weakness was
inevitably reflected in Turkey’s foreign trade and investment.

The US also gives importance to the economic growth, which is supposed to lead
to political stability, of the regional countries. The US companies are heavily involved in
the infrastructure development projects. Regional economic growth is acknowledged as
one of the important factors that would secure the sovereignty of the regional countries.
In this context there is an improved Turkish-American joint action towards the economic
and political transformation of the Turkic countries.

One common theme that attracts attention when Turkey’s investment capacity in
the region is considered is that Turkey enjoyed the privilege of exploiting the Central
Asian Market in the absence of serious competitors. Post-Soviet Turkic countries are still
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in a transition from Moscow’s command economy to a liberal economy. There are
unstable tariff systems, unsatisfactory banking services and they lack regulating laws.
Some of them have long done business by using their local monetary unit, which does not
exactly match the value of Turkish lira and this may result as loss of money for Turkish
businesspersons. These types of structural problems prevent big companies from doing
business there. Moreover they do not want to take the risk of doing business in an
unstable environment where they encounter high inflation rates, low output, red tape and
bribery, which are the common problems in the regional countries. Another difficulty is
to find qualified labor force. It is a significant problem because mostly it depends on how
qualified workforce is to take progress in running successful production. The regional
countries offer cheap workforce but businesspersons complain that employees are not
working in the way they should work.310 This is a significant issue that needs to be
resolved before demanding that foreign investors engage in business in the area.

An important business field where mostly Turkish entrepreneurs work is building
construction. Turkish people usually built hotels and airports. This can be interpreted as a
way to make the cities like Tashkent or Manas more attractive and welcoming to
foreigners.

The regional economies were mostly based on the agricultural industry and
farmers were producing raw materials for Russia and they have fallen behind
technological developments during the Soviet rule. In relevance with this situation one of
the major product groups that Turkey exports to these countries are electronic devices
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both partial and as a whole. Another major product of Turkey’s exports is automobiles
resulting from the situation that post-Soviet governments cannot respond to the
enterprises in automobile industry and cannot respond to the demand for passenger
automobiles. Many new cars are foreign, exclusively Audi, Mercedes or Volvo. On the
other hand Turkey mostly imports commodities like copper, leather, silk, mineral oil and
cotton from the Turkic countries. Turkey uses cotton, leather and silk for its textile
industry which has an important place in Turkish industry.

Turk Eximbank has done much to stimulate trade and business links in the region.
One point that is common to all five republics is that they received Eximbank credits
from Turkey for their national development projects. Looking at the used partition of the
credits given by Turk Eximbank to the Turkic countries from 1992 to 1998 one can see
how much these countries were in need of economic aid. These credits were used for
national development projects and financing trade. Also they were used for purchasing
emergency needs like medicine and food. Turkey was comfortable in giving hard cash
since these credits were guaranteed under state guarantee letters. This was a mutually
beneficial deal for the republics and for the Turkish entrepreneurs.

While the republics found a funding source to realize their projects, Turkish
exporters received Eximbank credits for their short term projects. Turk Eximbank
encouraged businesspersons to invest in the region.

Common policy goals of Turkey and the five republics led Turkey to establish
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close foreign relations with the regional countries. Turkey tried to give military aid to the
Turkic republics of Central Asia in their struggle against terrorist groups which have the
capacity to destabilize governments to threaten international security and which are
mostly located in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Turkey’s aid substantiated in the form of
sending military equipment and money and also Turkey offered training the military
servicemen through NATO. Particularly after 9/11 Turkey and the regional countries
turned out to be strong partners by signing military agreements within the scope of global
war against terrorism.

The hypothesis that the more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea
Region the more Turkey will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries is mostly
apparent in the case of Azerbaijan. In the area of energy politics Turkey has its strongest
link with Azerbaijan. Moreover, in the area of energy politics, the US shows significant
support for Turkish interests. The US acknowledges Turkey’s concerns for the Bosporus
Straits which is exposed to shipping congestion and environmental risks resulting from
the inconvenient way of the transition of oil in large amounts. As Chufrin notes “ since
1995 the US government has assertively backed this route not only to show support for
Turkey but also because it believe s that such a pipeline enhance economic and political
ties in the region and cement its independence from the undue influences of Russia and
Iran. ”311

Not only oil but also natural gas is exported from Azerbaijan. The two profound
projects that Turkey was able to realize are the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project
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and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline Project.

The BTC Project serves to the interests of Turkey in two ways: It is the first
constructed pipeline which bypasses the Bosporus Straits and Turkey has the privilege of
earning transit and operating fees from this project since the pipeline passes through
Turkish territory.

The Bosporus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the
Dardanelles links the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. This
Turkish waterway is quite busy because of supplying Europe with oil from the Caspian
Sea Region. Increasing number of tankers from the Black Sea can lead to accidents in the
narrow straits. It has become quite risky to use the Bosporus Straits as an energy
transition corridor and Turkey does not want to take this risk anymore by letting pipeline
routes pass through the straits. The BTC Pipeline, on the other hand, extends from the
Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli oilfield of Azerbaijan to Georgia and from there to a terminal at
Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey.

Turkey has oil in the Black, Mediterranean and Aegean Seas but it depends on
foreign companies to extract oil from these areas. British Petrol (BP) or Shell is the two
responsible companies for energy projects in the country. Turkey needs to pay high costs
for the production of oil since national companies. This situation forms an impediment
for Turkey’s economic growth.
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TUPRAS and TPAO are the two national companies for exploration, storage and
refining of oil. However these companies do not have sufficient technology and capital to
exploit Turkey’s resources. Apparently Turkey does not have the privilege to rely solely
on national energy industry for its energy projects. However Turkey may gain well from
doing energy business if it can work with joint ventures to produce oil and gas by being
the major responsible country in the joint venture rather than having a small share in
ventures. One way of convincing foreign companies is to use its energy card wisely by
opening its sources to foreign companies. Actually the Petroleum Market Reform Bill,
which was passed in December 2003 and which aims to liberalize the oil economy, was a
good starting point to attract foreign companies do business in the country.

Turkey has the strongest energy link with Azerbaijan. Not only oil but also natural
gas is exported from Azerbaijan. Turkey needs natural gas for domestic consumption and
Turkey’s first gas supply from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz-Guneshli field started to flow in
2007.

Turkey’s choice of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas exporter country proves that
common socio-cultural ties are important for Turkey in doing business with other states.
Turkey can buy oil from Russia and Iran as well. However Turkey is not comfortable
with these two countries as much as it is comfortable with Azerbaijan. Russia worked to
undermine the Ottoman control in the Balkan region as Sezer says “by acting as the
patron liberator of Balkan peoples most importantly of Greeks and Serbs.” A second
point that causes the two countries nourish negative perceptions of each other is that
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Russia has never supported the nationalist awakening of the Turkic Muslim people in the
early 20th century.

Cultural patterns of Turkey and Russia are quite different with the former based
on an Ottoman-Islamic heritage and the latter based on a Christian- heritage. Moreover
there is a 500-year history between Turkey and Russia and they are considered to be
“archrivals.”312

As far as Iran is concerned Turkey is not enthusiastic to engage in business
relations with this country considering the conflicting relations between Iran and the US,
which is a strong ally of Turkey. Additionally, unlike Azerbaijan, Turkey is different
from Iran in terms of ethnicity and religious sect. Iranians are Persians and mostly Shia
while Turkish people are mostly Sunni.

This study shows an important aspect of the Turkish-American alliance that the
US has considerable presence in the region and its presence has positive impacts on
Turkish policy towards this region. The US has supported both political and economic
interests of Turkey. The NIS is also very interested in forming strong bilateral relations
with the US. As Hunter says, “as the only remaining superpower and leader of the
Western world the US has been extremely important to the Central Asian countries”313
Starting from the 1990s the post-Soviet countries seeked for possible ways to establish
ties with the US at different levels. Hunter explains that “a continuous stream of US
academics, business people, journalists, and non-governmental organizations began
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flowing into Central Asia and there was a reverse flow of similar groups to the
US.”314Apart from these positive impacts of the US on Turkish policy in the Caspian Sea
Region, Turkey and the US share some common goals which are “ensuring that the
region does not become a breeding ground for illicit trafficking in arms, controlled
technologies and drugs or a center of ethnic and religious separatism that could spread
political devolution to other countries like China, Russia, Turkey or South Asia.”315

A final finding that this study shows is about the contextual factors of Turkey and
the regional countries. The contextual factors which act as driving forces of Turkish
policy can be categorized as economic and political factors. The contextual economic
factors Turkey’s need for natural gas and oil, Turkey’s need for new pipelines which
would avoid oil transition through the Bosporus Straits and Turkey’s need for the Central
Asian market to sell its products which can not be sold to Western markets. Turkish
entrepreneurs’ willingness to invest in the region while other foreign companies abstain
from starting business in the region because of the risky business environment is another
contextual factor leading Turkey to move closer to the Caspian Sea Region.

On the political and social level, contextual factors can be listed as follows.
Turkish politicians’ strong will to support their Turkic brothers in cases of trouble as in
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, to try to meet their needs such as books teaching Islam;
voluntary organizations’ efforts to achieve infrastructure projects to contribute to the
regional countries’ national development and Turkish politicians’ eagerness to establish
official ties with the Turkic leaders with whom they share certain characteristics.
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On the other hand the common themes of the internal contexts of the regional
countries are their poor infrastructure inherited from the USSR, their need for technology
and hard currency. On the political level they had a strong desire move away from the
Russian influence and establish their own unique identities. They did not want to be
labeled as ‘isolated’ and for this purpose; they were enthusiastic to establish political ties
with different countries. These factors led them to be open to the rest of the world and at
the same time they avoided coming under the influence of any supra-national ethnic or
religious organization. Lastly; the region’s exposure to terrorist activities is another
contextual factor which leads the states to act against terrorism in cooperation with the
international community.

5.2 Some Questions for Future Studies

Looking back over to this study it is unlikely that Turkey will become a leading
superpower in the region. Turkey lacks the necessary economic and financial resources to
have a major influence in the region. Nevertheless the Turkish government started
initiated various activities directed towards the development of the regional countries.
Turkey offered training services, educational and cultural assistance to the republics.
Turkey gave scholarships to the Turkic students and gave them the opportunity to receive
their college and graduate education in Turkey. Turkish programs were broadcast by
satellite and Turkish development agencies opened numerous cultural centers in the
region. However these policy efforts are insufficient, as Fuller says, “to reorient the
Republics toward Turkey”.316
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Findings showed that both Turkey and the five Turkic republics were enthusiastic
to carry their relations in every field to future cooperation following the break up of the
Soviet Union. The time period between 1991 and 1993 was the period when Turkey had
its closest relations in this region. In that period official and work visits occurred and
several agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation were signed.

Turkey was in a more advantageous position than any other country in the world
in terms of integrating with the region and exploiting the potential of the region with its
cultural closeness and familiarity of the language. However the Turkic Republics’ interest
in Turkey gradually declined starting from the 1994s. One reason for their declining
interest in Turkey is that the original expectations were not met. Winrow notes that
“Turkey initially had made unrealistic promises and proposals by offering up to $3 billion
in support to the Turkic states.”317 Turkey had given promises beyond its capacity. Also
Turkey’s offer of economic success was questionable since Turkey had its own economic
problems at home. In this context some scholars offered that these republics may have
more to gain from the western industrialized nations in terms of economic development
models and technical advice than they will gain from Turkey.318 Other than the West
there are the industrializing nations of East Asia which also offer successful economic
models. The Turkic leaders’ hiring of Korean economists serves as an example of their
appreciation of the advantages offered by East Asian countries.

Actually given Turkey’s economic and political expectations it is not reasonable
to expect Turkey to be a superpower like Russia. Moreover, given the problematic
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domestic environments of the republics, not only Turkey but also none of the regional
states has the resources to give full support to their economic development. Above
everything, the republics need to seek solutions for poverty and turmoil prevailing in their
territories.

The recent Turkish political atmosphere shows that it is more important for the
AKP government to work for long term and stable relationships than to try to fulfill
exaggerated expectations. The AKP government puts more emphasis on economic
cooperation than cultural similarities. We can say that today Central Asian politics is less
central to Turkey than before. But the question is at what level Turkey will maintain
interest in the region in the future. Is Turkey likely to revive its initial enthusiasm towards
the region or is Turkey going to be distracted by its busy foreign policy agenda?

A number of points need to be considered before one can make a prediction. The
future of Turkish foreign relations in the region will mainly be determined by the pipeline
selected for oil and gas transportation from the Caspian Region. The crucial states, in this
regard, are Kazakhstan with its oil reserves and Turkmenistan with its gas reserves. Will
Turkey be able to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan or will Turkey be able to
realize its Kazakh oil transportation project as a back up to the BTC pipeline?

Also Turkey’s future politics will be affected by the actions that Azerbaijan and
Armenia will take towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Will the
Azeri and Armenian side be able to agree on a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
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conflict and normalize their relations? Turkey as the strongest ally of Azerbaijan is likely
to support Azerbaijan fully while at the same time Ankara wants to improve its relations
with Yerevan. It is unlikely to resolve this conflict until the Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians give up claiming their unapproved independence over the enclave and Azeris
accept some limitations over the same territory. With a resolution to this conflict, Turkey
will be able to strengthen its relations with Azerbaijan.

Uzbekistan is criticized in the fields of human rights and democracy. The progress
made in these fields will accelerate the development of Turkish-Uzbek relations.
However Uzbekistan’s human rights records include serious violations of the right to
freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly.319 Although Turkey shares
Uzbekistan’s concerns about Uzbekistan’s security threats and supplies aid and military
education to this country320, Uzbekistan’s weaknesses in the areas of democracy and
human rights are likely to impede Turkish-Uzbek relations in the long term. Therefore it
is important to answer the question of how and when Uzbekistan is going to ameliorate
the domestic situation in human rights and democracy.

Despite the risky business environment in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey is a key economic
partner of Kyrgyzstan. Thus Kyrgyzstan wants to strengthen its relations with Turkey.
The question is whether Turkey and Kyrgyzstan will be able to institutionalize their
economic relations through a joint economic commission as both sides plan to form an
economic cooperation organization.
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An
important issue, which is raised by this study for future exploration, concerns identity.
The regional countries are under the influence of different identities. As Ajdari and
Kazemi mention “these countries borrowed several critical elements from three Islamic
groups; religion from Arabs, administration and bureaucracy from the Persians, and
military from the Turks.321” The question is whether each of the republics will preserve
their own unique nationalities. Will they be a part of the Western system or a Russian
system?
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